'Assadist System of Rule:
Nominally, Bashar al-Assad is still 'President of the Syrian Arab Republic'. This title has all the top executive powers. The result is that Bashar's personal authority is the same like state authority and all of his powers are derived from it.
Further down the chain of command, civilian authorities of Syria are divided into 14 governorates; the governorates are divided into a total of 60 districts, which are further divided into sub-districts.
A governorate is governed by a governor, which is appointed by the President (and only nominally approved by the 'Syrian government'). The governor is responsible – only to the president – for administration and public work, health, domestic trade, agriculture, industry, civil defence, and maintenance of law.
Each governor is assisted by a local council, which is elected by a popular vote for four-years terms: each council elects an executive bureau from its members, which works with district councils and administers the day-to-day issues.
Nominally, district councils were administered by officials appointed by the governor. These officials served as intermediaries between the central government and traditional local leaders (village chiefs, clan leaders and councils of elders). After six years of war, the reality is dramatically different.
Before the war, local councils were dominated by members of the Ba’ath Party. Meanwhile, and especially in northern Hama, there are also representatives of the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP); in Aleppo and Homs there are Hezbollah/Syria, etc., etc., etc..
Now, the essence of understanding the current system is knowing - and understanding - how it came into being. The background of all the militias (some are still naive enough to call them 'NDF') fighting 'for Assad' is the same. As the war erupted and then spread, Ba'athist local councils began organizing their own militias. About 50% of staff of these were members of the Ba’ath Party with a minimum of military training, and armed by the regime already since earlier times (early 1980s).
The importance of militias continued to grow with the dissolution of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA): more than half of its staff defected by spring of 2012, while a quarter was already lost in combat. The remaining units disintegrated through the orders to secure over 2,000 checkpoints all over Syria. In the course of this process, local militias absorbed all of the police and most of SAA’s functions (which was necessary due to massive defections). Correct me if you like, but AFAIK, no description of this - extremely complex - process is available online. The only description providing minute details for every single of 20 SAA's divisions is this one: Syrian Conflagration.
Concluding that local militias are more reliable and combat effective than the SAA, Iranian officers of the IRGC-QF (IRGC's Qods Force, i.e. 'Jerusalem Corps') then decided to expand and provide 'proper military training' (that's really a relative description) to units in question, and formalize their status. Additional militias came into being, most of which...nah: nearly all of which were recruited, established, trained and armed by the IRGC-QF. Initially, the system worked with help of local criminal networks. See so-called Shabbiha. Contrary to original militias of the Ba’ath (staffed by unpaid volunteers on temporary basis), these groups were staffed by so-called Shabbiha that served as professional militiamen. Regardless of their backgrounds militias took over the tasks of the police and began providing security.
The status of such militias was formalized through the establishment of the National Defence Force (NDF), in November 2012. There was never any kind of trace of doubt: the 'NDF' was established by the IRGC. Every single of its units. But mind: the IRGC never established a centralized command of the NDF. Instead, it dealt - and continues to deal - with every single of militia originally established as 'NDF' as a separate entity.
Ever since, militias are bolstered through intentional criminalisation of remaining SAA personnel: these are paid wages that make them unable to support their families, prompting continuous defections. In turn, militias are offering much higher wages and full amnesty from prosecution (whether of prosecution for defection or any other crime).
How is then the Assadist regime controlling this situation?
In a very simple fashion: through control of supplies. Then, as every stupid studying wars should know: supplies are the essence of war. No supplies = no war.
In Syria, all the stocks of food (including state-sponsored grain and egg-imports), fuel, electricity, arms and ammunition, public transport, telecommunications (Syria Tel), and water supply for large cities, are controlled by:
The president,
His ‘Inner Circle’ (Maher al-Assad, Mohammed Makhlouf, Rami Makhlouf, Havez Makhlouf, and Thou al-Himmah Shaleesh), and
The ‘Confidantes’ (Ali Mamlouk, Abdel Fattah Qudsiya, Jamil Hassan, Mohammad Nasif, Rustom Ghazaleh, Rafiq Shehadeh, Ali Younes, Mohammad Deeb Zaytoun, and Bassam al-Hassan).
