[p1]
‘Ahmet Davutoglu proposed a new, independent – some called it “neo-Ottoman” – foreign policy to replace its previous pro-NATO orientation.’
[p17]
‘Russia worried that if Assad went the way of Mubarak, that could act as an incubator for reigniting jihadist wars that had claimed tens of thousands of lives in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s.’
[p22]
‘Moscow’s ability to influence Assad was therefore limited: it had a sledgehammer to crack a walnut but desperately wanted to keep the walnut intact.’
[p24]
‘On February 22 veteran American war correspondent Marie Colvin and French photographer Remi Ochlik were intentionally killed by government rocket fire as they chronicled the systematic assault on civilians. Reports of atrocities by both sides became more common.’
[p56]
From Paul Wood’s report:
[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16984219]
‘Cpl Yousseff was a Christian. After he was taken, his relatives kidnapped six Sunnis, killing one in the process. In return, around 20 Christians were abducted.
"Some hotheads have been kidnapping Christians," one of the senior FSA commanders in the area told me. "We have got to calm this down."
After several days of stalemate, everyone was released, unharmed, including Corporal Yousseff.
Their ID cards showed they were Shabiha (or ghosts) - the hated government paramilitary force.
"We killed them," he told me.
"You killed your prisoners?"
"Yes, of course. They were executed later. That is the policy for Shabiha."
These were Sunni Shabiha, he added; the only Alawite had escaped.’
‘Where the rise of al-Nusra encouraged Riyadh to arm FSA-aligned groups, it fueled Western doubts about the armed opposition’s character and fears any arms they provided might find their way to extremists.’
[p58]
‘Lavrov had made it clear in Geneva that a chapter 7 resolution was out of the question. Annan felt “blindsided by the American and British push for a chapter 7 resolution. His strategy relied on keeping Russia inside the tent, using its influence on Assad.’
[p84]
‘There was no love lost between the Kurds and the Sunnis.’ [p85]
‘Baba_Adzz
@baba_adzz
Yesterday in Kurdistan, for the eighth year in a row, a hadith competition was held, with the participation of 100,000 Kurdish children from all over Kurdistan. Persian, Turkish, and Arab media outlets have not covered this event, as it contradicts their narrative that portrays Kurds as atheists.’
[https://twitter.com/baba_adzz/status/1695516850648428738]
‘Russia simply did not have that sort of leverage over the Syrian government [p89]
‘Western governments had made it abundantly clear they had no appetite for intervention.’
[p90]
‘Assad’s strategy, from the start, was to hold on to power.’
[p90]
‘Concessions would only have encouraged the régime’s hard-liners.’
[p91]
@baba_adzz
Yesterday in Kurdistan, for the eighth year in a row, a hadith competition was held, with the participation of 100,000 Kurdish children from all over Kurdistan. Persian, Turkish, and Arab media outlets have not covered this event, as it contradicts their narrative that portrays Kurds as atheists.’
[https://twitter.com/baba_adzz/status/1695516850648428738]
‘Russia simply did not have that sort of leverage over the Syrian government [p89]
‘Western governments had made it abundantly clear they had no appetite for intervention.’
[p90]
‘Assad’s strategy, from the start, was to hold on to power.’
[p90]
‘Concessions would only have encouraged the régime’s hard-liners.’
[p91]
‘The opposition’s foreign backers never coalesced around a strategy of supporting civilian governance. These bodies fought a long defeat against the anarchy, militarization, and extremism wrought by the better funded armed groups.’
[p103]
‘Establishing a pattern of thought that chimed well with the president’s own thinking, Dempsey warned a no-fly zone would require the engagement of seventy thousand personnel to dismantle Syria’s air defenses, which he reported, posed a significant threat.’
[p104]
‘There are reasons for thinking the president could have been right. There was little immediate prospect of Assad stepping down. Iran and Russia would simply counterescalate their support for Assad. Without political and organizational reform, arming the FSA would not have made it a stronger fighting force. Blowback was inevitable since Western arms would find their way to extremists.’
