The love of freedom

 

 'The life story of Yassin al-Haj Saleh, one of Syria's most important writers, tells a lot about the ongoing tragedy in his homeland. He almost died this year in Paris. He was invited to a podium discussion on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Syrian Revolution, and to read from his books in which he explains why there is much more raging in his homeland than just war.

The morning before the return flight from Paris, al-Haj Saleh received a positive corona test result. He was left alone in a friend's apartment. And got very sick. It was difficult for him to breathe, he was in unimaginable pain, but he didn't call for help, just lay there. Three days long. Until the friend worried that al-Haj Saleh wouldn't answer the phone. In the intensive care unit, the oxygen level in the blood was only 86 percent. It was very close, so says al-Haj Saleh. The doctor asked: How did you endure it? Why are you only coming now?

 A few weeks later, in June, he says softly, but firmly, in English: "I endured the pain in Paris because I longed deeply to punish myself."

 In the face of death he realized again that he was unable to convince himself that it was only a mistake from today's perspective to leave Samira behind in Douma near Damascus, eight years ago. About the fact that they had no choice and couldn't know. At that time, Al-Haj Saleh wanted to go north, to his family in Raqqa, the city he came from, just captured by the rebels, and help build something there. Artists gathered, a new newspaper was published. But the only way out of Douma, controlled by the radical Salafist militia Jaish al-Islam and besieged by government troops, a good 400 kilometres in total, many on foot, would - everyone said - too dangerous for his wife, the human rights activist Samira Khalil. In addition, she did important work for the Violations Documentation Center in Syria (VDC) in Douma, with which she later documented the attack on the Eastern Ghouta, with the nerve gas sarin by the Syrian Air Force in August 2013, in which, according to US data, 1,400 people are said to have died. But Khalil also documented the attacks by opposition members. She would follow al-Haj as soon as it was safer.



 Yassin al-Haj Saleh arrived in Raqqa after 19 days, but in the meantime his two brothers who lived there had been abducted by ISIS. Al-Haj Saleh went into hiding with his sister-in-law and her young son. After two months he managed to flee to Turkey, to Istanbul. He and Samira discussed on Skype how their departure would also be possible, the situation changed every hour. The conversations grew shakier. There was hardly any electricity left in the Duma. His great love only appeared blurred on the screen, as if they were getting further and further apart.

 On December 9, 2013, Samira Khalil, who despite threats still did not cover her hair when she took to the streets, was found together with prominent activist Razan Zaitouneh and her colleagues Nazem Hamadi and Wa'el Hamada by armed men from Jaish al -Islam kidnapped from the office of their NGO. Since then she has disappeared without a trace. And the author Yassin al-Haj Saleh, whom some call "Syria's voice of conscience" and others the "doctor of the revolution", feels, besides the grief, this extreme guilt for which he believes he has to atone - which is another injustice in its history, rich in injustices.



 Yassin al-Haj Saleh was born in 1961 in a village near Raqqa, not far from the border with Turkey, the fourth of nine children, the mother being everything. In the village, he says, everyone was related to one another. They had sheep, chickens, dogs, a donkey - and one day even a school, thanks to the now ruling Arab socialist Ba'ath party. Al-Haj Saleh was an even better student than his eldest brother. When he was eleven years old, he moved with him, just 16, and the second oldest, 14, to the city, Raqqa had hundreds of thousands of residents, in a small room that his father rented so that they could all go to secondary school.

 Al-Haj Saleh describes this event as trauma, he was still a child and for the first time and forever without his mother. He started reading a lot of books. The Metamorphosis of Kafka became the most important thing for him. Not only did he himself wake up every morning feeling different from the boy he had just been, the country was also changing: in 1970 Hafiz al-Assad, the general secretary of the Ba'ath party, from the minority Alawite community, became Prime Minister and, with the support of the military and the secret service, began to shape Syria into a left-wing nationalist dictatorship that was oriented towards the Soviet Union. In 1971 al-Assad became president, which he remained until his death in 2000, followed by his second eldest son: Bashar al-Assad.



 Yassin al-Haj Saleh no longer knows when he became political. He wonders today if he was political at all before becoming a political prisoner. In any case, when he went to Aleppo to study medicine, like the eldest brother, he joined one of the then two communist parties in Syria. Those who were critical of Moscow. The goals: democracy, real socialism, unity of the Arab states. Above all, he says, Marxism made him feel that he was one of the good guys and that there was a future for his country beyond the ubiquitous propaganda of the al-Assad family. At the meetings of his party group, Muslims came together with secularists, Sunnis with Shiites. On one of these evenings, on the 7th December 1980 at one o'clock in the morning, what Yassin al-Haj Saleh calls "the arrest" happened, the police took him and some comrades away. But it was more of a kidnapping: Al-Haj Saleh was imprisoned for 16 years and 14 days from then on. He was 19 when he got to jail and 35 when he left in 1996. The charge: membership in a prohibited association. Yassin al-Haj Saleh was only on trial after twelve years, and he never saw a lawyer. After him, his brothers were also imprisoned for five and six years. Their mother, sick with grief, died while the sons were locked away.

 The worst, says al-Haj Saleh, was not the humiliation, the beatings, the insults. It's time. She was the enemy. The torture. You just stopped your life. After a year and a half, at least books were allowed. He learned English. Noam Chomsky. Hannah Arendt. Anna Seghers. After eight years, the prisoners went on hunger strike to get pens. He wrote letters and small notes, but when you are inside, he says, you can't look at it yet. In time, says al-Haj Saleh, time became his friend. He felt that he was developing, even though he was not moving. An inner journey as he only knew it from the Koran, which had always remained alien to him. "It was an emancipation from all the circumstances that surrounded me," he says. "I became free from the challenges of freedom out there." In 1992, in court, he was offered a deal: If he cooperated with the régime, he would be set free. "Freedom only existed at the expense of dignity," says al-Haj Saleh. So he stayed trapped and yet free, as he found out. He was transferred to Tadmur prison in the desert near Palmyra, notorious for torture and murder. All others who were arrested with him in 1980 accepted the régime's offer, he learned. Al-Haj Saleh was among 300 prisoners who were crammed into 90-square-meter cells in Tadmur.