Persons in question are in control over a conglomerate of major companies, some of which are in private hands (like Syria Tel, owned by Makhloufs), while others are state-owned. Control over all of related companies is exercised via intelligence services responsible directly to the President (Air Force Intelligence and Military Security Intelligence). Therefore, the President, members of the ‘Inner Circle’, and the ‘Confidantes’ are in control over the water supply, bread supply, electricity supply, phone and internet services, and fuel and fertilizer supply.
This means: anybody who wants to fight there - no matter for what reason - is dependable on the president, the 'Inner Circle', and the 'Confidantes' for arms, ammo, food, water, electricity etc. If these do not provide, the militia in question can't fight.
...which brings us to the topic of financing. This is a very complex issue, and I've discussed it already about a dozen of times (at least; the last time in the thread here). So let me just summarise it as follows: Assad regime is bankrupt since November 2011. Ever since, it's living from loans from Tehran. As of 2015-2016, the situation reached a point at which Tehran had to provide for up to 60% of Assadist budget. Nowadays, it's probably more. There is clear evidence for this and this is available online (can provide all the necessary links, if somebody is curious to pursue that story further).
With other words: the IRGC finances the president, his 'Inner Circle', and the 'Confidantes' - in turn making them able to exercise control over various militias (for which fools in the West still think are 'NDF').
The system of that control - exercised through such gangs like Quwwat Nimr - and distribution of supplies, is the essence of what is nowadays the 'SAA'. Means: there are 'divisional headquarters', based and still designated on old divisional designations of the SAA. Each of these is responsible for specific geographic area - and thus for supplying militias in the given area. That's why not only the Assadists but the Russians too have it as easy to claim, 'SAA' is doing this, and 'SAA' is doing that.
Is that all really that hard to understand...?
Financing:
There are few basic laws about any armed conflict. Primary of these is that MONEY is the essence of every war. The party that has the money can pay its combatants and buy their arms, ammo and other supplies. The party that has no money, can't do that. Long wars - like the one in Syria - are gulping money at incredible rates.
I'm now lazy to search for older links, so let me just observe that the Assadist regime went bankrupt already back in November 2011. It survived 2012 thanks to billions in fresh money printed in Russia, and the first few Iranian loans. Since 2013, Assadist regime cannot provide for more than 50% of its annual budget. Ever since, the situation is only getting worse. The last annual budget I attempted to reconstruct was the one for 2016, and it showed that the Assadist regime can't cover more than 40% of its (i.e. 'state') expenses.
The Assadist budget is in constant decline - from US$ 15 billion (real value) in 2011, to US$ 5.67 billion in 2017. During the same period, the World Bank's estimates for regime's reserves dropped from US$ 20 billion to US$ 700 million (by the end of 2015).
With other words: under most favourable conditions, as of 2016, the Assadist regime was only able of buying food, fuel, electricity, arms and ammunition, public transport, telecommunications, and water supply for - at most - 40% of troops nominally fighting for it.
Actually, that's the most enthusiastic assessment. Reason? Matter of fact is that the Assadist regime is NOT spending 100% of the money it earns for its military. On the contrary, it's unlikely to spend more than 50% of its money for the military, and this despite the war. This means that the regime can - at best - provide for something like 10-20% of troops nominally fighting for it (for number of troops in question, see below).
This is imposing the question: who is then paying for the survival of the Assad-Regime?
Answer: Tehran.
Tehran has never published official figures for its spending for war in Syria - and is unlikely to ever publish anything of that kind. The only way to find out the approximate amounts of money Iran is spending there is 'circumstantial', i.e. with help of reports like this one:
Iranian Economy, 2015 (PDF file)
(Note: I'm sure there are going to be readers screaming, 'not the NCRI again!' I'll agree with them: anything from the NCRI must be enjoyed with a truck-load of salt. However, in this case the report in question is little else but a word-by-word translation of the Iranian budget law for 2016, with some commentary. I.e. no matter what's his motivation, the author couldn't do anything wrong, insert any fake figures or anything of that kind.)
Under point 4 of the latter, you can find details on the Defence Budget. From what can be read there, it is obvious that this is gulping massive 23% of the entire national budget. Specifically:
MOD gets US$ 5.2 billion
IRGC gets 4.188 billion
Army/Air Force/Navy are getting 1.9 billion
JCS gets 0.6 billion
Internal security services are getting 1.7 billion
MOI and other intelligence services about 0.6 billion
Construction projects related to security 0.4 billion
'Subventions for loyalists' cost 3.8 billion (!)