[p108]
‘These military measures would have increased the costs to Tehran and Moscow and deterred them from backing Assad so heavily by convincing them his government was doomed. There are especially good reasons for thinking a no-fly zone would have made a difference. It would have degraded the régime’s ability to drop barrel bombs, regular bombs, and gas-filled bombs on civilians and saved tens of thousands of lives. More than seven years later , Turkey demonstrated the wisdom of this in Idlib.’
[pp108-109]
“We have already seen inside of Syria that -- or groups like ISIL that right now are fighting with other extremist groups, or an Assad regime that was non-responsive to a Sunni majority there, that that has attracted more and more jihadists or would-be jihadists, some of them from Europe.”
[https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq]
’The Qataris and Saudis hobbled Syria’s opposition by sowing discord and fragmentation, denying Syrians the ability to speak for themselves. The two Gulf states had been allowed to play this inflated role because the United States and other western powers had no realistic strategy.’
[p117]
‘The opposition scored some major victories, including in March 2013 when it seized its first provincial capital, Raqqa, a host of towns on the Homs-Aleppo highway, and the main hydroelectric dams on the Euphrates, victories made possible by the active participation of jihadist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.’
[p119]
In May 2013, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived in Washington, to press the United States to show leadership on Syria. Having been browbeaten by Obama into calling for Assad to step aside, Erdogan expected the American president to lead efforts to achieve that goal and specifically hoped to persuade Obama to permit arming of the rebels and a no-fly zone over northern Syria. Obama dismissed Erdogan’s proposals and instead insisted Turkey do more to stem the flow of extremists to Syria.’ Note “Syria’s PKK-aligned Kurds”.
[pp126-127]
‘Corbyn chaired an activist coalition – “Stop the War” – which not only opposed Western military intervention in Syria (though not Russian or Iranian intervention) but also hosted speakers who claimed the dead children of Ghouta were merely asleep, props in an elaborate stage show.’
[p134]
‘By rejecting the use of force, Washington sacrificed potential leverage without creating significant change. It also effectively dealt itself out of leadership of international efforts to end Syria’s bloodshed, creating an political vacuum into which Russia inserted itself. Although nobody could have known it at the time, comprehensive strikes that degraded Syrian air defences and secured the U.S. control of Syria’s skies would have denied these skies to Russia.’
[p146]
‘The opposition tied itself in knots, the SOC unsure whether to participate. On the one hand, it wanted to preserve whatever international support it had and knew it risked losing sympathy if it refused to talk. On the other hand, it saw little point in further talks while the government refused to accept the Geneva communiqué and continued using force.
The SOC was finding it difficult to sell that message to Syria’s increasingly disenchanted and fragmented armed opposition. In the South, up to seventy FSA-aligned groups renounced their affiliation with pro-Geneva II factions. Things got worse when, in late October, Abu Eissa al-Sheikh, leader of a coalition of Islamic factions that included the powerful Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and Liwa al-Tawhid and comprised some forty thousand to seventy thousand soldiers, not only rejected the talks but warned that any who did not follow suit risked committing “treason”.‘
[p150]
‘The UN’s high commissioner for human rights, Navi Pillay, detailed the deliberate targeting of hospitals and medical personnel by government forces. The Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council resolved to condemn these and other violations of international humanitarian law and demand humanitarian access. Laudable as they were, these efforts, too, made little difference.’
[p153]
‘Seven of the largest Islamist groups formed the Islamic Front hoping to counter the influence of ISIS and other al-Qaeda allies. Since Islamists looked basically alike to Western governments, this initiative only seemed to confirm the opposition’s drift towards extremism.’
[p156]
‘The FSA and Islamic Front patched up their differences and began joint operations – a sensible move to enhance the opposition’s operational capacity, but one that challenged the neat separation of opposition forces into moderates and extremists in the minds of Western governments.
[p158]
‘Few in the West seemed to notice Syrian opposition mobilization against ISIS. Almost nothing was done {to] support them, and it did little to correct the Western view that the opposition was tainted by association with extremism.’