 Yassin al-Haj Saleh completed his medical degree in Aleppo, although he knew that he never wanted to be a doctor. He dissected other people's bodies in the university, but had realized that it was inside himself that he wanted to research. This place, to which he had been able to retreat behind bars, remained his protection even in the overwhelming and abundance of the open world. And writing down his thoughts gave him the security he missed, absurd as it sounds, now that the prison walls were no longer around him. "The prison made me a writer," says al-Haj Saleh. At first he hired himself as a translator, his first assignment: a book by Noam Chomsky. From the year 2000, at almost 40, he published his first texts, in various newspapers and magazines, political analyzes on Syrian society and the Arab states. And yet, says Yassin al-Haj Saleh, he would never have found his place without Samira. They met in 1999 over a meal from former political prisoners. Samira Khalil, an Alevi from Homs, was also imprisoned for membership in a Communist Party from 1987 to 1991. They both knew what they were talking about. Samira, says al-Haj Saleh, also had eight siblings like him. And yet, above all, she was different. So direct. Their laughter filled the streets. Your courage every room. After her release from custody, she ran a publishing house in Damascus. She didn't care that people whispered because she lived alone. Yassin al-Haj Saleh had hoped that he would get to know love, even though he was a man without youth. But he hadn't expected that.

 They married on September 5th, 2002, in their favorite restaurant. They found a 35-square-meter apartment in the suburbs of Damascus. The second and short life of Yassin al-Haj Saleh began. A very good one, he says. Of course: he still lived in a prison, now in one called Syria. He never received a passport. But his desk was enough for him to go exploring. Every week he wrote his column for the London newspaper al-Hayat. He knew that he couldn't write everything, and yet he wrote everything, called for reforms, justice and the end of corruption, yes: the free Republic of Syria - but he did that by talking about himself and his everyday life, from the little things the great, out of the cell into the world. There is writing about politics, says al-Haj Saleh, and there is politics about writing. A friend joked that Assad's censors just didn't understand his literary style. And yet they called him in regularly. Al-Haj Saleh sometimes got the feeling that they were only doing this to justify their snooping positions, they had to prove something to their superiors. They always let him go. He was immune, says al-Haj Saleh. How else could they break him?

 Soon he was one of the most famous commentators in Syria. He made good money. And more importantly: Samira and he made many friends, especially young ones, from the university, who gathered in their living room to debate. They no longer felt childless. Did you feel free? Maybe. Together they had come further than expected, every new morning with Samira was a revolution.



 So it was almost a shock for Yassin al-Haj Saleh when the Arab Spring erupted in late 2010. The mass demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt. The deposition of those in power, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Husni Mubarak, after a few weeks. Then the first protests in Syrian cities. Al-Haj Saleh wanted to protest, but his friends advised against it. Nobody is that immune. If there was one thing Bashar al-Assad had no use, it was a symbol against him. So al-Haj Saleh stayed at home. At first he believed that the change of power would take as long as pregnancy. The country would be ripe in nine months. But he saw how the army acted against the demonstrators. Heard of the dead. From the Free Syrian Army that formed. And decided he had to get out. He had waited for this all his life. That's what he'd sat for all his life.

 For Yassin al-Haj Saleh, going underground meant that he moved into the apartment of a friend who only he and Samira knew about. This is how his third life began. Al-Haj Saleh says that the solidarity during this time was unique. He even wrote about it for the New York Times. There was nothing left to lose. When her niece's husband was arrested and questioned about her, Samira Khalil was also forced to go into hiding. They fled to Duma, where many tried to bring order in the midst of the chaos. These people had been liberated by Islamists. Everyone recognizes the mistake in this sentence, says Yassin al-Haj Saleh.

 The frightening normality in which Yassin al-Haj Saleh and Samira Khalil lived in Douma can be traced in the documentary Our Terrible Country, which was released in 2014. The young filmmakers Ziad Homsi and Mohammad Ali Atassi accompanied al-Haj Saleh in 2013 on his excruciatingly long journey to Raqqa, into a supposed future, with a group of intellectuals and deserters. Al-Haj Saleh is worn down from the heat and the pain of separation, and yet he seems fearless and euphoric. What makes Our Terrible Country so depressing is that Ziad Homsi captures the moment of disillusionment with his camera. On the way, Yassin al-Haj Saleh learns of his brother's disappearance. And in Raqqa he comes across a bizarre scene in which street art activists design walls while next to them warriors of God reprimand passers-by with machine guns. Evil slowly seeped through the city, says Yassin al-Haj Saleh. But it didn't take him long to understand that it wasn't just the struggle of the people for the liberation of their country being waged here. But that the country became the scene of completely different fights and the people remained hostages.

 Al-Haj Saleh's father died shortly before the war began, which to date has killed more than half a million Syrians and from which around 13 million people have fled. His friends and relatives are scattered over Europe, France, Spain, England. The brothers who escaped ISIS live with their families in the Netherlands and Norway. He's not lonely, he hasn't been lonely since prison. He writes every day. But Yassin al-Haj Saleh is angrier than ever, even if you rarely notice it.



