Ziad Majed:
‘… in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, where Daesh imposed itself.
Now, regardless of all that, the social basis of the régime, and the demography supporting the régime, was becoming more and more tired with the war. By 2015, with all those complications, and lack of international political investment in Syria, lack of initiatives - there was a UN initiative in Geneva bringing some representatives of the régime, and different opposition groups to talk about a possible constitution, reconciliation, ending the conflict – all of that is agonising in fact, not progressing.
But on the ground, the régime is losing control over more and more territory. By summer 2015, the régime controlled only between 18 and 20% of Syria. Mainly Damascus, the area around Damascus, and all the areas close to the Lebanese borders, plus the Mediterranean coast, where is the majority of the Alawite community, that Assad was trying to mobilize as much as possible, and connecting his own destiny to the destiny of the whole community. And when it comes to the Lebanese borders, that was strategic for the Iranians and to Hezbollah, not to lose that area, because this is the connection between Syria and Lebanon, for the weapons, for strategic consideration; and they kept as well a kind of corridor, connecting that area to Iraq. Because if you look at the map, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, they needed a territorial continuity. That’s why Hezbollah’s efforts were mostly around Damascus, and around the Lebanese border.
But that was not enough any more. So the Iranians did negotiate, as of March 2015 until June 2015, with the Russians. On a possible Russian intervention, to save a régime, that the Iranians said we cannot continue any more. Because, at the time, Iran brought not only Hezbollah, that was securing the part in Syria that was close to the Lebanese borders, but they brought as well Iraqi militias, they then brought Hazara from Afghanistan and refugees in Iran militia, then there would be Pakistani militia Zainebiyoun; they brought them, and they were supporting Assad. Plus there was a kind of decentralisation of the security machine of the régime, by allowing local militias, pro- régime, in the Alawite areas, in some of the Christian areas, and in many other places, to emerge, and to control the ground, so the army of the régime that is losing men, and cannot recruit any more, could be on the fronts with the militias that Iran brought.
And this is what would lead finally, in September, to Russian intervention in Syria. Russian intervention, that in a way, would show that, overthrowing Assad is not possible any more. It became an illusion to consider, after the Russian intervention, that militarily on the ground, we can overthrow Assad.
But on the ground, the régime is losing control over more and more territory. By summer 2015, the régime controlled only between 18 and 20% of Syria. Mainly Damascus, the area around Damascus, and all the areas close to the Lebanese borders, plus the Mediterranean coast, where is the majority of the Alawite community, that Assad was trying to mobilize as much as possible, and connecting his own destiny to the destiny of the whole community. And when it comes to the Lebanese borders, that was strategic for the Iranians and to Hezbollah, not to lose that area, because this is the connection between Syria and Lebanon, for the weapons, for strategic consideration; and they kept as well a kind of corridor, connecting that area to Iraq. Because if you look at the map, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, they needed a territorial continuity. That’s why Hezbollah’s efforts were mostly around Damascus, and around the Lebanese border.
But that was not enough any more. So the Iranians did negotiate, as of March 2015 until June 2015, with the Russians. On a possible Russian intervention, to save a régime, that the Iranians said we cannot continue any more. Because, at the time, Iran brought not only Hezbollah, that was securing the part in Syria that was close to the Lebanese borders, but they brought as well Iraqi militias, they then brought Hazara from Afghanistan and refugees in Iran militia, then there would be Pakistani militia Zainebiyoun; they brought them, and they were supporting Assad. Plus there was a kind of decentralisation of the security machine of the régime, by allowing local militias, pro- régime, in the Alawite areas, in some of the Christian areas, and in many other places, to emerge, and to control the ground, so the army of the régime that is losing men, and cannot recruit any more, could be on the fronts with the militias that Iran brought.
And this is what would lead finally, in September, to Russian intervention in Syria. Russian intervention, that in a way, would show that, overthrowing Assad is not possible any more. It became an illusion to consider, after the Russian intervention, that militarily on the ground, we can overthrow Assad.