Spread of Islamic fundamentalism costs 1.5 billion.
Note that the IRGC gets more than two times the budget of the entire conventional military. And that's not to talk about various intelligence services, 'subventions for loyalists', and even less so on IRGC's income from the Iranian, Iraq and (meanwhile) Syrian economy - which is no part of the Iranian budget, first and foremost.
And then: this is still not all Iran is spending for defence: there are separate budgets for 'security issues', nuclear program (supposedly 'only' US$743 million; actual costs of the program between 1986 and 2013 are estimated at between US$100 and 170 billion!!!), missile program (alone the acquisition of North Korean know-how from 2009 cost Iran no less but US$ 11 billion!), Qods Force (IRGC-QF) etc.
With other words, real spending includes the published budget + extra budgets for specific projects + secret budget + IRGC income (from parts of economy it owns) + subventions provided directly from the budget of the 'Leader of the Islamic Revolution'...
Now, considering the IRGC and the IRGC-QF have no major arms acquisition projects running, while nuclear- and missile-related projects have their own budgets - question is: what for do they spend 4.188 billion from their official budget? Not to talk about: what for do they spend from their unofficial budgets...?
Considering how much is the IRGC spending for 'unknown' purposes, I would say that the answer is crystal clear.
With other words: under most favourable conditions, as of 2016, the Assadist regime was only able of buying food, fuel, electricity, arms and ammunition, public transport, telecommunications, and water supply for - at most - 40% of troops nominally fighting for it.
Actually, that's the most enthusiastic assessment. Reason? Matter of fact is that the Assadist regime is NOT spending 100% of the money it earns for its military. On the contrary, it's unlikely to spend more than 50% of its money for the military, and this despite the war. This means that the regime can - at best - provide for something like 10-20% of troops nominally fighting for it (for number of troops in question, see below).
This is imposing the question: who is then paying for the survival of the Assad-Regime?
Answer: Tehran.
Tehran has never published official figures for its spending for war in Syria - and is unlikely to ever publish anything of that kind. The only way to find out the approximate amounts of money Iran is spending there is 'circumstantial', i.e. with help of reports like this one:
Iranian Economy, 2015 (PDF file)
(Note: I'm sure there are going to be readers screaming, 'not the NCRI again!' I'll agree with them: anything from the NCRI must be enjoyed with a truck-load of salt. However, in this case the report in question is little else but a word-by-word translation of the Iranian budget law for 2016, with some commentary. I.e. no matter what's his motivation, the author couldn't do anything wrong, insert any fake figures or anything of that kind.)
Under point 4 of the latter, you can find details on the Defence Budget. From what can be read there, it is obvious that this is gulping massive 23% of the entire national budget. Specifically:
MOD gets US$ 5.2 billion
IRGC gets 4.188 billion
Army/Air Force/Navy are getting 1.9 billion
JCS gets 0.6 billion
Internal security services are getting 1.7 billion
MOI and other intelligence services about 0.6 billion
Construction projects related to security 0.4 billion
'Subventions for loyalists' cost 3.8 billion (!)
Spread of Islamic fundamentalism costs 1.5 billion.
Note that the IRGC gets more than two times the budget of the entire conventional military. And that's not to talk about various intelligence services, 'subventions for loyalists', and even less so on IRGC's income from the Iranian, Iraq and (meanwhile) Syrian economy - which is no part of the Iranian budget, first and foremost.
And then: this is still not all Iran is spending for defence: there are separate budgets for 'security issues', nuclear program (supposedly 'only' US$743 million; actual costs of the program between 1986 and 2013 are estimated at between US$100 and 170 billion!!!), missile program (alone the acquisition of North Korean know-how from 2009 cost Iran no less but US$ 11 billion!), Qods Force (IRGC-QF) etc.
With other words, real spending includes the published budget + extra budgets for specific projects + secret budget + IRGC income (from parts of economy it owns) + subventions provided directly from the budget of the 'Leader of the Islamic Revolution'...
Now, considering the IRGC and the IRGC-QF have no major arms acquisition projects running, while nuclear- and missile-related projects have their own budgets - question is: what for do they spend 4.188 billion from their official budget? Not to talk about: what for do they spend from their unofficial budgets...?