 It is not just Germany, but "the so-called West". that ticked off the conflict in Syria as "complicated". And ignore the fact that there are many "complicators" who support the various hostile groups - Russia and the USA, Turkey and Iran, plus Israel. "If something is complicated, you should really take a look," says al-Haj Saleh. “Then you would see two wars: that of a people against its dictator. And then the geopolitical, the occupying powers on the back of this people."

 The western world, however, had decided that the greatest danger in Syria came from terrorists and that Bashar al-Assad was, so to speak, the lesser evil, "probably because, viewed from here, a studied mass murderer in a tie appears more bearable than a praying mass murderer with a lint beard." Yassin al-Haj Saleh is not someone who would downplay Islamists; they took his wife away from him. And yet, on a walk, he points out that only about five percent of the dead in the Syrian war can be blamed on ISIS, while the vast majority of deaths can be attributed to the ruler Bashar al-Assad. "We are dealing with a genocidal régime," says al-Haj Saleh. "In Germany I often hear that Syria is a kind of GDR, but no: Syria is more of a brutal Stalinist state."

 He would like to ask Noam Chomsky, says al-Haj Saleh, why he is defending Bashar al-Assad. To see an attempt to overthrow Assad instigated by the USA out of dated anti-imperialism in the fight against Assad insults him, says al-Haj Saleh, and all his fellow campaigners who have sacrificed so much.

 “But we Syrians are not just victims,” says Yassin al-Haj Saleh, “that's why I don't want us to get used to this status. We have a long history in the struggle for freedom, and it is not over yet. In Germany, it is only becoming increasingly clear to him that many Western societies have not had to fight for their freedom for so long that they are busy fighting over their own identities. That is why there is a lack of empathy for the Syrian cause in this country. "It's not about compassion," says al-Haj Saleh, "but about understanding that Syria is the country that currently best symbolizes human suffering in this world." And maybe Yassin al-Haj Saleh is the human being, who best symbolizes this country.



 "Your husband is still the same writer who only has the word as a weapon," says one of the letters to Samira that Yassin al-Haj Saleh has been writing regularly since 2017. In it he tells his wife what has happened in Syria since she disappeared. From big politics. And the dead friends. They are love letters and editorials at the same time.

 Does he have Samira in mind when he writes to her? “I always have Samira in front of my eyes. When I think of Syria, I think of Samira. And when I think of Samira, I think of Syria.” She lives, he says, until he knows she is dead. He hardly has any hope left, but he clings to it. He doesn't want to accept that this is his fourth life without her. A friend from Damascus claims to have heard that the militia handed her over to the régime at the time. How cruel is it that a Syrian prison would be the best thing that could have happened to her? The 16 years in prison, says Yassin al-Haj Saleh, are the reason why he is not desperate. The prison vaccinated him against desperation.

 Is he happy that he survived the Covid infection, even though he wanted to punish himself for three days, in April, in Paris? Yassin al-Haj Saleh nods. But he smiles his mocking smile at it. He doesn't have to say it. It wouldn't be a punishment if it passed.

 His punishment is that he keep going.'

The regime misappropriates humanitarian aid

 

 'The Assad régime controls humanitarian aid efforts for political gains, appropriating aid meant for those in need, humanitarian workers say.

 Mousa, a manager who worked as procurement and logistics manager in the humanitarian sector in Syria, called it quits six months ago. He couldn’t cope with the pressure mounted by the Syrian régime.

 Mousa was “pressured on a regular basis” through those who hired him. He gave the account of his ordeal to the Syrian Association for Citizens Dignity (SACD), a civil rights movement established by Syrians, explaining why he quit his job.

 Eight years ago, when he got a job at the United Nations through some contacts, he said he wasn’t aware about the menacing reach the Syrian régime had in the organisation.

 “I didn’t imagine that there would be interference in all financial details, employees’ salaries, names of beneficiaries and even the organisation’s funding,” he said.

 Mousa was among the 45 humanitarian workers from 29 international and local Syrian organisations in the régime-held areas who were interviewed for a report published on Thursday by the organisation.

 The report found that the Syrian régime was directly influencing aid organisations to weaponize humanitarian assistance for political gains, as well as appropriating the aid meant for those in need. It also found an unspoken agreement between the régime and aid organisations operating in the régime-controlled areas.

 In practice, it means the régime determines who benefits from aid assistance and who does not; and appoints staff, hires employees, directs help and benefits only to its supporters, the aid workers say.

 They also blame the régime for setting up “independent” framed Civil Society Organisations to appear in political negotiations as representatives of “civil society” as well as collecting international funds.

 More than 50 per cent of aid workers who spoke to SACD said the Syrian military directly or unofficially intervened in their work.



 “The acceptance of such interference permeates all aid organisations, international and Syrian; there is now a dangerous symbiosis between these organisations and the régime’s institutions,” SACD has warned.

 That’s a sentiment that Ibrahim Olabi, a lawyer at Guernica 37, Int Justice Chambers and founder of Syrian Legal Development Programme shares.

 “The problem is not the régime on its own. The UN agencies and states funding those NGOs are allowing this to happen, saying that ‘we don’t want to politicise aid’,” Olabi said.

 “The régime needs these organisations and their aid to be able to feed the people they control,’ Olabi said, noting that the international organisations and donors behind them need to exercise more leverage.

 “In my opinion it’s not politicising. On the other hand the régime is politicising the aid and it’s eventually harming more people.”

 Olabi said that by international law, and the UN peace-keeping parameters, “the government or the parties in armed conflict must facilitate aid, not intervene with it.” But the real question, he argues, is where the aid is going, and if it’s going to finance more crimes or abuses.

 Around 44 per cent of interviewees said they believe that the Syrian régime military and militias was seizing more than 25 per cent of the humanitarian aid that was aimed at being distributed to régime-controlled areas. But 16 per cent of the aid workers said it was much higher, up to 75 per cent of the aid.