And gradually, in fact, the Russian intervention will allow Assad to start seizing the territories that his régime lost during the four previous years. Moving from around 20%, to what is today between 60 and 62 or 63% of the territory of Syria, with all major cities under his control. And that was one objective, to have urban Syria under the control of the régime, and to keep a divided, fragmented, rural Syria outside the control of the régime, if he can not seize it back.
So the war that Russia will lead, two years later will see its impact, after seizing back eastern Aleppo, after taking over the Ghouta and Daraa, ending with Homs before and then with northern Hama, pushing away any threat on the city, plus Deir Ezzor. So the régime will connect most of its cities, except for Idlib and Raqqa, as important cities, will control them.
And in between, due to the fact that the Kurdish militias supported by the Americans were fighting Daesh on the ground, there would be an expansion of the Kurdish territorial control, that pushed Turkey to intervene directly, after being indirectly behind some of the opposition groups.
So by 2018, and after the two summers of 2017/18, by March 2019, because this is when Trump declared the war on Daesh as mission accomplished; since that time, we have a kind of statico. It’s not always 100% the same map, sometimes there are a few clashes here and there, that might change part of the control in this territory or the other; but in general, the map is the same since 2018. The régime controls 60% now of the territory, the Kurdish militias supported by the Americans control around 20-25%, and then you have 10-12% in two different enclaves controlled by the oppositions. One of them directly supported by Turkey, the other by the Americans in the south. And you have the Russian army, the Iranian forces and the series of militias they brought, you have the American army, the Turkish army, and you have regularly Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah bases and on Iranian convoys in Syria. So, a country with different occupation forces.
So, this is the map now of the control. You can see it in red you have the régime, the Russians, the Iranians and their allies. In green you have the oppositions. When I say the oppositions, it’s rival groups, they’re not like a unified camp. So you have here in the Tanf area military bases, some refugees living down there, and supported by the Americans. In that area, some forces of the opposition were trained exclusively or only to fight ISIS, when ISIS existed, and they refused. They said we want to fight the régime and ISIS, so their mission was put on hold. And since that time, they have been in those bases. Sometimes they are attacked by Iranian drones, sometimes nothing happens and the Americans retaliate and bomb Iranian militias, but this is an area controlled by the opposition.
And that area in the north, where you have as well al-Nusra or Tahrir al-Sham, former al-Qaeda, in Idlib; and different groups of oppositions in the other part, directly supported by Turkey. In this area, you have the Turkish army present as well.
What is in yellow is the Kurdish controlled territory, with American bases, and a few special forces from France and Britain. And you have as well camps in this area, of the families of former Daesh fighters who were killed or captured by the Kurdish militias or by the Western allies. That is a big issue, whether they should return or not return. I think in different European countries, the debate exists, and each country adopted a different approach to it.
So, a fragmented country, an occupied country, and at the same time the destructions in Syria – that’s why I said at the beginning it’s a laboratory, maybe now in Gaza the destructions are more important too, the intensity of the bombing is much higher, and the space is much smaller - but what they call in French urbicide, you can say it; this urbicide, whether in Aleppo, whether in Homs, whether in some other places, the amount of destruction you see, was clearly also on purpose. To displace people, to make it impossible for them to return, because the question of the refugees, and the question of the displacement, was the policy, was the demographic policy based on sectarian or confessional lines.
And Assad did not hide it in two occasions when he mentioned that the Syrian social fabric or social tissue is much better now, when he said that those who left, he did not say they could not return, but he said that the country is much better now, and is more homogenous after their departure. Plus he refused their return during the process of normalisation with Saudi Arabia recently. After the normalisation with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The three also who normalised at the same time with Israel their relations.
