The US sanctions regimen against the Assad régime is working. Here’s how.

  'The refrain from foreign policy cynics and progressives on the ongoing conflict in Syria, which is now in its eleventh year, generally sounds the same: “the conflict in Syria is over,” “there is no US interest there any longer,” “Bashar al-Assad and his patrons have won the war.”

 The complexity of the conflict, Assad’s sordid history alongside that of his patrons Russia and Iran, and the bevy of state and non-state actors vying for political and military terrain make simple maxims hard to come by for Syria in 2021.

 Similarly, the subtle nuance and careful study required to recognize advances toward resolution and accountability for myriad war crimes make it easy for observers to shrug their shoulders and to quickly—and conveniently—forget Assad’s barbarism since 2011. Conflict of this magnitude is exhausting. Accountability and political resolution are even harder. It seems not everyone has the stomach for the latter.

 One maxim, though, holds true: the United States’ targeted and tailored sanctions regimen against Assad and other malign actors in Syria is accomplishing its stated objectives. These designations not only give the US and its allies leverage toward a political resolution to the conflict, but so too do said designations hold together a de facto nationwide ceasefire throughout Syria.

 When President Donald Trump announced a military drawdown in Syria in 2019 following the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), some expressed surprise and, curiously, blissful oblivion to his campaign promises to do just that. Whether the Joe Biden administration plans to follow through with that drawdown remains to be seen. President Biden’s Afghanistan withdrawal decision, though, signals limited interest in protracted military engagements. With the fall of ISIS accomplished, Biden will likely confront near-term decisions on a continued military footprint in Syria—a military mission that was and is about ISIS, not Assad.

 The problem emerges when conflating a military drawdown with the suggestion that the US has no interests in Syria or, worse yet, suggesting that the US is without resources to affect change—particularly political resolution, save military action. Such a notion naively overlooks military power as the final foreign policy resource and similarly disregards the devastatingly sharp power of the US financial system and exclusion from it under a targeted, tailored sanctions program.

 Enter the combination of sanctions designation authorities that the US has employed to date to limit Assad’s military advance; to deny his benefactors the spoils of a war with innumerable humanitarian atrocities; to hold accountable those responsible for said atrocities; and to compel political resolution through economic isolation of the Assad régime.

 The premise remains simple and transparent. Just as with other adversarial, malign actors, the US administers and enforces sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against state and non-state actors alike. By excluding those targeted from the US financial system, sanctions designations create trade, financial, commercial, and currency havoc for those countries, entities, and their partners.

 The stated objectives of targeting the murderous Assad régime with US sanctions are also clear: to compel political resolution to the conflict through diplomatic and economic isolation of Assad toward a new Syrian constitution and free and fair democratic elections for the Syrian people. Additionally, they seek to hold Assad and his supporters accountable for the unthinkable war crimes committed throughout the conflict.

 To this end, the US has employed a series of sanctions authorities, including the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and its related authorities, Executive Order (EO) 13894 from October 14, 2019, and the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (Caesar Act) against the Assad régime and its patrons.

 The reach of CAATSA allows the US to designate countries or individuals providing arms transfers to Syria—e.g. Iran and Russia—self-evident of continued, non-kinetic US national security levers and interests in Syria. While the passage of CAATSA became marred with suggestions of legislative overreach into the executive realm, CAATSA and its related authorities have provided the US opportunities to designate foreign entities in support of the Assad égime, including Rosoboroneksport, a state-owned Russian weapons trading company, its subsidiary Russian Financial Corporation Bank, and Russia’s National Security Advisor Nikolai Patrushev.

 In October 2019, the Trump administration issued EO 13894. An oft-overlooked provision of EO 13894, remains perhaps its most powerful: Section 2 of the order provides sanctions designation authority against those responsible for obstruction, disruption, or prevention of a ceasefire in northern Syria.

 Each renewal of the Idlib ceasefire further evinces 13894’s role in preserving the peace. Even the cynics cannot suggest that stymying Iranian and Russian military advances via sanctions-enforced ceasefires are not in the interest of the US or our allies.

 Finally, the Caesar Act goes right to the core of atrocity accountability for Assad and his régime. The enormous bipartisan support for Caesar has provided the US both specific and general deterrence to international actors supporting the barbarity of the Assad régime. The Caesar Act accomplishes two clear objectives: accountability for the régime’s atrocities and economic isolation of Assad to compel his participation in political resolution to the conflict.

 By the end of the Trump administration, the US had sanctioned 114 individuals and entities under the Caesar Act. In doing so, the US issued very specific and significant penalties to Assad’s patrons, including his inner circle, while establishing a very specific deterrent to individuals or entities mulling such support.