 Over 4 million people, meanwhile, fear a final showdown by the Syrian military and allies in Idlib, the last major opposition stronghold that is also largely isolated from the world.

 The majority of current Idlib residents reside in the camps and are in need of urgent access to basic humanitarian assistance amid isolation.

 The Syrian régime on the other hand has been insisting on the delivery of international aid through Damascus instead of border gates from neighbouring Turkey -- what human rights organisations see as a method of forcing Idlib into submission.

 Most recently in July, the régime’s ally Russia used its veto power at the UN Security Council to reduce the number of border crossings into Syria.

 SACD spokesperson Haya Atassi said that the information the aid workers gave deciphered the Syrian régime’s method of manipulating aid to deliberately starve opposition-held areas.

 The Syrian régime is “leading to the forced displacement of entire populations, not to mention blackmailing UN agencies and other organizations, to control the aid and use it to serve its own political and military interests,” Atassi said.

 One aid worker still tied with the UN, Meera said “all staff were in fear of being called for interrogation if they showed any objection to the interference.”

Over ten years into the Syrian war, the majority of the international community is still hesitant to repair political relations with the country’s régime leader Bashar al Assad.

 They blame the régime leader Bashar al Assad for cracking down on the widespread protest in 2011 --- what turned into a full-blown war that killed 400,000 people and created an unprecedented refugee crisis by displacing more than 50 per cent of the population.

 As the European Union and the United States stand behind their sanctions against the régime, a trend of warming ties with the régime seems to be slowly taking over the Gulf.

 The United Arab Emirates has recently sent two planes of humanitarian aid directly to Damascus.

 Atassi said, “there must be an independent, objective audit of how their funds are being used by the UN agencies and international and Syrian organizations working on the ground to prevent aid manipulation and interference by the Syrian régime in furtherance of its repressive, criminal agenda.” '

We must think about how to liberate our land

 Jameel al-Saleh:

 "Regarding the possibility that the régime and the Russians will start a new campaign, this is a valid possibility. During the 10 years that have passed of the Syrian revolution, our experience with the régime and the Russians: they are not true to their word.

 This is a battle that will not end except with the victory of one of the two sides. Either the régime is victorious, may Allah forbid, and of course we have great trust in Allah that the victory will be ours, and the revolutionaries and the mujahideen who put forth their blood and sacrificed, during those long years with their blood, houses, villages and their cities.

 We have the utmost certainty that there is a battle nearing. Not just a possibility, but an assurance that there is an upcoming operation. And we are constantly preparing ourselves for it, us and the other mujahideen factions. Whether it is preparing ourselves on the frontlines in terms of stabilisation, weaponry, equipment, we are constantly preparing ourselves. And by the will of Allah, we will not be surprised or unprepared if the régime decides to attack.

 We and the mujahideen factions are all preparing ourselves. And truth on this issue, something we are hearing a lot in the media is that the liberated areas will be taken by the régime and the Russians. In reality they will not take anything. This is fake news that is spread by supporters of the régime. And these rumours help the régime, whether intentionally or not. There are people who trust the régime, and listen to the rumours spread on social media. These false rumours are constantly trying to distort the image of the liberated areas. But in reality, all the mujahideen, all revolutionaries, all the youth who are present in the liberated areas, are preparing themselves and their weapons to defend and preserve the land. We are not satisfied with just the liberated areas. We must prepare ourselves for complete liberation, as we and our people in the camps, the detained brothers and the detained sisters; they are all waiting. To liberate the areas and open the areas.



 There is something we must think about, not just think about the campaign against the régime. We must think about how to liberate our land, how to take back our areas, how to take back our country completely. And disgrace the Russian occupier and the Iranian occupier. And get rid of the criminal Bashar al-Assad.

 At the same time we don't want to fall into previous errors. Like the false media and media directed towards the treason of the factions or the treachery of our men. On the contrary, we must stand with our men and the factions. Our men have lost thousands of martyrs in the battles of the Hama countryside. During the battles for Maarat al-Numan and Saraqib, the factions lost thousands of martyrs and thousands of injured. Until we lost the area completely.

 Now, of course, we are fighting countries who have determination. We are fighting Russia.This issue is not resolve by a publication, or by treason that exists on social media. This issue is resolved by the enlistment of our men. All those in the camps, villages and cities, even the Syrians who are outside the country; they should ready themselves, in order to resist this régime, until we liberate our country. It is through you.



 We all claim that we do not want to repeat the old mistakes. By Allah, our men did not prepare correctly for the enemies. We prepare our weapons and ammunition, we must prepare our men in the right way. We encourage all people to join the mujahideen factions and be ready. Not only to defend the liberated areas. They must prepare themselves to liberate all the areas under the control of the Russian and Iranian occupiers, and the criminal régime of Assad. During our experiences in the last battle, in the battles of the Hama countryside, we saw the barbarism of the bombing by the régime. We saw the régime's heavy bombardment in which aircraft and artillery were used. To be honest, it caused big losses to the mujahideen factions. So the preparation, engineering, and fortifications were better. And we are continuing to improve the trench engineering. The work and improvement on the frontlines never finishes. That is why this improvement is the most important thing that has been done. Until we know how to deal with the barbaric tactics that they use, especially with the high military presence of the Russians and the régime."

 Note 1/9/25, link broken.

Syria’s Constitutional Committee: In service of the régime

 

 'On October 22, the UN concluded the sixth round of the Syrian Constitutional Committee in Geneva. UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pederson, the fourth diplomat to occupy this position after the first three resigned in frustration, called the outcome of the talks a “big disappointment” and lamented the inability of the participants to find common grounds.

