Extracts from and notes on Syria Betrayed by Alex J Bellamy

 

 ‘Everybody had their agenda.’
[p1]

 ‘Ahmet Davutoglu proposed a new, independent – some called it “neo-Ottoman” – foreign policy to replace its previous pro-NATO orientation.’
[p17]

 ‘Russia worried that if Assad went the way of Mubarak, that could act as an incubator for reigniting jihadist wars that had claimed tens of thousands of lives in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s.’
[p22]

 ‘Moscow’s ability to influence Assad was therefore limited: it had a sledgehammer to crack a walnut but desperately wanted to keep the walnut intact.’
[p24]



 ‘On February 22 veteran American war correspondent Marie Colvin and French photographer Remi Ochlik were intentionally killed by government rocket fire as they chronicled the systematic assault on civilians. Reports of atrocities by both sides became more common.’
[p56]
 From Paul Wood’s report:
[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16984219]

 ‘Cpl Yousseff was a Christian. After he was taken, his relatives kidnapped six Sunnis, killing one in the process. In return, around 20 Christians were abducted.

 "Some hotheads have been kidnapping Christians," one of the senior FSA commanders in the area told me. "We have got to calm this down."

 After several days of stalemate, everyone was released, unharmed, including Corporal Yousseff.

 Their ID cards showed they were Shabiha (or ghosts) - the hated government paramilitary force.

 "We killed them," he told me.

 "You killed your prisoners?"

 "Yes, of course. They were executed later. That is the policy for Shabiha."

 These were Sunni Shabiha, he added; the only Alawite had escaped.’



 ‘Where the rise of al-Nusra encouraged Riyadh to arm FSA-aligned groups, it fueled Western doubts about the armed opposition’s character and fears any arms they provided might find their way to extremists.’
[p58]

 ‘Lavrov had made it clear in Geneva that a chapter 7 resolution was out of the question. Annan felt “blindsided by the American and British push for a chapter 7 resolution. His strategy relied on keeping Russia inside the tent, using its influence on Assad.’
[p84]

 ‘There was no love lost between the Kurds and the Sunnis.’ [p85]

 ‘Baba_Adzz
@baba_adzz
 Yesterday in Kurdistan, for the eighth year in a row, a hadith competition was held, with the participation of 100,000 Kurdish children from all over Kurdistan. Persian, Turkish, and Arab media outlets have not covered this event, as it contradicts their narrative that portrays Kurds as atheists.’
 [https://twitter.com/baba_adzz/status/1695516850648428738]



 ‘Russia simply did not have that sort of leverage over the Syrian government [p89]

 ‘Western governments had made it abundantly clear they had no appetite for intervention.’
[p90]

 ‘Assad’s strategy, from the start, was to hold on to power.’
[p90]

 ‘Concessions would only have encouraged the régime’s hard-liners.’
[p91]

 ‘The opposition’s foreign backers never coalesced around a strategy of supporting civilian governance. These bodies fought a long defeat against the anarchy, militarization, and extremism wrought by the better funded armed groups.’
[p103]

 ‘Establishing a pattern of thought that chimed well with the president’s own thinking, Dempsey warned a no-fly zone would require the engagement of seventy thousand personnel to dismantle Syria’s air defenses, which he reported, posed a significant threat.’
[p104]

 ‘There are reasons for thinking the president could have been right. There was little immediate prospect of Assad stepping down. Iran and Russia would simply counterescalate their support for Assad. Without political and organizational reform, arming the FSA would not have made it a stronger fighting force. Blowback was inevitable since Western arms would find their way to extremists.’
[p108]

 ‘These military measures would have increased the costs to Tehran and Moscow and deterred them from backing Assad so heavily by convincing them his government was doomed. There are especially good reasons for thinking a no-fly zone would have made a difference. It would have degraded the régime’s ability to drop barrel bombs, regular bombs, and gas-filled bombs on civilians and saved tens of thousands of lives. More than seven years later , Turkey demonstrated the wisdom of this in Idlib.’
[pp108-109]

 “We have already seen inside of Syria that -- or groups like ISIL that right now are fighting with other extremist groups, or an Assad regime that was non-responsive to a Sunni majority there, that that has attracted more and more jihadists or would-be jihadists, some of them from Europe.”
[https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq]