Considering how much is the IRGC spending for 'unknown' purposes, I would say that the answer is crystal clear.
Troop Strength:
Estimates were ranging between a minimum and maximum of following troops:
Assadists: 50,000-80,000
Russians: 4,751-10,300 (here my estimate is slightly different; for details, see below)
Hezbollah: 5,000-10,000
IRGC: 13,000-16,000 (Iranian troops)
IRGC: 40,000-47,000 (non-Iranian troops staffing various of IRGC's, Hezbollah/Syria's, Hezbollah/Iraq's and other allied formations).
This meant following totals: - Assadists: 50,000-80,000 - Foreign Troops: 62,751-83,300
Commentary:
1.) IMHO, the figure of 4,571 Russian troops in Syria can be seen as something like 'average' and 'conservative'. That number is based on the number of Russian citizens eligible to vote in Russian elections - i.e. at one, certain point in time. There are times when this number is much higher. For example, back in October 2015, up to 20 battalion-sized task forces of the Russian Army were identified as deployed in the country (I provided a detailed ORBAT for Russian ground formations in period October 2015-March 2016 in the thread here). Depending on its type, a battalion of the Russian army has between 360 and 700 troops. That would mean anything between 7,200 and 14,000 troops. Then add their two-regiments-sized aviation group to that figure - and you've got the picture.
2.) Considering the average rate of about 450 casualties a month (based on people monitoring related reporting in the social media on Assad-controlled territories) - and that for Assadists alone - these figures are meanwhile obsolete. I.e. Assadists have lost about 5,400 KIA (just KIA!) over the last 12 months, and are thus at anything between 45,000 and 75,000 troops.
3.) Unsurprisingly (because of Assadist losses), and considering [reports of this kind](), alone the IRGC meanwhile has 80,000 troops in Syria.
4.) Finally, majority of Syrian nationals considered as serving for Assadists in these estimates are actually not serving in Assadist formations any more. On the contrary, as can be read here, no less than 88,723 Syrians nationals are serving under IRGC's control, meanwhile.
Changes in Demography:
For anybody who might be 'surprised' by conclusions and figures posted above, and especially for all the characters who are now going to scream and cry 'don't believe', 'nonsense' and anything similar... well, sorry: this is just showing the extension of parallel universe in which you live. Namely, widespread practice of mis-reporting about this war by the msm but especially by the social media - resulted in creation of an alternative universe in which the Assadist state and the military are fully intact. Actually, they are not the least: they are only 'nominally existent' - because they're serving Iranian and Russian interests.
The dissolution of the Assadist state and military is a direct result of the popular uprising of 2011-2012, then the provocation of a sectarian and religious war by Assadists, 2012-2013, and then the Iranian military intervention launched in late 2012.
Russians: 4,751-10,300 (here my estimate is slightly different; for details, see below)
Hezbollah: 5,000-10,000
IRGC: 13,000-16,000 (Iranian troops)
IRGC: 40,000-47,000 (non-Iranian troops staffing various of IRGC's, Hezbollah/Syria's, Hezbollah/Iraq's and other allied formations).
This meant following totals: - Assadists: 50,000-80,000 - Foreign Troops: 62,751-83,300
Commentary:
1.) IMHO, the figure of 4,571 Russian troops in Syria can be seen as something like 'average' and 'conservative'. That number is based on the number of Russian citizens eligible to vote in Russian elections - i.e. at one, certain point in time. There are times when this number is much higher. For example, back in October 2015, up to 20 battalion-sized task forces of the Russian Army were identified as deployed in the country (I provided a detailed ORBAT for Russian ground formations in period October 2015-March 2016 in the thread here). Depending on its type, a battalion of the Russian army has between 360 and 700 troops. That would mean anything between 7,200 and 14,000 troops. Then add their two-regiments-sized aviation group to that figure - and you've got the picture.
2.) Considering the average rate of about 450 casualties a month (based on people monitoring related reporting in the social media on Assad-controlled territories) - and that for Assadists alone - these figures are meanwhile obsolete. I.e. Assadists have lost about 5,400 KIA (just KIA!) over the last 12 months, and are thus at anything between 45,000 and 75,000 troops.