 More importantly, whether those sanctioned under the Caesar Act’s authority will ever face criminal consequences is irrelevant in review of its ability to help compel political resolution and hold accountable Assad’s enablers. The focus of Caesar has always been to preclude Assad’s furtherance of conflict and accountability for his enablers, not domestic or international civil or criminal liability for those targeted under the Act’s authority.

 Some well-intentioned Syria watchers and, separately, Assad backers, suggest that the Caesar Act’s enforcement harms the people of Syria. This argument fails on two counts: the designations targets under this authority are carefully tailored to those providing illicit financial support to bolster Assad and, to suggest that the designations, which help bolster the political voice of the oppressed Syrian people against Assad, instead harms Syrians relies on a woefully circular rationale. Simply put, it is Assad who has perpetrated barbarity against his people—the Caesar Act is one such mechanism to end the tyranny.

 Were those perpetuating the more-harm-than-good Caesar Act fallacy truly focused on the humanitarian plight of the long-suffering Syrian people, they might point to Assad and Russia’s efforts to block humanitarian access renewal at the United Nations. Or they would look at the régime’s efforts to complicate other international aid and assistance organizations’ access to Syria.

 To posit, though, that any sanctions designation against adversarial actors around the world had not a single unintended trickle-down consequence would be irresponsible. Nevertheless, Caesar’s tailored and targeted approach seeks to swiftly curtail support on a macro level to the ultimate cause of Syrian’s plight: the Assad régime. Non-kinetic solutions to geopolitical strife will require risk-reward evaluation in perpetuity. The Caesar Act analysis should continue to tip in favor of targeting the twenty-first century’s most villainous despot and political resolution to the conflict he begat.

 With that in mind, the US maintains an interest in Syria beyond the defeat of ISIS and can flex the might of the most powerful economy in the world in lieu of military action toward a de facto ceasefire—often with even greater efficacy. Additionally, the US has every interest in political resolution to the Syrian conflict, in ensuring a free and fair election to the people of Syria, and in curtailing adversaries’ advancement in Syria to the detriment of the US and our allies. Perhaps, most importantly, the US maintains an interest in ensuring accountability for the Assad régime and its enablers for the atrocious deaths of over five hundred thousand Syrians since the inception of the conflict in 2011.

 Political resolution and accountability take work. Sanctions authorities and enforcement are the best levers available to further US national security interests.'

Assad takes from Syrians, gives resources to Iran, Russia

  'Syria’s economic trouble is not caused by sanctions but due to the Bashar Assad régime using the country’s resources to attack its own people and giving resources over to its allies, namely Iran and Russia, Abdurrahman Mustafa, head of the Syrian Interim Government, stated.

 Mustafa said that the country has been struggling for 10 years both economically and in a humanitarian regard. He reiterated that the United Nations’ 2020 report stated 90% of the Syrian people are living below the hunger threshold.

 “Millions of people live in tents in difficult conditions at a time when unemployment has increased due to forceful displacements by régime forces and their allies,” he stated, stressing that Syria’s economy is worse than it has ever been, with the Syrian pound further losing value. The monthly income of a person has fallen to as low as $20. The reason for this awful situation is not economic sanctions as the régime and its allies claim. The real reason is that the régime uses the country’s resources to attack its own people, leaving the people hungry and in poverty while handing the resources over to the use of its allies Iran and Russia.” 



 Syria's war has devastated the country's economy since 2011, plunging around 90% of its people into poverty, according to the United Nations.

 Much of the economy in régime-held areas has been shuttered to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. The World Food Programme (WFP) last year said food prices had doubled in a year to an all-time high across Syria. Over that same period, people in régime-held areas have faced fuel crises, a plummeting Syrian pound on the black market and steep price hikes. Damascus has blamed Western sanctions for its struggling economy.

 Mustafa stated that bad administering and corruption in all levels of the government also contributed to Syria’s economic downturn.

 He once again criticized the international community for not acting and giving the Syrian people the necessary support while the régime rejects a political solution, threatening the region’s peace, stability and Syrians themselves.

 “From past experiences, it is known that the régime does not promise any cease-fire or agreement but carries out massacres whenever it has the possibility. The fact that there is no international deterrent causes the régime and its allies to conduct ever more crimes against the Syrian people. We got used to the régime bombing its own people as a means to put pressure on Turkey and the international community and to make its election theater accepted.”

 Mustafa said that the opposition knows the régime will not abide by any agreement, while the opposition on the other hand has been sticking to all agreements.

 He also thanked Turkey’s efforts to reach a cease-fire with Russia, “which had been bombing the Syrian people.”

 The Idlib de-escalation zone was forged under an agreement between Turkey and Russia. The area has been the subject of multiple cease-fire understandings, which have been frequently violated by the Assad régime and its allies.