[p159]
[p103]
‘Establishing a pattern of thought that chimed well with the president’s own thinking, Dempsey warned a no-fly zone would require the engagement of seventy thousand personnel to dismantle Syria’s air defenses, which he reported, posed a significant threat.’
[p104]
‘There are reasons for thinking the president could have been right. There was little immediate prospect of Assad stepping down. Iran and Russia would simply counterescalate their support for Assad. Without political and organizational reform, arming the FSA would not have made it a stronger fighting force. Blowback was inevitable since Western arms would find their way to extremists.’
[p108]
‘These military measures would have increased the costs to Tehran and Moscow and deterred them from backing Assad so heavily by convincing them his government was doomed. There are especially good reasons for thinking a no-fly zone would have made a difference. It would have degraded the régime’s ability to drop barrel bombs, regular bombs, and gas-filled bombs on civilians and saved tens of thousands of lives. More than seven years later , Turkey demonstrated the wisdom of this in Idlib.’
[pp108-109]
“We have already seen inside of Syria that -- or groups like ISIL that right now are fighting with other extremist groups, or an Assad regime that was non-responsive to a Sunni majority there, that that has attracted more and more jihadists or would-be jihadists, some of them from Europe.”
[https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq]
’The Qataris and Saudis hobbled Syria’s opposition by sowing discord and fragmentation, denying Syrians the ability to speak for themselves. The two Gulf states had been allowed to play this inflated role because the United States and other western powers had no realistic strategy.’
[p117]
‘The opposition scored some major victories, including in March 2013 when it seized its first provincial capital, Raqqa, a host of towns on the Homs-Aleppo highway, and the main hydroelectric dams on the Euphrates, victories made possible by the active participation of jihadist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.’
[p119]
In May 2013, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived in Washington, to press the United States to show leadership on Syria. Having been browbeaten by Obama into calling for Assad to step aside, Erdogan expected the American president to lead efforts to achieve that goal and specifically hoped to persuade Obama to permit arming of the rebels and a no-fly zone over northern Syria. Obama dismissed Erdogan’s proposals and instead insisted Turkey do more to stem the flow of extremists to Syria.’ Note “Syria’s PKK-aligned Kurds”.
[pp126-127]
‘Corbyn chaired an activist coalition – “Stop the War” – which not only opposed Western military intervention in Syria (though not Russian or Iranian intervention) but also hosted speakers who claimed the dead children of Ghouta were merely asleep, props in an elaborate stage show.’
[p134]
‘By rejecting the use of force, Washington sacrificed potential leverage without creating significant change. It also effectively dealt itself out of leadership of international efforts to end Syria’s bloodshed, creating an political vacuum into which Russia inserted itself. Although nobody could have known it at the time, comprehensive strikes that degraded Syrian air defences and secured the U.S. control of Syria’s skies would have denied these skies to Russia.’
[p146]
‘The opposition tied itself in knots, the SOC unsure whether to participate. On the one hand, it wanted to preserve whatever international support it had and knew it risked losing sympathy if it refused to talk. On the other hand, it saw little point in further talks while the government refused to accept the Geneva communiqué and continued using force.
The SOC was finding it difficult to sell that message to Syria’s increasingly disenchanted and fragmented armed opposition. In the South, up to seventy FSA-aligned groups renounced their affiliation with pro-Geneva II factions. Things got worse when, in late October, Abu Eissa al-Sheikh, leader of a coalition of Islamic factions that included the powerful Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and Liwa al-Tawhid and comprised some forty thousand to seventy thousand soldiers, not only rejected the talks but warned that any who did not follow suit risked committing “treason”.‘
[p150]
‘The UN’s high commissioner for human rights, Navi Pillay, detailed the deliberate targeting of hospitals and medical personnel by government forces. The Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council resolved to condemn these and other violations of international humanitarian law and demand humanitarian access. Laudable as they were, these efforts, too, made little difference.’
[p153]
‘Seven of the largest Islamist groups formed the Islamic Front hoping to counter the influence of ISIS and other al-Qaeda allies. Since Islamists looked basically alike to Western governments, this initiative only seemed to confirm the opposition’s drift towards extremism.’