3.) Unsurprisingly (because of Assadist losses), and considering [reports of this kind](), alone the IRGC meanwhile has 80,000 troops in Syria.
4.) Finally, majority of Syrian nationals considered as serving for Assadists in these estimates are actually not serving in Assadist formations any more. On the contrary, as can be read here, no less than 88,723 Syrians nationals are serving under IRGC's control, meanwhile.
Changes in Demography:
For anybody who might be 'surprised' by conclusions and figures posted above, and especially for all the characters who are now going to scream and cry 'don't believe', 'nonsense' and anything similar... well, sorry: this is just showing the extension of parallel universe in which you live. Namely, widespread practice of mis-reporting about this war by the msm but especially by the social media - resulted in creation of an alternative universe in which the Assadist state and the military are fully intact. Actually, they are not the least: they are only 'nominally existent' - because they're serving Iranian and Russian interests.
The dissolution of the Assadist state and military is a direct result of the popular uprising of 2011-2012, then the provocation of a sectarian and religious war by Assadists, 2012-2013, and then the Iranian military intervention launched in late 2012.
Conclusions about Troop Strength and Composition:
Assadists have far less than '50,000 troops' mentioned above: the figure is unlikely to be higher than 30,000.
The IRGC-QF is likely to have up to 160,000 combatants under its control in Syria, of which roughly 50% are Syrian nationals, and 50% foreigners.
With other words: numbers alone are making it clear that there's not only no SAA any more: they're making it clear that there's no 'Assadists' to speak about any more. The entire 'Syrian Army' story is a scam of epic proportions.
Correspondingly, anybody discussing terms like 'the Syrians who support Assad' is actually talking about figures that are not comparable even with with the pre-war population of Tel Rifat any more.
Assadist Authorisations for IRGC-QF's Commanders:
Of course, there are still going to be characters denying even the possibility of all of this happening - although it should be more than well-known, meanwhile, that the IRGC-QF's commanders have received sweeping authorisations from nobody else but Bashar al-Assad. Indeed, a summary of everything above should make it crystal clear: it's the IRGC-QF that has the final word in Assadist-Syria. Assad and his 'Inner Circle' are little more but 'puppets' or 'useful fools' nowadays.
Obviously, in a country hamstrung by a regime as oppressive as that of Assadists - and then since 40+ years - nothing of that kind is possible to happen without an official approval, i.e. Assad's orders to 'his' commanders to listen to the IRGC-QF.
The situation in which the Assadist regime, its warlords and their 30,000 troops are supported by up to 160,000 IRGC-QF-controlled combatants is absolutely no surprise. On the contrary: it's a logical result of years long and very intensive conversion of the Assadist state into an IRGC-QF's fiefdom.'
Assadists have far less than '50,000 troops' mentioned above: the figure is unlikely to be higher than 30,000.
The IRGC-QF is likely to have up to 160,000 combatants under its control in Syria, of which roughly 50% are Syrian nationals, and 50% foreigners.
With other words: numbers alone are making it clear that there's not only no SAA any more: they're making it clear that there's no 'Assadists' to speak about any more. The entire 'Syrian Army' story is a scam of epic proportions.
Correspondingly, anybody discussing terms like 'the Syrians who support Assad' is actually talking about figures that are not comparable even with with the pre-war population of Tel Rifat any more.
Assadist Authorisations for IRGC-QF's Commanders:
Of course, there are still going to be characters denying even the possibility of all of this happening - although it should be more than well-known, meanwhile, that the IRGC-QF's commanders have received sweeping authorisations from nobody else but Bashar al-Assad. Indeed, a summary of everything above should make it crystal clear: it's the IRGC-QF that has the final word in Assadist-Syria. Assad and his 'Inner Circle' are little more but 'puppets' or 'useful fools' nowadays.
Obviously, in a country hamstrung by a regime as oppressive as that of Assadists - and then since 40+ years - nothing of that kind is possible to happen without an official approval, i.e. Assad's orders to 'his' commanders to listen to the IRGC-QF.
The situation in which the Assadist regime, its warlords and their 30,000 troops are supported by up to 160,000 IRGC-QF-controlled combatants is absolutely no surprise. On the contrary: it's a logical result of years long and very intensive conversion of the Assadist state into an IRGC-QF's fiefdom.'
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