Now, what I said at the beginning about this laboratory, in addition to the map and the layers that we saw, with a conflict that had many wars at the same time. There is a kind of Kurdish/ Arab tribes war in the east, there are wars between many opposition groups, there are rival groups loyal to the régime, there is a war between the régime and the oppositions, there is a war between Russia and Iran on the one hand opposing them to the opposition, there were clashes between Turkey and Russia and then they reconciled, there are clashes between Turkey and Kurds that are negotiated regularly by the Americans and the Russians in order to contain them, Israel bombs Hezbollah and sometimes Hezbollah retaliates.
So you have different conflicts taking place at the same time, and the national cause of the Syrians in that sense, got lost. It did not disappear, it did not vanish, but it was lost in between all those ongoing conflicts and struggles on the Syrian land. It became an incarnation of the UN inability to deal with the situation, 14 vetoes. Sometimes, some diplomats say the vetoes were not that bad, because if there was no veto, we need to be able to impose what the UN resolution might stipulate. So, in some cases, it was not like a terrible arrangement, even for Western powers who were protesting against the Russian use of veto.
So, the inability of dealing with the conflict, and the fact that it kept evolving one year after the other, created questions and problems that we will live with for a long period of time. Definitely we cannot explain the Russian war in Ukraine based on the Syrian model. For sure, there are historical contexts and reasons for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But if Russia was not allowed to intervene the way it did in Syria, I’m not sure the same configuration in the invasion of Ukraine that happened; Syria allowed Russia to feel much more confident in its aggressive policy, and made its invasion of Ukraine, I think, more possible.
The other thing, is that the refugee crisis, did lead in some places to hysteria. Not only in Europe, by the way, in Lebanon also, in Turkey in the last few years also. But parts of the reasons for this hysterical rise of the far right in many places, is related to migration and refugees, and for sure the Syrian crisis and the millions of Syrian refugees, in a way were part of the reason of that. Which means leaving the country, abandoning the country, and allowing a régime and some forces to displace people the way this happened, without any intervention, also had consequences elsewhere. In Europe, around the Mediterranean, and in the neighbouring countries where racism, crisis, instrumentalisation of the misery of the refugees, are now parts, characteristics, of the domestic political scenes.
And, of course, Syria is given as an example now in the Arab world. Whoever speaks again about revolution, revolutionary attempts, revolutionary aspirations, democratic transition; ah, you want to become like Syria. Exactly as a few years before, they use to say, ah, you want to become like Iraq. Or like Libya at the beginning of the revolutions. So Syria became a kind of a model. A kind of example given, always, you want Syria, or stability, even if under a dictator. You want Syria, and becoming a refugee, or you accept a Sisi or a Saied or many examples can be given.
And of course, Gulf countries used that example on many occasions as well, promoting what they call stability, rather than what revolutions create in terms of instability. So the counter-revolutionary model took Syria as an example, and built on it to end any democratic aspiration; even if that did not really work well, because remember 2019 Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria, the second wave of Arab revolutions. But once again, they were defeated, like most of the previous ones. They were defeated, but it showed that the story is not over in a way. That there are still dynamics, and there are still factors that might bring people again to the streets; even if two defeats, and the second defeat immediately after it, Covid, and all the crisis that followed, and then the collapse of the Lebanese economy, and the civil war in Sudan.
It’s not encouraging any more, but for now we can see that revolutionary model was defeated, but maybe it’s not like a final defeat, or a definite defeat.
So the war that Russia will lead, two years later will see its impact, after seizing back eastern Aleppo, after taking over the Ghouta and Daraa, ending with Homs before and then with northern Hama, pushing away any threat on the city, plus Deir Ezzor. So the régime will connect most of its cities, except for Idlib and Raqqa, as important cities, will control them.
And in between, due to the fact that the Kurdish militias supported by the Americans were fighting Daesh on the ground, there would be an expansion of the Kurdish territorial control, that pushed Turkey to intervene directly, after being indirectly behind some of the opposition groups.