 Consisting of 150 members and 45 drafters, whose delegates are distributed equally across the régime of Syria's Bashar al Assad, the Syrian Negotiations Committee representing the opposition, and pre-approved civil society members, the committee, which is designed in principle to provide a platform for the parties to jointly reform and amend the Syrian charter, constitutes the framework through which the Syrian peace process currently exists.

 Theoretically, the talks comply with UN Resolution 2254, which among other things, calls for a political transition that culminates in free and fair elections, held under UN supervision “to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability.” Syrian state diplomats have expressed their support for this initiative.

 Since its inaugural session in October 2019, however, the Constitutional Committee has amounted to little more than a diplomatic avenue through which the Assad régime can secure its position as the sole benefactor of the negotiating process. It represents merely the latest political tool at the disposal of the Assad régime, which has for years managed to exploit diplomatic bodies to resist change while endlessly stalling under the guise of negotiating surrounding Syria’s political future.

 For two years, the régime has paid lip service to the notion of engaging in legitimate talks within the framework of the Constitutional Committee. Yet, during this time, its forces, supported by Iran (and at times Russia), have crystallized a pattern of hard power engagement within Syria in which limited provocations-turned-military-assaults are periodically followed by ceasefires intended to consolidate control over newly recaptured pockets of territory.

 On the Idlib front, these limited offensives have often culminated in de-escalation agreements brokered by Moscow and negotiated with its Turkish counterparts, permitting the former to redefine demarcation lines in service of the régime with each additional truce. At times, this is made possible by bombing campaigns specifically intended to induce population displacement towards the Turkish border, exploiting Ankara’s apprehensions over further refugee flows as political leverage.

 In Daraa, Iran-aligned forces within the Syrian military, such as the Fourth Armoured Division commanded by Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother, have, alongside Hezbollah and other pro-government militias, long sought to undermine Russian-sponsored hybrid security configurations to secure uncontested authority across the province. Over the summer, the latest round of fighting between this camp and opposition pockets in Daraa al-Balad, during which residential neighbourhoods were subjected to a siege and indiscriminate shelling by the former, resulted in a deal brokered by Moscow that saw the submission of rebels and an expansion of régime power in the south.

 Though northern and southern Syria's political and security dynamics vary significantly, the end goal is ultimately the same: the complete reacquisition of Syrian territory (although in reality, the régime and its sponsors currently lack the resources to do so).

 In light of the pro-Assad camp’s inability to make sweeping gains, these offensives have enabled Damascus to gradually broaden its reach against the backdrop of negotiations, which it intentionally undermines in order to delay the talks and thus obstruct the possibility that the committee will make genuine progress regarding Syria’s political future.

 Assad’s presidency, having been primarily responsible for uprooting half of the country’s population, would surely not survive the political outcome of the process – democratic elections that are free, fair, and transparent – if allowed, without obstructionism, to run its course.



 To the pro-Assad axis, the peace process is therefore intended neither to provide a just peace nor be a meaningful process. It represents the latest chapter of the Oslofication of Syria’s peace talks, deliberately meant to alter the material reality within the country to one that leaves the other parties void of any leverage to use in furthering their positions – all while new ‘facts on the ground’ effectively transform negotiations into an exercise in political futility.

 Moreover, it forces the other parties to accept the framework set by the régime as a prerequisite for its official involvement. One need not look beyond the main tenets of the proposed draft – combating “terrorism and extremism,” preserving “Syrian sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity,” the coercive forces, and the “rule of law” – to ascertain that its focus has been superimposed on the committee by the régime, which wishes to securitize the framing of the peace settlement in hope of returning to a rebranded form of Syria’s oppressive pre-2011 status quo. The drafting of elements of the constitution related to so-called terrorism and extremism, notably, is to be composed by governmental delegates, who are sure to insist on a definition formulated by the security apparatus – one broad enough to constitute the basis of a legal justification for its ongoing repression of all forms of dissent.

 The régime, therefore, has everything to gain and nothing to lose by indefinitely prolonging the talks. This is especially true given its gradual reassertion of military control over the majority of the country, the increasingly precarious position of US-backed, Kurdish-led forces (who control swathes of territory in the north and northeast), and Assad’s accelerating rehabilitation into the region’s Arab bloc. Simply put, the régime has no incentive to act in good faith or act productively.

 While the one arguable exception to this may be the desire to see sanctions under the Caesar Act lifted, the Joe Biden administration’s recent approval of the Egypt-Jordan gas deal – which signalled the US’ willingness to loosen stipulations attached to the sanction’s framework – has likely been interpreted by Damascus as an indication that its Arab neighbours can lobby Washington to ease even more restrictions as its isolation becomes less and less tenable. However, for a number of reasons, including their desire to lure Assad away from his Iranian allies, Arab states have re-engaged Damascus and are unlikely to re-embrace the opposition in any impactful way.

 The proverbial writing is on the wall: the international community is broadly uninterested in Syrian peace talks. Many of the leaders once publicly resolute in their demand that Assad depart have reversed course, thereby relinquishing the need for an opposition through which they can exert pressure on Assad, as well as lay a stake to the outcome of the negotiating process. By partaking in the Constitutional Committee, both the opposition and the (non-aligned) civil society delegates are ultimately, if unwittingly, serving the interests of the régime in Damascus.

 However, should they boycott the process, the decision would surely be decried by their backers, in addition to being framed by the pro-régime camp as evidence of their reluctance to commit to peace. They have the unenviable task of being forced to negotiate with a party that is unconcerned with peace and to operate within parameters defined by regional and international players that champion their cause only when it suits them.'