 ’The Qataris and Saudis hobbled Syria’s opposition by sowing discord and fragmentation, denying Syrians the ability to speak for themselves. The two Gulf states had been allowed to play this inflated role because the United States and other western powers had no realistic strategy.’
[p117]

 ‘The opposition scored some major victories, including in March 2013 when it seized its first provincial capital, Raqqa, a host of towns on the Homs-Aleppo highway, and the main hydroelectric dams on the Euphrates, victories made possible by the active participation of jihadist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.’
[p119]



 In May 2013, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived in Washington, to press the United States to show leadership on Syria. Having been browbeaten by Obama into calling for Assad to step aside, Erdogan expected the American president to lead efforts to achieve that goal and specifically hoped to persuade Obama to permit arming of the rebels and a no-fly zone over northern Syria. Obama dismissed Erdogan’s proposals and instead insisted Turkey do more to stem the flow of extremists to Syria.’ Note “Syria’s PKK-aligned Kurds”.
[pp126-127]

 ‘Corbyn chaired an activist coalition – “Stop the War” – which not only opposed Western military intervention in Syria (though not Russian or Iranian intervention) but also hosted speakers who claimed the dead children of Ghouta were merely asleep, props in an elaborate stage show.’
[p134]



 ‘By rejecting the use of force, Washington sacrificed potential leverage without creating significant change. It also effectively dealt itself out of leadership of international efforts to end Syria’s bloodshed, creating an political vacuum into which Russia inserted itself. Although nobody could have known it at the time, comprehensive strikes that degraded Syrian air defences and secured the U.S. control of Syria’s skies would have denied these skies to Russia.’
[p146]

 ‘The opposition tied itself in knots, the SOC unsure whether to participate. On the one hand, it wanted to preserve whatever international support it had and knew it risked losing sympathy if it refused to talk. On the other hand, it saw little point in further talks while the government refused to accept the Geneva communiqué and continued using force.

 The SOC was finding it difficult to sell that message to Syria’s increasingly disenchanted and fragmented armed opposition. In the South, up to seventy FSA-aligned groups renounced their affiliation with pro-Geneva II factions. Things got worse when, in late October, Abu Eissa al-Sheikh, leader of a coalition of Islamic factions that included the powerful Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and Liwa al-Tawhid and comprised some forty thousand to seventy thousand soldiers, not only rejected the talks but warned that any who did not follow suit risked committing “treason”.‘
[p150]

 ‘The UN’s high commissioner for human rights, Navi Pillay, detailed the deliberate targeting of hospitals and medical personnel by government forces. The Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council resolved to condemn these and other violations of international humanitarian law and demand humanitarian access. Laudable as they were, these efforts, too, made little difference.’
[p153]

 ‘Seven of the largest Islamist groups formed the Islamic Front hoping to counter the influence of ISIS and other al-Qaeda allies. Since Islamists looked basically alike to Western governments, this initiative only seemed to confirm the opposition’s drift towards extremism.’
[p156]

 ‘The FSA and Islamic Front patched up their differences and began joint operations – a sensible move to enhance the opposition’s operational capacity, but one that challenged the neat separation of opposition forces into moderates and extremists in the minds of Western governments.
[p158]

 ‘Few in the West seemed to notice Syrian opposition mobilization against ISIS. Almost nothing was done {to] support them, and it did little to correct the Western view that the opposition was tainted by association with extremism.’
[p159]

 ‘Al-Nusra regularly used car bombings in régime-controlled areas of the city to relieve the pressure, but their targets and victims were mostly civilians.’
[p164] Source Sam Dagher

 ‘Homs became a model for government operations as, in city after city, government forces bombarded and starved them into submission, and then negotiated the evacuation of whoever was left alive. In all this, the UN team at the Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus helped. They delivered aid to government areas but not besieged areas, deposited millions directly into government and Assad-family bank accounts, and facilitated the final evacuations, which completed the forced displacement of civilians opposed to Assad.’
[pp166-167]

 ‘ “The opposition didn’t represent anybody; for them, getting rid of al-Assad would resolve all issues.” Brahimi’s criticism of the SOC seems harsh. Jarba and his team were never given the opportunity to represent Syrians, nor did they demand anything beyond what they thought had already been agreed.’
[p167]