 A fragile truce was brokered between Moscow and Ankara in March 2020 in response to months of fighting by the Russia-backed régime. Almost a million people have fled the Assad régime’s offensive. The régime still frequently carries out attacks on civilians, hindering most from returning to their homes and forcing them to stay in makeshift camps.

 The elections, which the Assad régime set for May 26, will block the roads to a political solution for the Syrian conflict, Mustafa pointed out.

 Calling the elections nonsense, he highlighted that they have neither a political nor legal basis.

 “The régime lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people and the international community long ago. The current elections are reimposed so that this dictator (Bashar Assad) and his allies can kill and displace its people without a moral deterrent.” '

‘The régime’s cruelty pushed people’: How Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship maintained its grip on Syria in the face of a popular uprising

 

 'On Wednesday, Bashar. al-Assad will preside over a farce of an election, just as the Baath Party has every seven years since shortly after Hafez al-Assad took power in a 1970 coup d’état.

 In the aftermath, Mr. al-Assad will be declared the victor over his two hand-picked “rivals.” If history is any guide, the official figures will claim that more than 90 per cent of the country voted for Mr. al-Assad.

 For Mr. al-Assad and his loyalists, May 26 will mark a day of triumph. After 10 years of horrific war, their totalitarian system remains improbably intact, at least in the parts of the country under the régime’s control.

 Those who oppose the régime say Wednesday won’t mark the end of their struggle, which began 10 years ago when a group of teenagers in the southern city of Daraa spray-painted “it’s your turn doctor” on the wall of their school. It was a reference to the toppling of other dictators around the Middle East in a series of uprisings known as the Arab Spring. Zine El Abedine Ben Ali had been forced to flee Tunisia. Hosni Mubarak had been jailed in Egypt. Many Syrians believed then that Mr. al-Assad, an ophthalmologist by training, would be the next to fall.

 But the staged vote will provide a harsh reality check – a reminder of how much ground the rebels have lost since the heady days of 2013 and 2014 when change felt imminent. The process is seen as a signal to Syria’s opposition – and the international community – that Mr. al-Assad and his régime aren’t going anywhere.

 “The régime thinks that it can force the result of this election on us, and the international community will start to give up [on Syria],” said Hadi al-Bahra, who served in 2014 as the president of the Syrian National Council, an umbrella group representing a kaleidoscope of rebel groups and pro-democracy forces. Mr. al-Bahra was also a top opposition negotiator through several rounds of failed peace talks with representatives of the régime.

 The Syria that Mr. al-Assad presides over is a shattered country. Ten years of war have left more than 500,000 people dead or missing, and the ongoing violence has driven more than 12 million others – more than half the country’s prewar population – from their homes. The economy is a broken mess, needing tens of billions of dollars in investment just to return it to its prewar state, when it was already one of the poorest countries in the region.

 It’s also a country that the régime, which is backed by Russia and Iran, can only claim to govern parts of. Russia’s military intervention, which began in 2015, helped save Mr. al-Assad’s forces from defeat and aided their recapture of key cities such as Aleppo, Homs and Daraa. But the east of the country is run by the Kurdish forces allied to the U.S., while the northwest province of Idlib and much of the border zone remain are controlled by rebel groups with Turkish military posts protecting them inside Syrian territory.

 “Anybody who can claim victory in Syria should be put into a mental institution,” Mr. al-Bahra said in a telephone interview. 



 Oussama Chourbagi briefly lived in a free Syria, or a corner of it. In the first three years of the conflict, the activist – who was trained as a pharmacist in France but returned to his country at the outset of the uprising – was part of the local council in Daraya. The Damascus suburb was one of the first areas to escape Mr. al-Assad’s grasp. Unlike other parts of Syria, where the once-peaceful uprising quickly turned to violence as the régime kept shooting at its opponents, Daraya placed its armed groups under civilian control.

 “We wanted to create a small example to us and to the international community that we can manage and we can control our area, because the [narrative] of the régime was, ‘if we don’t want Bashar al-Assad, you will have Islamist groups, it will be a mess, you will have chaos.’ I can say that we reached 80 per cent of our goal in Daraya … any decisions taken were taken by the majority,” Mr. Chourbagi said in an interview in Slough, a town on the outskirts of London with a large population of refugees from Syria and other conflicts.

 By the start of 2014, the opposition felt so strong in its negotiating position that it arrived at United Nations-brokered peace talks in Geneva with a proposal to create an interim government – an offer that made no mention at all of Mr. al-Assad. He and his régime were finished, they believed.

 Mr. al-Bahra, who led the opposition delegation, says all that was lacking was a unified message from the international community telling Mr. al-Assad that it was time to go. But relations between Russia and the West were plunging in early 2014 over a separate crisis in Ukraine. Moscow broke with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s call in Geneva for Mr. al-Assad to resign. Instead, the Kremlin threw its full weight behind the Syrian régime.