The world will regret bringing Assad in from the cold

 

 'When Jordanian King Abdullah II spoke with Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, on the phone earlier this month, it set a precedent that thawed a decade of ice between the two. A week prior to that, Amman had fully re-opened its main border crossing with Damascus, and the intelligence chiefs of both countries met and agreed on cooperation.

 It was a stark contrast to Abdullah's initial stance in 2011, when he condemned the Assad régime's brutal crackdown on peaceful protestors at the start of the Syrian revolution, making Jordan the first regional country to cut ties with Syria and support the opposition.

 Jordan is not the only country which has implemented a supportive stance on Assad. Two weeks ago, Egypt's foreign minister also met with his Syrian counterpart and vowed to help return Syria to the Arab League and restore its position in the Arab world. All these,, of course, came after the normalisation processes initiated by Gulf states such as the UAE, Oman and, partially, Saudi Arabia.

 The flurry of efforts to restore and normalise ties with the Assad régime is, in many ways, understandable. As was the case with Arab states joining the international community in normalising ties with the likes of Israel, to do so with Assad is simply an extension of that recognition of geopolitical reality.

  After a decade of war and the involvement of numerous foreign actors in the country, the relative territorial victory of Assad—thanks largely to his Russian and Iranian allies, of course—has compelled his neighbours to accept him back into the fold. Whether it is proof of 'might is right' or just the fact that the régime is there to stay and they may as well put up with it, is not important: they simply see that dealing with Assad is the only and best practical solution.

 Of course, the best time to ensure a transition of government in Syria has long passed. That opportunity presented itself in the early years of the revolution, when the opposition was still largely unified and gathering velocity in its fight against the régime. Back then, when the opposition was requesting arms and military assistance from the US and Western nations, however, all it was given were supplies of food packs.

 In the current situation and the efforts to restore diplomatic ties, everything that the Syrian military forces did is dropped and forgotten. This includes the countless and indescribable war crimes, the disappearance and torturing to death of tens of thousands, the dropping of barrel bombs on civilian areas and their populations, the (disputed, apparently) chemical weapons attacks on civilians and opposition alike, and the régime's vast and nightmarish prison system which is still very much intact.



 What governments in the region fail to realise, however, is that they are most at risk of the crimes of the Syrian régime than even its enemies. While Assad does provide a measure of stability and security, albeit in a way that labels any form of dissent as 'terrorism,' that is only a short-term stability.

 Firstly, there is the obvious social and political instability caused by unrestrained human rights violations, as suppressed dissatisfaction amongst the population has a way of resurfacing in later years, if left unresolved. We witnessed that fact with the Syrian revolution itself, which was built upon decades of repression and massacres such as that in Hama in 1982.

 Aside from that, there is also the major obstacle of the narcotics trade that has emerged from Syria over the course of the conflict. The production and smuggling of drugs such as captagon and hashish—especially the former—have been a nightmare for customs and border officers throughout the region, with neighbouring states, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, having busted numerous shipments of narcotics, as well as states as far away as Libya and Greece.

 Those narcotics smuggling operations have had their source in Syria, and not under militias like Daesh, as many initially thought, but under the Assad régime and its overwhelming amount of manufacturing sites which it runs throughout its territory. If states in the region and beyond allow the Syrian régime to reign unhindered, they will be making themselves vulnerable to the ever-growing transnational narcotics trade coming from the 'narco state' at their doorstep.



 One surprising phenomenon throughout the normalisation process has been the silence of the US. Under the former Trump administration, despite all of its many faults, there was an active effort to check the Syrian régime and its allies. From Trump's revelation that he considered assassinating Assad, to the implementation of the major Caesar sanctions on Damascus and its affiliates, that administration had a distinctive policy on Syria and a force behind its words.

 Under the current administration of President Joe Biden, however, there are no distinctive goals in Syria and Washington's policy is notably unclear. Apart from assurances that the US does not plan to restore ties with Assad and its urging of its regional partners to cease their normalisation efforts, no serious steps have yet been taken.

 Even the Caesar sanctions —those hard-hitting measures implemented in 2019 against the Syrian government and any individuals, companies, or states that dealt with it—seem to have been forgotten. According to that landmark act, sanctions should have hit numerous entities dealing with Assad by now.

 There are cases where exceptions are understandably granted, such as the US's assurance to Lebanon that it can import from, and export to, Syria during Beirut's ongoing economic crisis and lack of essential goods, including fuel. Other states in the region, however, are not in such desperate straits.

 The fading of the Caesar sanctions shows both the US's allies and adversaries in the region—and certainly around the world—that it may not enforce what it rules. In fairness, though, many have attributed that lack of a clear Syria policy to Biden's own health concerns, which have also fuelled theories that he is not truly at the helm of the US government and that he does not even occupy the White House's oval office.

 The entire debacle also, ultimately, proves to states that sanctions can be outmanoeuvred and overcome, especially with the right geopolitical allies, a booming drug trade, and an international network of businessmen and front companies.

 States in the region and beyond who intend to normalise relations with the Syrian government should know that such a régime is not conducive to long-term stability and prosperity. Normalisation will come back to haunt them.'

Assad Steps In From the Cold, but Syria Is Still Shattered

 'Assad’s grip on power is often tenuous even in areas he controls.

 From the Presidential Palace in the capital, Damascus, he cannot drive to his country’s northern border with Turkey or to much of its eastern border with Iraq without hitting hostile front lines.

 Syria’s northwest is run by jihadists formerly associated with Al Qaeda who expend more effort trying to open a line to Western countries than they do to Mr. al-Assad.

 Rebels backed by Turkey hold other territory along the border, where Turkish currency has displaced the drastically devalued Syrian pound.