 ‘Even those who rejected al-Nusra’s Islamist ideology acknowledged that it was at least a committed and determined opponent to Assad.’
[p198]

 ‘Bab al-Salam in Idlib governate and Bab al-Hawa in Aleppo.’
[p204]

 ‘A government offensive on the outposts of Nubl and al-Zahraa was led by foreign fighters.’
[p209]

 ‘Mindful of ISIS, and worried about the YPG’s deepening co-operation with the United States, Ankara desperately wanted the opposition in the North to do more to confront Assad and hold back ISIS. It increased the supply of arms to Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham. Leaders representing some seventy-two factions gathered in the Turkish city of Gazientep, and agreed to form a Revolutionary Command Council to coordinate military operations.

Encouraged, Turkish intelligence urged Ahrar al-Sham to reach out to other opposition groups in neighbouring Idlib.Qatar and Saudi Arabia joined forces to support the initiative. Dozens of groups, including al-Nusra, joined the new Idlib coalition, known as Jaysh al-Fatah.

 Encouraged by Turkey, the opposition in the North showed clear signs it was finding ways of cooperating more effectively. The effects would not be slow to show themselves.’
[p211]

 ‘Things looked even more promising in the South. In early 2014 the US-run Military Operations Center in Amman had summoned more than fifty southern-based secular and moderate factions. They had agreed to form the Southern Front to challenge both Assad and ISIS/al-Nusra. The new front had a lot going for it. Its secular leadership pledged to uphold the laws of war and protect minorities, and generally avoid ideological posturing, presenting itself as a military coalition dedicated to overthrowing Assad. It began work on a plan to take Daraa.’
[p212]

 ‘On April 1 ISIS stormed the besieged Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp. The extremists took control after two days of intense fighting with both pro-FSA and progovernment militias. Unusually, al-Nusra, which also had an armed presence in the camp, refused to get involved, effectively aligning itself with ISIS.’
[p215]



 ‘A rare joint FSA-YPG offensive, backed by US airpower, drove ISIS out of Tal Abyad.’
[p216]
 What happened when they got there: ‘After FSA arrived to Tal Abyad, YPG is kicking them out. No a single FSA batallion is allowed to enter Tal Abyad.’

[https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2015/06/24/syria-raqqa-and-western-al-hassake-rif-the-truth-behind-the-cleansing-video/]

 ‘Southern Storm [Daraa 2015] persuaded everyone that neither side was close to victory.’
[p222]

 ‘All this helped ISIS by weakening its principal foe (the mainstream opposition) and forcing moderates to align more closely with jihadists.’
[p243]
 Link to Lister: ‘Moscow’s ill defined fight against “terrorism” was set to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Syria’s genuine moderate opposition began coordinating more closely with al-Qaeda and other similar jihadist factions. Rather than fighting jihadist militancy, Russia’s military intervention was fueling it like never before.’
[The Syrian Jihad p369]



 ‘By 2016 the last remaining rebel strongholds in Latakia were cleared out.’
[p243]

 ‘On Christmas Day a Syrian government air strike in Ghouta killed Jaysh al-Islam’s commander, Zahran Alloush.’
[p243]



 ‘The defenders set hundreds of tires alight, hoping the smoke would prevent or misdirect the air attacks. All it did was choke themselves.’
[p280]

 ‘The government suspended its co-operation, demanding the rebels give up the besieged villages of al-Fuah and Kafraya.’
[p282]

 ‘Of the outside powers professing sympathy for Syrians tormented by their government, only Turkey put up any meaningful resistance.’
[p288]

 ‘Russia delivered sophisticated Pantsir anti-aircraft systems to Syria.’
[p298]

 ‘Ahrar al-Sham and Tahrir al-Sham also had a presence amid the ruined tenement blocks. HTS never had an armed presence in eastern Ghouta.
[p304]

 ‘The Syrians responded with S-200 surface-to-air missiles but failed to hit any of the aircraft.’
[p304]



 ‘The very real risks of mission creep were forcefully demonstrated when an armed group comprising Syrian government forces, Iranian-trained Afghan militia, and Russian mercenaries belonging to the Wagner Group approached an SDF headquarters housing US Special Operations Forces in Khasham. Most put government-side losses at between eighty and one hundred fighters, twenty to thirty of them Russian mercenaries. For Damascus and its allies, the incident was a sharp reminder of their vulnerability; for Washington , a warning it might be dragged into fighting on behalf of the SDF.’
[p318]
 “To make it short, we’ve had our fucking asses kicked,” one Wagner Group veteran reportedly says in a recording. “Yeah so, one squadron fucking lost 200 people immediately … Another one lost 10 people, and I don’t know about the third squadron, but it got torn up pretty badly too … They tore us to pieces.”