[p156]
‘The FSA and Islamic Front patched up their differences and began joint operations – a sensible move to enhance the opposition’s operational capacity, but one that challenged the neat separation of opposition forces into moderates and extremists in the minds of Western governments.
[p158]
‘Few in the West seemed to notice Syrian opposition mobilization against ISIS. Almost nothing was done {to] support them, and it did little to correct the Western view that the opposition was tainted by association with extremism.’
[p159]
‘Al-Nusra regularly used car bombings in régime-controlled areas of the city to relieve the pressure, but their targets and victims were mostly civilians.’
[p164] Source Sam Dagher
‘Homs became a model for government operations as, in city after city, government forces bombarded and starved them into submission, and then negotiated the evacuation of whoever was left alive. In all this, the UN team at the Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus helped. They delivered aid to government areas but not besieged areas, deposited millions directly into government and Assad-family bank accounts, and facilitated the final evacuations, which completed the forced displacement of civilians opposed to Assad.’
[pp166-167]
‘ “The opposition didn’t represent anybody; for them, getting rid of al-Assad would resolve all issues.” Brahimi’s criticism of the SOC seems harsh. Jarba and his team were never given the opportunity to represent Syrians, nor did they demand anything beyond what they thought had already been agreed.’
[p167]
[p164] Source Sam Dagher
‘Homs became a model for government operations as, in city after city, government forces bombarded and starved them into submission, and then negotiated the evacuation of whoever was left alive. In all this, the UN team at the Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus helped. They delivered aid to government areas but not besieged areas, deposited millions directly into government and Assad-family bank accounts, and facilitated the final evacuations, which completed the forced displacement of civilians opposed to Assad.’
[pp166-167]
‘ “The opposition didn’t represent anybody; for them, getting rid of al-Assad would resolve all issues.” Brahimi’s criticism of the SOC seems harsh. Jarba and his team were never given the opportunity to represent Syrians, nor did they demand anything beyond what they thought had already been agreed.’
[p167]
‘Even those who rejected al-Nusra’s Islamist ideology acknowledged that it was at least a committed and determined opponent to Assad.’
[p198]
‘Bab al-Salam in Idlib governate and Bab al-Hawa in Aleppo.’
[p204]
‘A government offensive on the outposts of Nubl and al-Zahraa was led by foreign fighters.’
[p209]
[p198]
‘Bab al-Salam in Idlib governate and Bab al-Hawa in Aleppo.’
[p204]
‘A government offensive on the outposts of Nubl and al-Zahraa was led by foreign fighters.’
[p209]
‘Mindful of ISIS, and worried about the YPG’s deepening co-operation with the United States, Ankara desperately wanted the opposition in the North to do more to confront Assad and hold back ISIS. It increased the supply of arms to Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham. Leaders representing some seventy-two factions gathered in the Turkish city of Gazientep, and agreed to form a Revolutionary Command Council to coordinate military operations.
Encouraged, Turkish intelligence urged Ahrar al-Sham to reach out to other opposition groups in neighbouring Idlib.Qatar and Saudi Arabia joined forces to support the initiative. Dozens of groups, including al-Nusra, joined the new Idlib coalition, known as Jaysh al-Fatah.
Encouraged by Turkey, the opposition in the North showed clear signs it was finding ways of cooperating more effectively. The effects would not be slow to show themselves.’
[p211]
‘Things looked even more promising in the South. In early 2014 the US-run Military Operations Center in Amman had summoned more than fifty southern-based secular and moderate factions. They had agreed to form the Southern Front to challenge both Assad and ISIS/al-Nusra. The new front had a lot going for it. Its secular leadership pledged to uphold the laws of war and protect minorities, and generally avoid ideological posturing, presenting itself as a military coalition dedicated to overthrowing Assad. It began work on a plan to take Daraa.’
[p212]
‘On April 1 ISIS stormed the besieged Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp. The extremists took control after two days of intense fighting with both pro-FSA and progovernment militias. Unusually, al-Nusra, which also had an armed presence in the camp, refused to get involved, effectively aligning itself with ISIS.’