So by 2018, and after the two summers of 2017/18, by March 2019, because this is when Trump declared the war on Daesh as mission accomplished; since that time, we have a kind of statico. It’s not always 100% the same map, sometimes there are a few clashes here and there, that might change part of the control in this territory or the other; but in general, the map is the same since 2018. The régime controls 60% now of the territory, the Kurdish militias supported by the Americans control around 20-25%, and then you have 10-12% in two different enclaves controlled by the oppositions. One of them directly supported by Turkey, the other by the Americans in the south. And you have the Russian army, the Iranian forces and the series of militias they brought, you have the American army, the Turkish army, and you have regularly Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah bases and on Iranian convoys in Syria. So, a country with different occupation forces.
So, this is the map now of the control. You can see it in red you have the régime, the Russians, the Iranians and their allies. In green you have the oppositions. When I say the oppositions, it’s rival groups, they’re not like a unified camp. So you have here in the Tanf area military bases, some refugees living down there, and supported by the Americans. In that area, some forces of the opposition were trained exclusively or only to fight ISIS, when ISIS existed, and they refused. They said we want to fight the régime and ISIS, so their mission was put on hold. And since that time, they have been in those bases. Sometimes they are attacked by Iranian drones, sometimes nothing happens and the Americans retaliate and bomb Iranian militias, but this is an area controlled by the opposition.
And that area in the north, where you have as well al-Nusra or Tahrir al-Sham, former al-Qaeda, in Idlib; and different groups of oppositions in the other part, directly supported by Turkey. In this area, you have the Turkish army present as well.
What is in yellow is the Kurdish controlled territory, with American bases, and a few special forces from France and Britain. And you have as well camps in this area, of the families of former Daesh fighters who were killed or captured by the Kurdish militias or by the Western allies. That is a big issue, whether they should return or not return. I think in different European countries, the debate exists, and each country adopted a different approach to it.
So, a fragmented country, an occupied country, and at the same time the destructions in Syria – that’s why I said at the beginning it’s a laboratory, maybe now in Gaza the destructions are more important too, the intensity of the bombing is much higher, and the space is much smaller - but what they call in French urbicide, you can say it; this urbicide, whether in Aleppo, whether in Homs, whether in some other places, the amount of destruction you see, was clearly also on purpose. To displace people, to make it impossible for them to return, because the question of the refugees, and the question of the displacement, was the policy, was the demographic policy based on sectarian or confessional lines.
And Assad did not hide it in two occasions when he mentioned that the Syrian social fabric or social tissue is much better now, when he said that those who left, he did not say they could not return, but he said that the country is much better now, and is more homogenous after their departure. Plus he refused their return during the process of normalisation with Saudi Arabia recently. After the normalisation with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The three also who normalised at the same time with Israel their relations.
Now, what I said at the beginning about this laboratory, in addition to the map and the layers that we saw, with a conflict that had many wars at the same time. There is a kind of Kurdish/ Arab tribes war in the east, there are wars between many opposition groups, there are rival groups loyal to the régime, there is a war between the régime and the oppositions, there is a war between Russia and Iran on the one hand opposing them to the opposition, there were clashes between Turkey and Russia and then they reconciled, there are clashes between Turkey and Kurds that are negotiated regularly by the Americans and the Russians in order to contain them, Israel bombs Hezbollah and sometimes Hezbollah retaliates.
So you have different conflicts taking place at the same time, and the national cause of the Syrians in that sense, got lost. It did not disappear, it did not vanish, but it was lost in between all those ongoing conflicts and struggles on the Syrian land. It became an incarnation of the UN inability to deal with the situation, 14 vetoes. Sometimes, some diplomats say the vetoes were not that bad, because if there was no veto, we need to be able to impose what the UN resolution might stipulate. So, in some cases, it was not like a terrible arrangement, even for Western powers who were protesting against the Russian use of veto.
