"The SDF cannot do anything without the Americans. It can take some movement on the side. The Americans could allow this: “see the régime, see the Russians,” Ismail says. There are relations between the SDF and the Russians, logistical in certain points, and the US gives a bit of space, but as a result, it doesn’t do anything without US consent, likewise for the régime
The SDF tries to hand over areas to the régime, and this is leaked news from their circles, and they also announce it before the Turks come, to hand over areas to the régime. The régime is preferable for the SDF in comparison to Turkey. I do not know to what degree the Americans agreed or not
The relations with the régime are of two types. Relations between the PKK and the régime are ongoing and have not stopped for a single day, and they exist at all levels. The SDF’s relations with the régime, as well as their tactics with the régime, are what the US allows them to do on the sidelines. So, they will not bother the Americans.
Sabri Ok, visited Damascus recently. He is a Turkish PKK. He lives inside inside Syria, of course, how can one go to Damascus and go back?"
Abdallah al-Hafi, the Kurdish-Arab Syrian Local Councils Unit Director in Azaz:
"In the Western part of Northern Syria, the YPG coordinates with the Russians, while in the east with the American. There was a before Ayn Daqna, and there was an after Ayn Daqna. There was no intention of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to enter Afrin. There were no problems at all. Not between the Assad -opposed Kurds and the Assad -opposed rebels. Firstly, the YPG made a Russian base in Afrin, in Kafr Janna, and Russia entered. Secondly, when the régime was besieged in Nubul and Zahraa, they let them escape. Thirdly, there was Ayn Daqna. It became a war. One sees his brother’s corpse, or his cousin’s, or his friend’s, and the YPG militants put the corpses on a loader and parade them. After that, it was over. The peace ended. They tried to take Azaz, if they could.
The battle for Tel Rif’at was with Russian and régime airplanes bombing Tel Rif’at, and on the ground, the Kurdish YPG took it. There was coordination between Russia, the régime, and the YPG. The bombing caused the people to flee, and there was a total war in the area. They organized it completely. Furthermore, the Russians have a military base in Tel Rif’at, and régime soldiers entered Tel Rif’at. The same happened in Afrin. This is proof that they are coordinating among each other."
The defected security director of Qamishli, in Syria’s northeast Hasakah province:
"I got orders to hand over all police departments to the PYD/YPG. We even handed them the new weapons and equipment we received months ago."
Koran Ahmad, the Kurdish chairman of the board of Bahar, an NGO working in opposition-held and SDF-held parts of northern Syria:
"It was in June or July 2012, the PYD announced a curfew, so the people wouldn’t leave the house. We heard a few shots. I was standing on the balcony, there was nothing on the ground. Two hours later, they said we had the victory over the régime and we took the areas. Now, there is no Syrian régime here anymore. And really, the next day, when we went out on the street, the régime wasn’t there anymore. So, this happened within one day? Within three or four hours, not a day. They said we won from the régime with the fact that the régime elements stayed but changed their clothes from military to civil and stayed among the people. Afrin was special in all of northern Syria. There were seven security branches. Even military security was present in Afrin. State security, criminal and political security, etc., were all present in Afrin."
Rena Netjes:
"From the early 1980s until 1988, Hafez al-Assad’s régime hosted the PKK in Yafour, Zabadani, and Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. Assad’s objective in supporting the PKK was to gain leverage over its much larger northern neighbor, so as to influence various territorial and water disputes. The PKK’s long-standing presence highlights the contrast between the Syrian régime’s treatment of domestic Kurdish political and militant activity and its treatment of externally-oriented Kurdish political and militant activity on Syrian soil. The former was harshly suppressed in most cases; the latter was supported. Such support was naturally conditioned on the PKK staying out of Syria’s domestic politics. Instead of mobilizing Syria’s Kurdish community against Damascus, the PKK harnessed it for its war against Turkey. From the PKK’s point of view, the Syrian Kurdish community became a recruitment pool for its war in Turkey." '
"In the Western part of Northern Syria, the YPG coordinates with the Russians, while in the east with the American. There was a before Ayn Daqna, and there was an after Ayn Daqna. There was no intention of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to enter Afrin. There were no problems at all. Not between the Assad -opposed Kurds and the Assad -opposed rebels. Firstly, the YPG made a Russian base in Afrin, in Kafr Janna, and Russia entered. Secondly, when the régime was besieged in Nubul and Zahraa, they let them escape. Thirdly, there was Ayn Daqna. It became a war. One sees his brother’s corpse, or his cousin’s, or his friend’s, and the YPG militants put the corpses on a loader and parade them. After that, it was over. The peace ended. They tried to take Azaz, if they could.
The battle for Tel Rif’at was with Russian and régime airplanes bombing Tel Rif’at, and on the ground, the Kurdish YPG took it. There was coordination between Russia, the régime, and the YPG. The bombing caused the people to flee, and there was a total war in the area. They organized it completely. Furthermore, the Russians have a military base in Tel Rif’at, and régime soldiers entered Tel Rif’at. The same happened in Afrin. This is proof that they are coordinating among each other."
The defected security director of Qamishli, in Syria’s northeast Hasakah province:
"I got orders to hand over all police departments to the PYD/YPG. We even handed them the new weapons and equipment we received months ago."
Koran Ahmad, the Kurdish chairman of the board of Bahar, an NGO working in opposition-held and SDF-held parts of northern Syria:
"It was in June or July 2012, the PYD announced a curfew, so the people wouldn’t leave the house. We heard a few shots. I was standing on the balcony, there was nothing on the ground. Two hours later, they said we had the victory over the régime and we took the areas. Now, there is no Syrian régime here anymore. And really, the next day, when we went out on the street, the régime wasn’t there anymore. So, this happened within one day? Within three or four hours, not a day. They said we won from the régime with the fact that the régime elements stayed but changed their clothes from military to civil and stayed among the people. Afrin was special in all of northern Syria. There were seven security branches. Even military security was present in Afrin. State security, criminal and political security, etc., were all present in Afrin."
Rena Netjes:
"From the early 1980s until 1988, Hafez al-Assad’s régime hosted the PKK in Yafour, Zabadani, and Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. Assad’s objective in supporting the PKK was to gain leverage over its much larger northern neighbor, so as to influence various territorial and water disputes. The PKK’s long-standing presence highlights the contrast between the Syrian régime’s treatment of domestic Kurdish political and militant activity and its treatment of externally-oriented Kurdish political and militant activity on Syrian soil. The former was harshly suppressed in most cases; the latter was supported. Such support was naturally conditioned on the PKK staying out of Syria’s domestic politics. Instead of mobilizing Syria’s Kurdish community against Damascus, the PKK harnessed it for its war against Turkey. From the PKK’s point of view, the Syrian Kurdish community became a recruitment pool for its war in Turkey." '
Taken from "The SDF, the PKK, and the Syrian regime" by Rena Netjes in MENA Affairs.