[p215]
‘A rare joint FSA-YPG offensive, backed by US airpower, drove ISIS out of Tal Abyad.’
[p216]
What happened when they got there: ‘After FSA arrived to Tal Abyad, YPG is kicking them out. No a single FSA batallion is allowed to enter Tal Abyad.’
Encouraged, Turkish intelligence urged Ahrar al-Sham to reach out to other opposition groups in neighbouring Idlib.Qatar and Saudi Arabia joined forces to support the initiative. Dozens of groups, including al-Nusra, joined the new Idlib coalition, known as Jaysh al-Fatah.
Encouraged by Turkey, the opposition in the North showed clear signs it was finding ways of cooperating more effectively. The effects would not be slow to show themselves.’
[p211]
‘Things looked even more promising in the South. In early 2014 the US-run Military Operations Center in Amman had summoned more than fifty southern-based secular and moderate factions. They had agreed to form the Southern Front to challenge both Assad and ISIS/al-Nusra. The new front had a lot going for it. Its secular leadership pledged to uphold the laws of war and protect minorities, and generally avoid ideological posturing, presenting itself as a military coalition dedicated to overthrowing Assad. It began work on a plan to take Daraa.’
[p212]
‘On April 1 ISIS stormed the besieged Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp. The extremists took control after two days of intense fighting with both pro-FSA and progovernment militias. Unusually, al-Nusra, which also had an armed presence in the camp, refused to get involved, effectively aligning itself with ISIS.’
[p215]
‘A rare joint FSA-YPG offensive, backed by US airpower, drove ISIS out of Tal Abyad.’
[p216]
What happened when they got there: ‘After FSA arrived to Tal Abyad, YPG is kicking them out. No a single FSA batallion is allowed to enter Tal Abyad.’
[https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2015/06/24/syria-raqqa-and-western-al-hassake-rif-the-truth-behind-the-cleansing-video/]
‘Southern Storm [Daraa 2015] persuaded everyone that neither side was close to victory.’
[p222]
‘All this helped ISIS by weakening its principal foe (the mainstream opposition) and forcing moderates to align more closely with jihadists.’
[p243]
Link to Lister: ‘Moscow’s ill defined fight against “terrorism” was set to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Syria’s genuine moderate opposition began coordinating more closely with al-Qaeda and other similar jihadist factions. Rather than fighting jihadist militancy, Russia’s military intervention was fueling it like never before.’
[The Syrian Jihad p369]
‘By 2016 the last remaining rebel strongholds in Latakia were cleared out.’
[p243]
‘On Christmas Day a Syrian government air strike in Ghouta killed Jaysh al-Islam’s commander, Zahran Alloush.’
[p243]
‘The defenders set hundreds of tires alight, hoping the smoke would prevent or misdirect the air attacks. All it did was choke themselves.’
[p280]
‘The government suspended its co-operation, demanding the rebels give up the besieged villages of al-Fuah and Kafraya.’
[p282]
‘Of the outside powers professing sympathy for Syrians tormented by their government, only Turkey put up any meaningful resistance.’
[p288]
‘Russia delivered sophisticated Pantsir anti-aircraft systems to Syria.’
[p298]
‘Ahrar al-Sham and Tahrir al-Sham also had a presence amid the ruined tenement blocks. HTS never had an armed presence in eastern Ghouta.
[p304]
‘The Syrians responded with S-200 surface-to-air missiles but failed to hit any of the aircraft.’
[p304]
‘The very real risks of mission creep were forcefully demonstrated when an armed group comprising Syrian government forces, Iranian-trained Afghan militia, and Russian mercenaries belonging to the Wagner Group approached an SDF headquarters housing US Special Operations Forces in Khasham. Most put government-side losses at between eighty and one hundred fighters, twenty to thirty of them Russian mercenaries. For Damascus and its allies, the incident was a sharp reminder of their vulnerability; for Washington , a warning it might be dragged into fighting on behalf of the SDF.’