So, the inability of dealing with the conflict, and the fact that it kept evolving one year after the other, created questions and problems that we will live with for a long period of time. Definitely we cannot explain the Russian war in Ukraine based on the Syrian model. For sure, there are historical contexts and reasons for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But if Russia was not allowed to intervene the way it did in Syria, I’m not sure the same configuration in the invasion of Ukraine that happened; Syria allowed Russia to feel much more confident in its aggressive policy, and made its invasion of Ukraine, I think, more possible.
The other thing, is that the refugee crisis, did lead in some places to hysteria. Not only in Europe, by the way, in Lebanon also, in Turkey in the last few years also. But parts of the reasons for this hysterical rise of the far right in many places, is related to migration and refugees, and for sure the Syrian crisis and the millions of Syrian refugees, in a way were part of the reason of that. Which means leaving the country, abandoning the country, and allowing a régime and some forces to displace people the way this happened, without any intervention, also had consequences elsewhere. In Europe, around the Mediterranean, and in the neighbouring countries where racism, crisis, instrumentalisation of the misery of the refugees, are now parts, characteristics, of the domestic political scenes.
And, of course, Syria is given as an example now in the Arab world. Whoever speaks again about revolution, revolutionary attempts, revolutionary aspirations, democratic transition; ah, you want to become like Syria. Exactly as a few years before, they use to say, ah, you want to become like Iraq. Or like Libya at the beginning of the revolutions. So Syria became a kind of a model. A kind of example given, always, you want Syria, or stability, even if under a dictator. You want Syria, and becoming a refugee, or you accept a Sisi or a Saied or many examples can be given.
And of course, Gulf countries used that example on many occasions as well, promoting what they call stability, rather than what revolutions create in terms of instability. So the counter-revolutionary model took Syria as an example, and built on it to end any democratic aspiration; even if that did not really work well, because remember 2019 Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria, the second wave of Arab revolutions. But once again, they were defeated, like most of the previous ones. They were defeated, but it showed that the story is not over in a way. That there are still dynamics, and there are still factors that might bring people again to the streets; even if two defeats, and the second defeat immediately after it, Covid, and all the crisis that followed, and then the collapse of the Lebanese economy, and the civil war in Sudan.
It’s not encouraging any more, but for now we can see that revolutionary model was defeated, but maybe it’s not like a final defeat, or a definite defeat.
Syria became a laboratory of violence. I think this is the most documented conflict in history. We’ve seen almost everything. Sometimes the criminals themselves filmed what they did. We don’t know if they did it in order to frighten the others, in order to be proud about what they did. I think you also recently in the Guardian the films that were brought from Tadamon massacre, where they are laughing, while asking people to run and then shooting them, and then burning them. There are tens of videos, if not hundreds of videos like that, filmed by the killers, the perpetrators, themselves.
Plus you have lots of statistics, about all airstrikes. There are lots of satellites as well, filming all the time, showing all the time. There were some alerts about a possible airstrike would take place here, take place there. So it is extremely well documented. And that might be a basis, not only for a historical archive, but also a good basis for later judicial procedures, maybe some investigations.
This is the most documented conflict, and the philosophy of violence of the régime is not like just it’s war and everything is allowed. No. There were clear messages through the violence. For instance, not giving the families the bodies of their beloved ones who were killed under torture, or were just killed and their bodies were taken, is not something because of lack of administrative capacities. No. It is not allowing them to turn pages, to consider that they can go on. It is to keep them suspended in time, always waiting, always paralysed. It’s a way of paralysing a whole society, and that’s why there are still more than 100,000 people in jail in Syria under the régime control. Why wouldn’t they release them, they’re not any more a threat? The régime is not threatened any more, with the Russians. To keep them is also to paralyse millions of people: relatives, friends, families; who don’t want to talk about them.