Marine artillery support was vital to the fight against Syrian forces and mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group in the Battle of Khasham. US Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Matthew Callahan.

 The lopsided American victory worked as a deterrent a month later when another group of Syrian fighters and Russian mercenaries began a similar buildup near American forces along the Euphrates. This time, when Mattis called his Russian counterpart, the enemy force dispersed, successfully avoiding a second curb-stomping.

 The Wagner Group is trained at Russian Defense Ministry bases, and the group’s leaders have received awards in the Kremlin, but Russia downplayed its involvement in the engagement that’s come to be known as the Battle of Khasham. Russia claimed the clash was a result of American aggression.

 Similar Russian misinformation is rampant in the war in Ukraine, and like in the Battle of Khasham, Russia’s numerical superiority isn’t translating to tactical success. In hindsight, perhaps Russia’s humiliating defeat in Syria was a sign of what was to come in Ukraine, where many analysts predicted Russia would “steamroll” that nation’s military and defense forces.
[https://coffeeordie.com/wagner-group-syria-khasham]

 ‘Most civilians and fighters fled before the advancing forces. Those who did not were forced out soon after, an almost complete exercise of ethnic cleansing that depopulated Afrin’s Kurdish community.’
[p320]

 ‘The strikes were too limited to have much material effect on Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities, and though it may be claimed they restored deterrence, this was only a temporary effect – Assad’s forces began using chemical weapons again the following May.’
[p330]

 ‘Ankara feared Idlib’s collapse would trigger a new refugee crisis and present the Kurds another opportunity for territorial growth. But stability meant somehow loosening the extremists’ grip.’
[p338]

‘Turkey agreed to use its influence to dissolve Idlib’s HTS-led administration and replace it with a new civilian authority.’
[p341]

 ‘The extremists tried to win a seat at the international table by offering the government a deal granting access to the highways.’
[p343]



 ‘Amid the chaos in Tall Abyad, nearly eight hundred ISIS prisoners broke free from a detention camp – a predictable, and predicted, consequence of the Turkish intervention.’
[p360]

‘The United States lost the opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat on ISIS.’
[p362]

 ‘The balance of power between the two sides had changed dramatically. This made it much more likely that the Kurds could be persuaded to accept a political settlement with Damascus.’
[p363]

‘Far from stimulating the return of displaced Syrians, Erdogan’s operation displaced 300,000 more. Those who remained were subjected to killings, sexual violence, and looting by Turkish-backed Islamist militia.’
[p364]

‘By late 2019 the Assad government was well on its way toward re-establishing its international position. Recognizing Assad had all but prevailed, Syria’s Gulf Arab neighbours began normalizing relations with the government.’
[p366]

 ‘At the end of 2019 the situation remained uncertain, because of the ad hoc efforts of a couple of international actors, and the growing exhaustion of the régime and its allies.’
[p368]

‘Russian and Syrian forces attempted once again to impose a military solution on Idlib. Turkey countered with its own military and stopped the government in its tracks.’

‘The longer the enclave held out, the more entrenched its defenders might become, and the more stable its manner of governing, a potential beacon for future resistance.’
[p370]

 ‘Damascus worried that if it left the NLF and SNA to fester, they might displace the extremist HTS and win international legitimacy. This was precisely what Turkey wanted to engineer.’
[pp370-371]

 ‘Government forces made steady progress, which turned into a rout largely because HTS withdrew to more defensible positions in hilly areas.’
[p373]



 ‘Starting on February 28, Turkish forces unleashed a barrage of artillery and drone strikes against more than two hundred Syrian government and Hezbollah targets, including Russian mercenaries and proxies, causing one hundred to three hundred casualties and destroying dozens of tanks, APCs and ammunition stores.’
[p379]