[p318]
“To make it short, we’ve had our fucking asses kicked,” one Wagner Group veteran reportedly says in a recording. “Yeah so, one squadron fucking lost 200 people immediately … Another one lost 10 people, and I don’t know about the third squadron, but it got torn up pretty badly too … They tore us to pieces.”
Marine artillery support was vital to the fight against Syrian forces and mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group in the Battle of Khasham. US Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Matthew Callahan.
The lopsided American victory worked as a deterrent a month later when another group of Syrian fighters and Russian mercenaries began a similar buildup near American forces along the Euphrates. This time, when Mattis called his Russian counterpart, the enemy force dispersed, successfully avoiding a second curb-stomping.
The Wagner Group is trained at Russian Defense Ministry bases, and the group’s leaders have received awards in the Kremlin, but Russia downplayed its involvement in the engagement that’s come to be known as the Battle of Khasham. Russia claimed the clash was a result of American aggression.
Similar Russian misinformation is rampant in the war in Ukraine, and like in the Battle of Khasham, Russia’s numerical superiority isn’t translating to tactical success. In hindsight, perhaps Russia’s humiliating defeat in Syria was a sign of what was to come in Ukraine, where many analysts predicted Russia would “steamroll” that nation’s military and defense forces.
[https://coffeeordie.com/wagner-group-syria-khasham]
‘Southern Storm [Daraa 2015] persuaded everyone that neither side was close to victory.’
[p222]
‘All this helped ISIS by weakening its principal foe (the mainstream opposition) and forcing moderates to align more closely with jihadists.’
[p243]
Link to Lister: ‘Moscow’s ill defined fight against “terrorism” was set to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Syria’s genuine moderate opposition began coordinating more closely with al-Qaeda and other similar jihadist factions. Rather than fighting jihadist militancy, Russia’s military intervention was fueling it like never before.’
[The Syrian Jihad p369]
‘By 2016 the last remaining rebel strongholds in Latakia were cleared out.’
[p243]
‘On Christmas Day a Syrian government air strike in Ghouta killed Jaysh al-Islam’s commander, Zahran Alloush.’
[p243]
‘The defenders set hundreds of tires alight, hoping the smoke would prevent or misdirect the air attacks. All it did was choke themselves.’
[p280]
‘The government suspended its co-operation, demanding the rebels give up the besieged villages of al-Fuah and Kafraya.’
[p282]
‘Of the outside powers professing sympathy for Syrians tormented by their government, only Turkey put up any meaningful resistance.’
[p288]
‘Russia delivered sophisticated Pantsir anti-aircraft systems to Syria.’
[p298]
‘Ahrar al-Sham and Tahrir al-Sham also had a presence amid the ruined tenement blocks. HTS never had an armed presence in eastern Ghouta.
[p304]
‘The Syrians responded with S-200 surface-to-air missiles but failed to hit any of the aircraft.’
[p304]
‘The very real risks of mission creep were forcefully demonstrated when an armed group comprising Syrian government forces, Iranian-trained Afghan militia, and Russian mercenaries belonging to the Wagner Group approached an SDF headquarters housing US Special Operations Forces in Khasham. Most put government-side losses at between eighty and one hundred fighters, twenty to thirty of them Russian mercenaries. For Damascus and its allies, the incident was a sharp reminder of their vulnerability; for Washington , a warning it might be dragged into fighting on behalf of the SDF.’
[p318]
“To make it short, we’ve had our fucking asses kicked,” one Wagner Group veteran reportedly says in a recording. “Yeah so, one squadron fucking lost 200 people immediately … Another one lost 10 people, and I don’t know about the third squadron, but it got torn up pretty badly too … They tore us to pieces.”
Marine artillery support was vital to the fight against Syrian forces and mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group in the Battle of Khasham. US Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Matthew Callahan.
The lopsided American victory worked as a deterrent a month later when another group of Syrian fighters and Russian mercenaries began a similar buildup near American forces along the Euphrates. This time, when Mattis called his Russian counterpart, the enemy force dispersed, successfully avoiding a second curb-stomping.