 “The régime’s cruelty pushed people. They wanted to defend themselves,” says Mr. Chourbagi, who remains a committed pacifist, despite being arrested and tortured for three months early in the uprising. “When the revolution transformed from pacifism to military – for me that was the beginning of the end.”

 Even before the rise of the Islamic State, U.S. President Barack Obama had made clear that his support for the Syrian rebellion had limits. He warned Mr. al-Assad in 2012 not to cross the “red line” of using banned chemical weapons in the war, but did nothing when the régime’s army used sarin gas on the Damascus suburb of Ghouta in August, 2013. It would be the first of many proved uses of chemical weapons, and the beginning of the end of U.S. influence over the outcome.

 Into the vacuum stepped Russian President Vladimir Putin, who in September, 2015, caught the world off-guard by deploying his military to bolster Mr. al-Assad’s régime and protect the Soviet-era naval base in the port of Lattakia. Russian air strikes quickly turned the tide of the war, forcing the anti-Assad rebels to retreat to the corners that they still control today.

 The political opposition, once unified around the goal of fighting the régime, began to fall apart. The Islamic State caliphate drew adherents from Sunni Muslim youth who came to see the struggle for Syria in sectarian terms (the al-Assad family are adherents of a strain of Shia Islam, and the régime has been supported throughout the war by fighters from Iran, the region’s main Shia power).

 There were also the separate tensions between Turkey, which cheered on the Arab Spring revolts (and the form of political Islam they swept into office in Egypt and Tunisia), and Saudi Arabia, which feared and opposed the democratic tide. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood government elected in 2011 was deposed in a military coup supported by Saudi Arabia. The regional rivalry created a rift inside the Syrian National Council as well, strengthening the Russian narrative that Syria’s only choice was between Mr. al-Assad and anarchy.

 Bahia Mardini, a Syrian Kurdish journalist who attended the Geneva peace talks in 2014, says foreign powers played the various Syrian factions “as if we were cards.” But she also blames the opposition, which started fighting amongst itself before they had achieved their shared aim of deposing Mr. al-Assad.

 “They were in a hurry to take power,” she said. “They believed change was coming, so they tried to destroy each other.”

 On Wednesday, or shortly thereafter, Mr. al-Assad will declare a sweeping victory over his two token opponents – Abdullah Salloum Abdullah, a former deputy cabinet minister whose own Socialists Unionists Party supports Mr. al-Assad, and Mahmoud Ahmed Marei, who claims to represent the opposition to Mr. al-Assad but who is derided by those still fighting the régime.

 The only real question is whether the level of official support will be allowed to dip slightly, as it did in 2014, when Mr. al-Assad won “just” 92.2 per cent of the votes in what was seen as muted acknowledgement that the régime was in the middle of a war that wasn’t going very well. It was the only time he or his father gained less than 99 per cent.

 Mr. al-Assad’s campaign slogan translates awkwardly as “Hope to Work.” Slick social-media accounts show the eye-doctor-turned-dictator, dressed in a blazer and no tie, speaking to a group of construction workers. “Working in war conditions, as well as being an honour and morality, becomes a defence of the homeland,” Mr. al-Assad was quoted as saying. (Mr. al-Assad’s campaign page had slightly more than 1,500 followers on Twitter before it was “temporarily restricted” on Tuesday, and more than 147,000 on Facebook, which had taken no action as of Thursday.)

 Another photo shows Mr. al-Assad looking at military maps. In a third, he’s holding a sapling. There’s no mention on any of the accounts regarding if or how he intends to unite his shattered state.

 “After all this blood and this revolution and the people refusing the régime – saying we don’t want Assad, we don’t want the mukhabarat [secret police], we want democracy – they should make some changes. But they don’t change anything at all. It’s still about the Baath Party, even though I don’t think even they read the Baath Party texts. They just want authority and power,” Ms. Mardini said.

 Mr. Chourbagi, the pharmacist-turned-activist said he, like most Syrians outside régime-controlled areas of the country, will ignore Wednesday’s election, and the result. Instead, he and the Afaq Academy, the non-governmental organization he founded in 2012, will focus on trying to explain the concept of democracy to Syrians who have no experience with ideas like voting, paying taxes in exchange for receiving services, or equality before the law. Afaq’s focus, for now, is an educational campaign aimed at the 55 per cent of Syrians who now live either in rebel-held areas of the country or in exile.

 “The struggle for Syria isn’t between the opposition and the régime. It’s between the people and the culture of dictatorship,” Mr. Chourbagi said. But he acknowledges that the real election he’s trying to prepare for isn’t happening any time soon. “I still have hope, but for the long term.” '