Why areas outside of regime control are faring better amid Syria's economic crisis

 

 'Anti-régime protests in southern Syria are closing out their second week. These protests were initially triggered by the government's decision to slash fuel subsidies, even as the régime tried to mitigate the impact by doubling the salaries of government workers.

 Meanwhile, in the areas beyond the régime's grip — stretching from the northeast autonomous administration to the northwest salvation government and Turkish-backed councils— sporadic protests have emerged against their respective de facto authorities over the years.

 However, the ongoing surge of anti-régime protests has not directly triggered similar demonstrations against the predominant de facto authorities in other regions of the country. Instead, residents in these areas have joined together in solidarity with, and extended support to, those protesting against the régime.

 This phenomenon can be attributed to the perception that inhabitants in non-government-controlled zones view their de facto authorities as a more tolerable option compared to the régime — further solidifying opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

 Nonetheless, it's important to note that living conditions for residents in territories controlled by the régime are considerably more dire than in other regions. This disparity endures despite the advantage of established state structures in government-held areas, in contrast to newly constructed frameworks in other locations that were initiated with limited resources and knowledge.



 In 2017, the Syrian Salvation Government (SG) emerged in the Idlib governorate and rural Aleppo, with HTS's endorsement and support. The group's influence over the SG extends beyond its military presence, as it grants access to revenues generated or managed by the group. In exchange, HTS utilises the SG to establish administrative control over the region.

 The SG comprises a prime minister and 11 ministers, who, in turn, rely on technical directorates and administrative councils to govern the territories. Technical directorates are manned by appointed personnel, while local councils theoretically emerge from local community elections to ensure grassroots participation in local governance.

 Additionally, a Shura Council exists, serving as a theoretical legislative body (akin to a parliament) responsible for overseeing the SG.

 While elections are nominally conducted for Shura and administrative councils, many perceive these processes as mere formalities. Successful candidates are often predetermined by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and its affiliates.

 Furthermore, the governance model of the Salvation Government centralises decision-making authority at a higher level. Consequently, service directorates primarily implement policies and programmes devised by their respective line ministries, which are under the dominance of HTS.



 Turkish-backed territories encompass Azaz and regions under Turkey's Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch military operations.

 These semi-autonomous councils possess substantial executive authority within their domains — largely due to Turkey's significant financial and managerial engagement. Financially, these councils depend on revenues generated from border and frontline crossings, supplemented by financial support from Turkey.

 Officially, the association between these councils and the Turkish government revolves around financial and technical assistance. Yet, Turkey's direct and substantial on-ground engagement empowers it to exert substantial influence over council decision-making.

 The day-to-day council management is overseen by Turkish-appointed administrators, who station representatives or advisors to collaborate with the councils.

  These advisors — often experts in fields such as healthcare, education, and finance — are government-designated professionals. They occupy relevant council offices and work closely with their respective heads.

 Unlike other areas, where nominal elections occur, local council members in these regions are reportedly appointed following consultations among local leaders, armed factions, and Turkish officials.



 Originating in 2012 within Kurdish-majority regions of Hasakah governorate, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration expanded after the military defeat of the Islamic State (IS) to encompass areas like Manbij, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor.

 This organisational structure comprises seven self-governing regions, also known as cantons: Afrin, Jazira, Euphrates, Raqqa, Tabqa, Manbij, and Deir Ez-Zor.

 In 2018, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) emerged to coordinate and oversee these seven regional administrations. Acting as the highest authority, the AANES consists of an Executive Council (handling governance) and a Legislative Council (performing parliamentary duties).

 The Regional Executive Council's structure and functioning mirror those of the AANES. While executive powers are officially decentralised across various administrative tiers — from regional to canton/province councils, areas, districts, and local councils —practical implementation appears to be more centralised. High-level council approval often precedes the execution of decisions.

 Underneath this formal governance structure, an informal or shadow framework exists led by Kurdish commanders known as "kadros." These individuals exert significant influence over pivotal strategic and policy choices.

 Although local communities are theoretically responsible for electing civilian administrative council members, reality veers from theory. Appointments often stem from consultations with local figures, rather than through popular vote, across both regional and central bodies.



 With its grip on governing structures weakening in regions outside its direct control, the régime increasingly sought to bolster its authority over state institutions within its held areas.

 This resulted in a more inflexible and interventionist approach to the day-to-day functioning of state institutions. Even with the introduction of Law No. 107 in August 2011, which aimed to facilitate decentralisation of power and establish a foundation for local administration in régime-controlled territories, implementation of this law has remained largely dormant.

 The central office of the Presidency continues to play a paramount role in shaping public policies and enacting laws and regulations for streamlined execution. While the government and parliament can offer input, their authority to modify laws proposed by the Presidency is limited, if it even exists.

 Residents have — at times and to various degrees — demonstrated against the policies and performance of de facto authorities in their respective areas. However, it remains true that all these entities have succeeded in providing better living conditions than the Damascus government.



 Despite the complexity of a comprehensive analysis, we have distilled this evaluation into two crucial benchmarks: salaries and services.

 In Syrian government-controlled areas, wages remain strikingly low, even with a recent increase. The average civil servant's salary barely scrapes $22. In contrast, the average earnings within SDF territories, boosted by recent salary hikes, exceed $85.

 Meanwhile, public servants in Turkish-backed regions witnessed their most recent raise in December 2022, elevating their average income to around $92. Meanwhile, in regions administered by HTS, the average salary for public servants hovers at approximately $90.



 It is important to note that the actual value of these salaries varies in accordance with the frequency of increases and the volatility of the currency used. Turkish Lira governs in HTS and Turkish-backed areas, while other regions rely on the Syrian Lira. Nonetheless, it's clear that the government disburses only a quarter of what public servants in other regions receive.

 To comprehensively gauge the practical buying power of these salaries, the considerable disparity in food prices across regions warrants emphasis.

 In SDF-controlled areas, food prices are relatively more reasonable compared to régime-held territories. Conversely, areas under opposition control boast the most affordable costs in Syria.

 Meanwhile, bread and fuel shortages are gripping certain regions, a significance that warrants further elaboration.

 In regions under the oversight of HTS and Turkish forces, these essential commodities are generally available in the market. However, it's essential to emphasise that fuel prices in these territories are not subsidised by de facto authorities.

 In regions controlled by the SDF, a similar pattern emerges — albeit with intermittent fuel shortages — sparking points of contention.

 Nevertheless, these scarcities tend to be short-lived.

 Past grievances have also revolved around queuing for bread purchases and concerns about the adequacy of allocated rations. In response, the autonomous administration has recently heightened per-person bread allocations by a significant 25%.

 It's worth noting that the commitment of the autonomous administration extends to providing subsidised fuel and cooking gas rations. However, concerns persist regarding delays in delivery.

 In stark contrast, fuel and bread scarcities in régime-held areas have solidified into persistent, protracted challenges.

 The government, on its part, distributes petroleum products and cooking gas at subsidised rates. However, reports of significant delays are widespread, along with complaints about inefficiencies in ration quantities.

 Amidst the divergences in income, purchasing power, and access to essential services, Syrians throughout the country are facing an ongoing battle to make ends meet.

 Consequently, the momentum behind protests against the ruling authorities is expected to continue — albeit with varying intensity — as long as families grapple with the unmet demands of their basic necessities.

 Moreover, a significant number of people will continue to seek better prospects abroad, despite the mounting expenses and heightened risks involved.'