The Wagner Group is trained at Russian Defense Ministry bases, and the group’s leaders have received awards in the Kremlin, but Russia downplayed its involvement in the engagement that’s come to be known as the Battle of Khasham. Russia claimed the clash was a result of American aggression.
Similar Russian misinformation is rampant in the war in Ukraine, and like in the Battle of Khasham, Russia’s numerical superiority isn’t translating to tactical success. In hindsight, perhaps Russia’s humiliating defeat in Syria was a sign of what was to come in Ukraine, where many analysts predicted Russia would “steamroll” that nation’s military and defense forces.
[https://coffeeordie.com/wagner-group-syria-khasham]
‘Most civilians and fighters fled before the advancing forces. Those who did not were forced out soon after, an almost complete exercise of ethnic cleansing that depopulated Afrin’s Kurdish community.’
[p320]
‘The strikes were too limited to have much material effect on Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities, and though it may be claimed they restored deterrence, this was only a temporary effect – Assad’s forces began using chemical weapons again the following May.’
[p330]
‘Ankara feared Idlib’s collapse would trigger a new refugee crisis and present the Kurds another opportunity for territorial growth. But stability meant somehow loosening the extremists’ grip.’
[p338]
‘Turkey agreed to use its influence to dissolve Idlib’s HTS-led administration and replace it with a new civilian authority.’
[p341]
‘The extremists tried to win a seat at the international table by offering the government a deal granting access to the highways.’
[p343]
‘Amid the chaos in Tall Abyad, nearly eight hundred ISIS prisoners broke free from a detention camp – a predictable, and predicted, consequence of the Turkish intervention.’
[p360]
‘The United States lost the opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat on ISIS.’
[p362]
‘The balance of power between the two sides had changed dramatically. This made it much more likely that the Kurds could be persuaded to accept a political settlement with Damascus.’
[p363]
‘Far from stimulating the return of displaced Syrians, Erdogan’s operation displaced 300,000 more. Those who remained were subjected to killings, sexual violence, and looting by Turkish-backed Islamist militia.’
[p364]
‘By late 2019 the Assad government was well on its way toward re-establishing its international position. Recognizing Assad had all but prevailed, Syria’s Gulf Arab neighbours began normalizing relations with the government.’
[p366]
[p320]
‘The strikes were too limited to have much material effect on Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities, and though it may be claimed they restored deterrence, this was only a temporary effect – Assad’s forces began using chemical weapons again the following May.’
[p330]
‘Ankara feared Idlib’s collapse would trigger a new refugee crisis and present the Kurds another opportunity for territorial growth. But stability meant somehow loosening the extremists’ grip.’
[p338]
‘Turkey agreed to use its influence to dissolve Idlib’s HTS-led administration and replace it with a new civilian authority.’
[p341]
‘The extremists tried to win a seat at the international table by offering the government a deal granting access to the highways.’
[p343]
‘Amid the chaos in Tall Abyad, nearly eight hundred ISIS prisoners broke free from a detention camp – a predictable, and predicted, consequence of the Turkish intervention.’
[p360]
‘The United States lost the opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat on ISIS.’
[p362]
‘The balance of power between the two sides had changed dramatically. This made it much more likely that the Kurds could be persuaded to accept a political settlement with Damascus.’
[p363]
‘Far from stimulating the return of displaced Syrians, Erdogan’s operation displaced 300,000 more. Those who remained were subjected to killings, sexual violence, and looting by Turkish-backed Islamist militia.’
[p364]
‘By late 2019 the Assad government was well on its way toward re-establishing its international position. Recognizing Assad had all but prevailed, Syria’s Gulf Arab neighbours began normalizing relations with the government.’
[p366]
‘At the end of 2019 the situation remained uncertain, because of the ad hoc efforts of a couple of international actors, and the growing exhaustion of the régime and its allies.’
[p368]
‘Russian and Syrian forces attempted once again to impose a military solution on Idlib. Turkey countered with its own military and stopped the government in its tracks.’