 Administering the northeast, where most of Syria’s oil and much of its farmland are, are Kurdish-led forces backed by the United States. Rounds of talks about reconnecting the territory to Damascus have failed.

 Assad relied heavily on Russia and Iran to fend off the rebels, and now both countries are eyeing his economy for opportunities to recoup their investments.

 But the economy is so weak that businessmen are closing up shop.

 The owner of a Damascus ice cream company said in an interview that he was shuttering his family business after 50 years and moving to Egypt. Recently, the tax authorities, the electricity company and the consumer protection department had all come to collect bribes after threatening to shut him down over bogus infractions if he refused to pay up.

 Other families had already moved their businesses, and the badly needed jobs they created, to Turkey, Iraq, Egypt or Gulf countries, he said.

 The Syrian government has no money and wants to collect its employees’, soldiers’ and militiamen’s salaries from the traders and industrialists,” the man said, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of retribution.



 International powers have largely given up on seeking peace through diplomacy, and many acknowledge that 10 years of war, sanctions and peace talks have failed to secure concessions from Assad.

 Since he has resisted compromise so far, he probably won’t start now, said Karam Shaar, research director of the Operations and Policy Center, a research institute in southern Turkey.

 “Western policymakers do not appreciate what they are asking Bashar al-Assad to do” when they speak of integrating the opposition into his government, Mr. Shaar said.

 Mr. Shaar recalled Adib Shishakli, a Syrian politician who was president in the 1950s before being pushed out and fleeing to Brazil, where he was assassinated a decade later by a man who had been orphaned in a battle Mr. Shishakli oversaw.

 Assad had killed many more people, Mr. Shaar said, so he faced greater risks.

 “If Bashar al-Assad is ever out of office, he knows that there will be thousands of people going after him,” Mr. Shaar said.

 Still, the moves by Syria’s neighbors to draw closer with Assad reflect an erosion of the feeling that he should be ostracized when there are so many other problems in the region.



 The pipeline that the United States has backed is supposed to transmit Egyptian gas from Jordan through Syria to Lebanon, where an economic collapse has caused extensive blackouts. Despite sanctions on the Syrian government, the United States supports the plan, in part to compete with efforts by the militant group Hezbollah to bring in sanctioned fuel from Iran.

 Jordan, seeking to revive its own ailing economy, has reopened its border with Syria for trade and recently was host to the Syrian defense minister for security talks. King Abdullah II, who called on Assad to step down in 2011, spoke with the Syrian leader last week to discuss ties between the “brotherly countries and ways to enhance cooperation between them,” according to Jordan’s royal court.

 Wealthy Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., some of which bankrolled the rebels early in the war, have dropped their opposition to Assad and scoped out investment opportunities. But the cash has not followed, largely because of American sanctions.

 The Biden administration has taken a less aggressive approach toward Assad than former President Donald J. Trump, but the Biden administration has still discouraged its Arab partners from normalizing relations.

 In an interview, a senior Biden administration official said it was clear that Assad had survived and that sanctions had yielded few concessions, so the administration preferred to focus on other issues, including fighting the coronavirus pandemic, assuaging economic distress in the region and limiting Iranian influence.

 The United States would like the gas deal, whose details are still being worked out, to avoid triggering sanctions and provide minimal benefit to Mr. al-Assad, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity under government protocols. The administration was also telling its friends not to let Mr. al-Assad off the hook.

 “We are actively telling the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia, ‘Don’t go building shopping malls. Don’t unfreeze Bashar’s assets. Don’t give the government in Syria access to any kind of revenue for rebuilding or reconstruction,’” the official said.

 But it was allowing flexibility on issues like the provision of electricity to Lebanon and some kinds of aid inside Syria, in hopes of having a “humane, sensible policy,” the official said.'

Will the world wake up to Russian occupation of Syria?

 

 'As the Russian occupation of Syria enters its seventh year and with the Syrian crisis no longer in the news, serious questions must be asked. Vladimir Putin's intervention on behalf of his ally Bashar al-Assad may have offered Assad a short term victory, but moving forward, both lose out. At the same time however, the West has lost out too, its empty rhetoric coming to nothing, as the international community failed the Syrian people.

 Putin's intervention in late September 2015 was never meant to be a long term fix; there were concerns that Assad's position was genuinely weakened, so what was originally short term intervention has become a six-year occupation that has no sign of it ending. Russia is essentially stuck in Syria. To abruptly leave would be an admission of defeat, no matter how Putin spins the fact that Assad is still in power. The Syrian president's hold on power is tenuous, and nowhere near as strong as it was pre-March 2011. Any indication of Russia abandoning Assad would embolden even fragmented opposition groups, and threaten the régime.



 Similar to the invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014, Syria is essentially being used by Russia to score political points in a new cold war. The occupation of Syria is a way of showing the international community that Russia – as a great power – is "back", and that its weaker days of the 90s and early 2000s are behind it. The fact that Russia has a veto on the UN Security Council (an organisation that is fundamentally broken) is crucial here too; it can shield the régime from any wrongdoing, binding it ever closer and making it even more reliant. Weapon sales and the use of warm water ports are also benefits Russia enjoys as a result of its occupation and shielding of the réegime.

 The statement "a diplomatic solution must be sought to end the Syrian crisis" is often repeated, but is now completely meaningless. A diplomatic solution cannot be achieved unless there is genuine political will; this looks like it is in extremely short supply right now.

 Any help for Syria has to go beyond humanitarian aid. This cannot simply be used by politicians and policy makers to soothe their consciences. The root of the problem, the disease, has to be tackled and that is the Assad régime, which has destroyed the state over the last decade. Countless conferences and meetings failed; the longer the crisis continued, the more the appetite shrunk amongst the international community who quickly became preoccupied with a variety of internal and regional political problems. Fighting Daesh isn't less important as fighting Assad, with the former's creation and support being the result of the latter's brutality and a way in which all protesters were tarnishes with the label "terrorist". But unfortunately, Russia simply had to state that its airstrikes and intervention were aimed at eradicating Daesh (evidence indicates that it was not), and the response was muted.



