'There has been much talk about Russia’s supposed intent to abandon Syrian President Bashar Assad. This theory was backed by Russian media reports of Moscow being disappointed by Assad and his entourage’s inability to maintain control of areas that the régime had regained thanks to the Russian military effort beginning in September 2015.
The Syrian war went through several stages, including a crucial juncture in 2012 and another in 2015.
The near collapse of the Syrian régime began in 2012 when major cities, one by one, started rejecting the régime. The revolution started with the south-western city of Daraa rebelling after a group of its youth were killed in retaliation by the régime’s security forces. And yet, Daraa was always pro-régime, even though it is a Sunni city with some Christian and Druze presence. It is more of a rural town than anything else and quite different from Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. Daraa was home to a real bourgeoisie, for which Hafez Assad always had a strong dislike. But, Hafez Assad was very skilled at establishing internal alliances in order to surround the Sunni communities of the large cities. He also began to remove senior Sunni officers from the army quite early in his reign, as the Alawites marched on Latakia from the countryside and mountains in order to change the demographic and cultural character of the city, which was originally Sunni-Christian.
In 2012, Damascus was in serious danger of falling to the revolution. The alternative Alawite project based on the concept of the “Useful Syria” was not a viable one, despite the efforts made since 1970 to surround the city with Alawite neighbourhoods. That’s when Iran intervened after discovering that the régime forces were not skilled at urban warfare. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with its experience in suppressing popular movements in Iranian cities in 2009, did not stop at just training Syrian forces to suppress the turmoil in Syrian cities. It took the extra step of sending its forces to Syria, while Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei asked Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah to send forces into the Syrian interior.
Arab diplomatic circles recount that Nasrallah told Khamenei that the price of such an intervention would be enormous, to which the supreme leader responded that this was required of Hezbollah regardless of the price it would have to pay.
Enter Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. His assignment was to save Bashar Assad and his régime. He succeeded to a great extent but, in 2015, it became clear that he and Assad needed Russia’s help. Russia submitted to them its conditions and Soleimani immediately flew to Moscow to meet with Russian officials. Likewise, Assad flew to Moscow and met with President Vladimir Putin.
The near collapse of the Syrian régime began in 2012 when major cities, one by one, started rejecting the régime. The revolution started with the south-western city of Daraa rebelling after a group of its youth were killed in retaliation by the régime’s security forces. And yet, Daraa was always pro-régime, even though it is a Sunni city with some Christian and Druze presence. It is more of a rural town than anything else and quite different from Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. Daraa was home to a real bourgeoisie, for which Hafez Assad always had a strong dislike. But, Hafez Assad was very skilled at establishing internal alliances in order to surround the Sunni communities of the large cities. He also began to remove senior Sunni officers from the army quite early in his reign, as the Alawites marched on Latakia from the countryside and mountains in order to change the demographic and cultural character of the city, which was originally Sunni-Christian.
In 2012, Damascus was in serious danger of falling to the revolution. The alternative Alawite project based on the concept of the “Useful Syria” was not a viable one, despite the efforts made since 1970 to surround the city with Alawite neighbourhoods. That’s when Iran intervened after discovering that the régime forces were not skilled at urban warfare. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with its experience in suppressing popular movements in Iranian cities in 2009, did not stop at just training Syrian forces to suppress the turmoil in Syrian cities. It took the extra step of sending its forces to Syria, while Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei asked Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah to send forces into the Syrian interior.
Arab diplomatic circles recount that Nasrallah told Khamenei that the price of such an intervention would be enormous, to which the supreme leader responded that this was required of Hezbollah regardless of the price it would have to pay.
Enter Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. His assignment was to save Bashar Assad and his régime. He succeeded to a great extent but, in 2015, it became clear that he and Assad needed Russia’s help. Russia submitted to them its conditions and Soleimani immediately flew to Moscow to meet with Russian officials. Likewise, Assad flew to Moscow and met with President Vladimir Putin.
Russia’s direct military intervention quickly changed the rules of the game in Syria. The Assad régime regained the initiative militarily. It regained full control of Damascus and surrounding areas, recaptured Aleppo and Hama, and destroyed a good part of Homs, arriving finally at Daraa.
The Russians resorted mainly to air strikes, using modern Sukhoi bombers to hit both civilian and military targets. On the ground, however, they had to rely on the régime’s forces, which had no qualms about using explosive barrels against civilians, and on the Iranians and their various sectarian militias.