 ‘There is no doubt Turkey’s intervention inflicted a heavy toll, stalled the government offensive, and exposed its military fragility.’
[p380]

 ‘The government side could not withstand the sort of losses inflicted by Turkey for long without serious repercussions.’
[p381]

 ‘The settling of scores in Idlib will likely prove to be one of the catalysts for Syria’s next civil war.’
[p382]



 ‘There were rumors of a plot to remove Assad. Perhaps sensing this, the president reined in his cousin Rami Makhlouf. One theory suggests Makhlouf’s fall from grace stemmed from a conflict with Assad, another holds that Russia demanded the oligarch’s fall, concerned Makhlouf was a divisive figure and economic competitor.’
[p384]

 ‘The United Nations, an increasing number of governments, and even some human rights-focused NGOs believe an authoritarian peace is possible, that Assad victorious can be persuaded to reform, and his terrorized people persuaded to meekly accept their fate. They are wrong. The war will most likely continue until there is a reckoning with Assad and his allies.’
[p385]

 ‘To think that some sort of compromise was possible, was to misunderstand the personalized and patrimonial nature of the Assad régime.’
[p388]

 ‘The story is also one of the UN’s inexorable descent into political irrelevance and complicity with evil.’
[p389]

 

Why areas outside of regime control are faring better amid Syria's economic crisis

 

 'Anti-régime protests in southern Syria are closing out their second week. These protests were initially triggered by the government's decision to slash fuel subsidies, even as the régime tried to mitigate the impact by doubling the salaries of government workers.

 Meanwhile, in the areas beyond the régime's grip — stretching from the northeast autonomous administration to the northwest salvation government and Turkish-backed councils— sporadic protests have emerged against their respective de facto authorities over the years.

 However, the ongoing surge of anti-régime protests has not directly triggered similar demonstrations against the predominant de facto authorities in other regions of the country. Instead, residents in these areas have joined together in solidarity with, and extended support to, those protesting against the régime.

 This phenomenon can be attributed to the perception that inhabitants in non-government-controlled zones view their de facto authorities as a more tolerable option compared to the régime — further solidifying opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

 Nonetheless, it's important to note that living conditions for residents in territories controlled by the régime are considerably more dire than in other regions. This disparity endures despite the advantage of established state structures in government-held areas, in contrast to newly constructed frameworks in other locations that were initiated with limited resources and knowledge.



 In 2017, the Syrian Salvation Government (SG) emerged in the Idlib governorate and rural Aleppo, with HTS's endorsement and support. The group's influence over the SG extends beyond its military presence, as it grants access to revenues generated or managed by the group. In exchange, HTS utilises the SG to establish administrative control over the region.

 The SG comprises a prime minister and 11 ministers, who, in turn, rely on technical directorates and administrative councils to govern the territories. Technical directorates are manned by appointed personnel, while local councils theoretically emerge from local community elections to ensure grassroots participation in local governance.

 Additionally, a Shura Council exists, serving as a theoretical legislative body (akin to a parliament) responsible for overseeing the SG.

 While elections are nominally conducted for Shura and administrative councils, many perceive these processes as mere formalities. Successful candidates are often predetermined by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and its affiliates.

 Furthermore, the governance model of the Salvation Government centralises decision-making authority at a higher level. Consequently, service directorates primarily implement policies and programmes devised by their respective line ministries, which are under the dominance of HTS.



 Turkish-backed territories encompass Azaz and regions under Turkey's Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch military operations.

 These semi-autonomous councils possess substantial executive authority within their domains — largely due to Turkey's significant financial and managerial engagement. Financially, these councils depend on revenues generated from border and frontline crossings, supplemented by financial support from Turkey.

 Officially, the association between these councils and the Turkish government revolves around financial and technical assistance. Yet, Turkey's direct and substantial on-ground engagement empowers it to exert substantial influence over council decision-making.

 The day-to-day council management is overseen by Turkish-appointed administrators, who station representatives or advisors to collaborate with the councils.

  These advisors — often experts in fields such as healthcare, education, and finance — are government-designated professionals. They occupy relevant council offices and work closely with their respective heads.