There’s an economy that has been built, a mafia economy. I pay people money to get some information. And in many cases, the information is wrong, they are just lies, they are taking the money. Or I pay someone money, so they will treat my brother or my father or my son a bit better. They will give him some better food. They send food sometimes, and many people are still in Damascus. They don’t want to leave, because they hope that one day, maybe he is alive, maybe she is alive.
So that kind of paralysing a society is not just arbitrary violence, it’s a well-thought and planned violence. Exactly as the destruction of all suburbs of cities, with the idea of one day reconstructing these areas with a different economic model, for other social classes, and maybe for people from other communities as well, in a sectarian system, and sectarian régime approach.
The other issue, is allowing people to steal, what the Syrians call taafish, from afish, which means the furniture, meaning seizing the furniture. Taking what is so intimate. The idea of not only destroying the public space where you can live, but I will also destroy your private place. I will seize all your memories, all whatever you lived with, the furniture, your pictures; and I will sell them at markets, that were called the Sunni market, souk Sunna, in order to create more sectarian anger and hatred, and to divide the society even more. So this is also a well-thought policy.
The question of imposing sieges. I don’t know if you saw pictures from the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp, or from the Ghouta of Damascus, or from many other places. Besieging people, without a military in fact need, because the balance of power is so clear. And they have the air force, and they have the Russians. But it is also, to keep in their mind forever, that they suffered hunger, that they were suffocating under the siege, that the régime can do whatever it wanted to do with them, that their lives were just the matter of a decision.’
Plus you have lots of statistics, about all airstrikes. There are lots of satellites as well, filming all the time, showing all the time. There were some alerts about a possible airstrike would take place here, take place there. So it is extremely well documented. And that might be a basis, not only for a historical archive, but also a good basis for later judicial procedures, maybe some investigations.
This is the most documented conflict, and the philosophy of violence of the régime is not like just it’s war and everything is allowed. No. There were clear messages through the violence. For instance, not giving the families the bodies of their beloved ones who were killed under torture, or were just killed and their bodies were taken, is not something because of lack of administrative capacities. No. It is not allowing them to turn pages, to consider that they can go on. It is to keep them suspended in time, always waiting, always paralysed. It’s a way of paralysing a whole society, and that’s why there are still more than 100,000 people in jail in Syria under the régime control. Why wouldn’t they release them, they’re not any more a threat? The régime is not threatened any more, with the Russians. To keep them is also to paralyse millions of people: relatives, friends, families; who don’t want to talk about them.
There’s an economy that has been built, a mafia economy. I pay people money to get some information. And in many cases, the information is wrong, they are just lies, they are taking the money. Or I pay someone money, so they will treat my brother or my father or my son a bit better. They will give him some better food. They send food sometimes, and many people are still in Damascus. They don’t want to leave, because they hope that one day, maybe he is alive, maybe she is alive.
So that kind of paralysing a society is not just arbitrary violence, it’s a well-thought and planned violence. Exactly as the destruction of all suburbs of cities, with the idea of one day reconstructing these areas with a different economic model, for other social classes, and maybe for people from other communities as well, in a sectarian system, and sectarian régime approach.
The other issue, is allowing people to steal, what the Syrians call taafish, from afish, which means the furniture, meaning seizing the furniture. Taking what is so intimate. The idea of not only destroying the public space where you can live, but I will also destroy your private place. I will seize all your memories, all whatever you lived with, the furniture, your pictures; and I will sell them at markets, that were called the Sunni market, souk Sunna, in order to create more sectarian anger and hatred, and to divide the society even more. So this is also a well-thought policy.
The question of imposing sieges. I don’t know if you saw pictures from the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp, or from the Ghouta of Damascus, or from many other places. Besieging people, without a military in fact need, because the balance of power is so clear. And they have the air force, and they have the Russians. But it is also, to keep in their mind forever, that they suffered hunger, that they were suffocating under the siege, that the régime can do whatever it wanted to do with them, that their lives were just the matter of a decision.’
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