In the meantime, the US administration was willing, since the summer of 2013, to overlook any violations in Syria in order to accommodate Iran. In August 2013, the Syrian régime used chemical weapons in Ghouta, despite previous warnings against crossing any such “red lines” by then US President Barack Obama. But in the end, the Americans did nothing.
It is undeniable that, before 2015, the Syrian régime had benefited tremendously from the secret US-Iranian negotiations under Obama in order to reach an agreement regarding its nuclear programme. Throughout these negotiations, which later became public, the Obama administration had been careful not to anger Iran, especially in Syria.
Russia went on to consolidate its presence in Syria. It neutralised Turkey and reached some understandings with Israel. But now, fewer than five years after its direct intervention to save the Syrian régime, the Russians are showing signs that they are fed up with it. They have realised that there are limits to Iran’s ability to continue assisting this régime in light of its own economic hardships at home, suffered at the hands of US economic sanctions and the decline of oil and gas prices. Russia is not doing great economically itself either after engaging in an oil-price war with Saudi Arabia. Despite agreements reached recently between both sides following an American request, there are no indications that oil prices are likely to recover in the foreseeable future. This explains to a large extent why Russia has had to find understandings with Turkey in Syria. On top of all of that, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that Russia is not immune to a major crisis coming its way – one that has already caused devastating blows to more developed countries with better infrastructure.
The Russians resorted mainly to air strikes, using modern Sukhoi bombers to hit both civilian and military targets. On the ground, however, they had to rely on the régime’s forces, which had no qualms about using explosive barrels against civilians, and on the Iranians and their various sectarian militias.
In the meantime, the US administration was willing, since the summer of 2013, to overlook any violations in Syria in order to accommodate Iran. In August 2013, the Syrian régime used chemical weapons in Ghouta, despite previous warnings against crossing any such “red lines” by then US President Barack Obama. But in the end, the Americans did nothing.
It is undeniable that, before 2015, the Syrian régime had benefited tremendously from the secret US-Iranian negotiations under Obama in order to reach an agreement regarding its nuclear programme. Throughout these negotiations, which later became public, the Obama administration had been careful not to anger Iran, especially in Syria.
Russia went on to consolidate its presence in Syria. It neutralised Turkey and reached some understandings with Israel. But now, fewer than five years after its direct intervention to save the Syrian régime, the Russians are showing signs that they are fed up with it. They have realised that there are limits to Iran’s ability to continue assisting this régime in light of its own economic hardships at home, suffered at the hands of US economic sanctions and the decline of oil and gas prices. Russia is not doing great economically itself either after engaging in an oil-price war with Saudi Arabia. Despite agreements reached recently between both sides following an American request, there are no indications that oil prices are likely to recover in the foreseeable future. This explains to a large extent why Russia has had to find understandings with Turkey in Syria. On top of all of that, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that Russia is not immune to a major crisis coming its way – one that has already caused devastating blows to more developed countries with better infrastructure.
Iran’s intervention in Syria was contrary to common sense and nature. It was bound to be rejected by the majority of Syrians. No matter how much land it buys or how many demographic changes it carries out, Iran will not change the profound character of Syrian society. As for Russia, there are limits to what it can accomplish in Syria, especially in the absence of the tools that it can rely on to build a new professional army possessing a mental orientation that will be completely different from the one instilled in Assad’s army.
Several factors will push Russia to seriously consider a change of strategy in Syria: First, the fact that it no longer shares a common objective with Iran, and second, that it can no longer rely on a régime that does not possess a viable political project for Syria.
Moscow discovered rather late that the régime it was protecting needed to have some kind of legitimacy while the Damascus rulers were only interested in remaining in power at any cost.
At some stage, the régime decided to play the Iranian card, then at another, it played the Russian card. It even managed to play both cards at the same time. But, in the end, there is a price for any military intervention. With the drastic changes in the oil market, and in light of a looming COVID-19 pandemic, Russia needs to reconsider its Syrian policy.'
Several factors will push Russia to seriously consider a change of strategy in Syria: First, the fact that it no longer shares a common objective with Iran, and second, that it can no longer rely on a régime that does not possess a viable political project for Syria.
Moscow discovered rather late that the régime it was protecting needed to have some kind of legitimacy while the Damascus rulers were only interested in remaining in power at any cost.
At some stage, the régime decided to play the Iranian card, then at another, it played the Russian card. It even managed to play both cards at the same time. But, in the end, there is a price for any military intervention. With the drastic changes in the oil market, and in light of a looming COVID-19 pandemic, Russia needs to reconsider its Syrian policy.'
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