 Unlike other areas, where nominal elections occur, local council members in these regions are reportedly appointed following consultations among local leaders, armed factions, and Turkish officials.



 Originating in 2012 within Kurdish-majority regions of Hasakah governorate, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration expanded after the military defeat of the Islamic State (IS) to encompass areas like Manbij, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor.

 This organisational structure comprises seven self-governing regions, also known as cantons: Afrin, Jazira, Euphrates, Raqqa, Tabqa, Manbij, and Deir Ez-Zor.

 In 2018, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) emerged to coordinate and oversee these seven regional administrations. Acting as the highest authority, the AANES consists of an Executive Council (handling governance) and a Legislative Council (performing parliamentary duties).

 The Regional Executive Council's structure and functioning mirror those of the AANES. While executive powers are officially decentralised across various administrative tiers — from regional to canton/province councils, areas, districts, and local councils —practical implementation appears to be more centralised. High-level council approval often precedes the execution of decisions.

 Underneath this formal governance structure, an informal or shadow framework exists led by Kurdish commanders known as "kadros." These individuals exert significant influence over pivotal strategic and policy choices.

 Although local communities are theoretically responsible for electing civilian administrative council members, reality veers from theory. Appointments often stem from consultations with local figures, rather than through popular vote, across both regional and central bodies.



 With its grip on governing structures weakening in regions outside its direct control, the régime increasingly sought to bolster its authority over state institutions within its held areas.

 This resulted in a more inflexible and interventionist approach to the day-to-day functioning of state institutions. Even with the introduction of Law No. 107 in August 2011, which aimed to facilitate decentralisation of power and establish a foundation for local administration in régime-controlled territories, implementation of this law has remained largely dormant.

 The central office of the Presidency continues to play a paramount role in shaping public policies and enacting laws and regulations for streamlined execution. While the government and parliament can offer input, their authority to modify laws proposed by the Presidency is limited, if it even exists.

 Residents have — at times and to various degrees — demonstrated against the policies and performance of de facto authorities in their respective areas. However, it remains true that all these entities have succeeded in providing better living conditions than the Damascus government.



 Despite the complexity of a comprehensive analysis, we have distilled this evaluation into two crucial benchmarks: salaries and services.

 In Syrian government-controlled areas, wages remain strikingly low, even with a recent increase. The average civil servant's salary barely scrapes $22. In contrast, the average earnings within SDF territories, boosted by recent salary hikes, exceed $85.

 Meanwhile, public servants in Turkish-backed regions witnessed their most recent raise in December 2022, elevating their average income to around $92. Meanwhile, in regions administered by HTS, the average salary for public servants hovers at approximately $90.



 It is important to note that the actual value of these salaries varies in accordance with the frequency of increases and the volatility of the currency used. Turkish Lira governs in HTS and Turkish-backed areas, while other regions rely on the Syrian Lira. Nonetheless, it's clear that the government disburses only a quarter of what public servants in other regions receive.

 To comprehensively gauge the practical buying power of these salaries, the considerable disparity in food prices across regions warrants emphasis.

 In SDF-controlled areas, food prices are relatively more reasonable compared to régime-held territories. Conversely, areas under opposition control boast the most affordable costs in Syria.

 Meanwhile, bread and fuel shortages are gripping certain regions, a significance that warrants further elaboration.

 In regions under the oversight of HTS and Turkish forces, these essential commodities are generally available in the market. However, it's essential to emphasise that fuel prices in these territories are not subsidised by de facto authorities.

 In regions controlled by the SDF, a similar pattern emerges — albeit with intermittent fuel shortages — sparking points of contention.

 Nevertheless, these scarcities tend to be short-lived.

 Past grievances have also revolved around queuing for bread purchases and concerns about the adequacy of allocated rations. In response, the autonomous administration has recently heightened per-person bread allocations by a significant 25%.

 It's worth noting that the commitment of the autonomous administration extends to providing subsidised fuel and cooking gas rations. However, concerns persist regarding delays in delivery.

 In stark contrast, fuel and bread scarcities in régime-held areas have solidified into persistent, protracted challenges.

 The government, on its part, distributes petroleum products and cooking gas at subsidised rates. However, reports of significant delays are widespread, along with complaints about inefficiencies in ration quantities.