‘The longer the enclave held out, the more entrenched its defenders might become, and the more stable its manner of governing, a potential beacon for future resistance.’
[p370]
‘Damascus worried that if it left the NLF and SNA to fester, they might displace the extremist HTS and win international legitimacy. This was precisely what Turkey wanted to engineer.’
[pp370-371]
‘Government forces made steady progress, which turned into a rout largely because HTS withdrew to more defensible positions in hilly areas.’
[p373]
‘Starting on February 28, Turkish forces unleashed a barrage of artillery and drone strikes against more than two hundred Syrian government and Hezbollah targets, including Russian mercenaries and proxies, causing one hundred to three hundred casualties and destroying dozens of tanks, APCs and ammunition stores.’
[p379]
‘There is no doubt Turkey’s intervention inflicted a heavy toll, stalled the government offensive, and exposed its military fragility.’
[p380]
‘The government side could not withstand the sort of losses inflicted by Turkey for long without serious repercussions.’
[p381]
‘The settling of scores in Idlib will likely prove to be one of the catalysts for Syria’s next civil war.’
[p382]
‘There were rumors of a plot to remove Assad. Perhaps sensing this, the president reined in his cousin Rami Makhlouf. One theory suggests Makhlouf’s fall from grace stemmed from a conflict with Assad, another holds that Russia demanded the oligarch’s fall, concerned Makhlouf was a divisive figure and economic competitor.’
[p384]
‘The United Nations, an increasing number of governments, and even some human rights-focused NGOs believe an authoritarian peace is possible, that Assad victorious can be persuaded to reform, and his terrorized people persuaded to meekly accept their fate. They are wrong. The war will most likely continue until there is a reckoning with Assad and his allies.’
[p385]
‘To think that some sort of compromise was possible, was to misunderstand the personalized and patrimonial nature of the Assad régime.’
[p388]
‘The story is also one of the UN’s inexorable descent into political irrelevance and complicity with evil.’
[p389]
[p368]
‘Russian and Syrian forces attempted once again to impose a military solution on Idlib. Turkey countered with its own military and stopped the government in its tracks.’
‘The longer the enclave held out, the more entrenched its defenders might become, and the more stable its manner of governing, a potential beacon for future resistance.’
[p370]
‘Damascus worried that if it left the NLF and SNA to fester, they might displace the extremist HTS and win international legitimacy. This was precisely what Turkey wanted to engineer.’
[pp370-371]
‘Government forces made steady progress, which turned into a rout largely because HTS withdrew to more defensible positions in hilly areas.’
[p373]
‘Starting on February 28, Turkish forces unleashed a barrage of artillery and drone strikes against more than two hundred Syrian government and Hezbollah targets, including Russian mercenaries and proxies, causing one hundred to three hundred casualties and destroying dozens of tanks, APCs and ammunition stores.’
[p379]
‘There is no doubt Turkey’s intervention inflicted a heavy toll, stalled the government offensive, and exposed its military fragility.’
[p380]
‘The government side could not withstand the sort of losses inflicted by Turkey for long without serious repercussions.’
[p381]
‘The settling of scores in Idlib will likely prove to be one of the catalysts for Syria’s next civil war.’
[p382]
‘There were rumors of a plot to remove Assad. Perhaps sensing this, the president reined in his cousin Rami Makhlouf. One theory suggests Makhlouf’s fall from grace stemmed from a conflict with Assad, another holds that Russia demanded the oligarch’s fall, concerned Makhlouf was a divisive figure and economic competitor.’
[p384]
‘The United Nations, an increasing number of governments, and even some human rights-focused NGOs believe an authoritarian peace is possible, that Assad victorious can be persuaded to reform, and his terrorized people persuaded to meekly accept their fate. They are wrong. The war will most likely continue until there is a reckoning with Assad and his allies.’
[p385]
‘To think that some sort of compromise was possible, was to misunderstand the personalized and patrimonial nature of the Assad régime.’
[p388]
‘The story is also one of the UN’s inexorable descent into political irrelevance and complicity with evil.’
[p389]
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