 Amidst the divergences in income, purchasing power, and access to essential services, Syrians throughout the country are facing an ongoing battle to make ends meet.

 Consequently, the momentum behind protests against the ruling authorities is expected to continue — albeit with varying intensity — as long as families grapple with the unmet demands of their basic necessities.

 Moreover, a significant number of people will continue to seek better prospects abroad, despite the mounting expenses and heightened risks involved.'

Syrian protests enter second week with calls for Assad to go

 

 'A spate of protests and strikes across government-held areas in southern Syria have continued into their second week, with demonstrators increasingly unafraid to call for the removal of the president, Bashar al-Assad.

 Protesters gathered in the southern city of Suwayda on Monday, closing provincial roads. The province of Suwayda has remained under government control since Syria’s 2011 uprising and is home to much of the country’s Druze minority.



 Video shared by the activist-led organisation Suwayda24 showed several hundred people gathered in a central square waving Druze flags and chanting “long live Syria, and down with Bashar al-Assad”.

 Another video circulating online showed activists chanting on Sunday evening after welding shut the doors of a branch of the ruling Ba’ath party in the town of Melh in the east of Suwayda province.

 One protester explained that they targeted the building due to its role in suppressing previous protests calling for an increase in basic services such as water and electricity.

 He then directed his cries towards the Syrian president, who has worked to stamp out all dissent since protests against his rule first erupted in 2011. “From Melh we call on you, Bashar al-Assad … we say leave, we don’t want you, you’re going to fall.”

 He added: “You have two options: either you leave with your dignity, or you are destined to die.”

 Protests spurred by a rise in fuel prices and anger at economic corruption and mismanagement quickly morphed into anti-government demonstrations, including repeated calls for Assad to leave. Demonstrations have grown steadily throughout Syria’s south.

 In Suwayda, people held signs citing a UN security council resolution demanding a transitional government, or calling for the release of thousands that have been forcibly disappeared by the Syrian security apparatus since protests first gripped the country 12 years ago.

 “Suwayda hasn’t witnessed a civil strike and movement like this before. People don’t want reforms. This régime is not able to provide people with any of their needs,” said Rayan Marouf, the exiled head of Suwayda24.

 “These protests have awakened hope in Syrians. Their demands are clear, and no one is making economic demands. People in Suwayda also protested over the past few years and nothing changed.”

 Marouf emphasised that the renewed protests were about calls for political change, rather than economic grievances that saw smaller protests in Suwayda in previous years.

 “If they wanted economic reforms they would have protested differently, they would have taken to the streets, for example, and tried to break into banks, or called for a change of ministers and to bring back fuel subsidies. They wouldn’t have attacked the Ba’ath party offices, one of its few functioning branches in Syria. People want Assad to go,” he said.

 The demonstrations in majority Druze areas, which have drawn support from local clerics and other groups in the area, like Bedouin, represent a further blow to the Assad régime, which has long touted its defence of the country’s minorities.

 The Syrian pound has hit historic lows throughout the summer, plummeting to almost 15,000 to the dollar on the black market, depreciating threefold since its value late last year. The government continues to hike wages amid a costly restructuring plan on subsidies for basic goods, including bread and petrol.

 The United Nations said in June that Syria’s 12-year conflict had pushed 90% of its remaining population over the poverty line, amid rising food costs and cuts to electricity and fuel.

 Despite efforts by Assad to oversee a return to the Arab League and re-establish relations with former foes in the Gulf, his control over Syrian territory remains fractured and a profound economic crisis persists.

 The government has offered little comment on the protests, apart from the state’s head of reconciliation, Omar Rahmoun, who posted on social media to accuse protesters of acting as a conduit for extremist groups.

 Damascus has blamed its collapsing economy on western sanctions, which increased following documentation of war crimes committed by the Assad régime as well as its role in the regional drug trade.

 Marouf said the protests show Assad’s efforts at control have done little to quell public anger, even in government-held areas. “People want a fair government, and al-Assad’s régime is incapable of giving his people that. Whatever this régime does it won’t be enough for his people,” he said.

 “The world thinks that Bashar al-Assad has won after being readmitted to the Arab League, but it’s those on the ground who decide whether he’s a legitimate ruler or not.” '