 The Syrian uprising is not over yet. Whilst the narrative slips away from the news, recent protests in Dara'a serve as a reminder that the people of Syria are still taking to the streets and are still demanding justice and accountability for their perpetrators. A possible step for the West to take is to re-engage with Turkey. As a neighbouring state on the doorstep of Europe, it would be prudent to have Turkey onside and distance itself from Russia; essentially an occupying power here.

 Efforts to legitimise the régime must be resisted at all costs. The steps that Gulf states and other Arab states who in the past were staunchly opposed (Jordan being a notable example) have been making in rebuilding their ties with Al-Assad are deeply concerning. Al-Assad must remain an international pariah. It is deeply concerning too, that international organisations such as the WHO and Interpol are recognising the legitimacy of Assad. Ultimately, the UN never stripped the Assad régime of Syria's seat either.

 Russia is ultimately part of the problem, not the solution. No matter how it may run a protection racket with Assad, destroying the state but then claiming it is the only power that can defend and rebuild it, any efforts to accept Russian hegemony cannot stand.

 The EU should adopt policies similar to that of the Caesar Protection Act to those who finance and support the Syrian régime. Seeing Russian figures at the top of that list would be no surprise whatsoever. Moreover, holding perpetrators of the last ten years accountable, has to be considered.

 Where there is political will, there is a way. The Middle East is said to be a troubled place, but the longer the Assad régime remains, the less likely it is that other problems in the region – including Iranian aggression and the spill over crises – will be solved.'

How History Will Remember Assad's Siege of Yarmouk

 

 'Over the course of the ongoing decade-long Syrian conflict, documentation of the war and its effects has always been desired by the outside world. From footage spread on social media to entire masterpieces produced by those who lived through it, such as the movie 'For Sama' in 2019, those who were fortunate enough to only witness the conflict were able to catch glimpses of the atrocities committed by the Syrian régime, its allies and the numerous opposition groups on the ground.

 The period resulted in the emergence of a generation of unlikely filmmakers and directors, who picked up their cameras and decided to record exactly what they saw around them, without any certainty of whether the world would, one day, see it or if they would even survive the ordeal. Abdallah Al-Khatib was one such individual.

 What made his situation even more unique, though, was that he was not just in Syria but in one of the areas where the régime of Bashar al-Assad and his loyalist forces laid siege to. The Yarmouk camp—that site which was home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees since the Nakba and their exile from Palestine in 1948—had all the roads leading to and from it blocked off by Assad's forces while they held checkpoints on the camp's outskirts.

 Since the siege was enforced in 2012, the régime starved the camp's population and forbade international aid from getting in. Anyone who dared to escape through a checkpoint was arrested, disappeared and often tortured to death.

 Speaking to me about his experience, Khatib revealed that he initially had no plans on releasing his own film. Using the camera of a friend—Hassan Hassan, who attempted to leave but was detained and tortured to death—Khatib filmed footage of the situation within the camp for others who would use it outside to produce their own films. "I thought I would die" in the siege, he told me, and had no idea if he would ever escape.

  to the outbreak of the Syrian Revolution, he had worked with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) while studying sociology at the University of Damascus, planning to continue his life in Yarmouk and to contribute towards the Palestinian population's well-being. The Assad régime's brutal crackdown on protestors throughout the country and the ensuing siege on Yarmouk changed that.



 Like most of the country, Yarmouk and its Palestinian residents faced the full force of the régime's repression, and Khatib's film has an intense way of showing that. With starvation ravaging the camp and aid resources running dangerously dry, the camp's inhabitants—including numerous children—could be seen picking weeds out of the ground to eat them, both raw and to be cooked as a soup. Undernourished babies and skeletal figures could be seen throughout the camp as testimony to Assad's long-perfected strategy of 'siege and starve' warfare.

 Aside from the obvious human rights violations that this strategy resulted in, the fact that it targeted Palestinian refugees en-masse was also seen as a contradiction of the Assad family's long-perpetuated myth that it supports Palestinians and their historical plight. When asked whether he—as a Palestinian from Syria—saw the siege and other atrocities by the régime against his people as a betrayal, Khatib disagreed.

 Rather than a betrayal, the siege "was rather a continuation of the series of crimes committed against Palestinians, and the Syrian régime never leaned towards the Palestinian cause at all." He stressed that, through acts such as historic massacres and the targeting of hundreds of Palestinian fighters, "the Syrian régime used the Palestinians as a card of pressure for its own good in order to reach its own goals."

 Throughout the film, the viewer often notices that, contrary to popular Western notions of what would take place in an apocalyptic scenario, the inhabitants of the camp acted with an air of dignity and upheld much of their joy and laughter despite their condition. Khatib insisted, however, that it "was actually nothing exceptional to us as Palestinians, but you can also see it in other parts of Syria and you could also see it in Afghanistan."

 The important question is, he explained, "who is making the film and how do they want to portray them? Western media is used to picturing us as broken people, as victims and in that sense only as numbers."

 The siege on Yarmouk may have ended a few years ago, but the ordeal left long-term effects on him and others who survived it. When he eats, uses electricity, showers with running water, and other basic daily tasks, he says he remembers the siege. While there was no physical effect on his body, he admitted that it left a mark on his soul and psyche.

 That impact was most obvious when he was about to title his film 'The Siege within Me' rather than the current and final title of 'Little Palestine: Diary of a Siege.'

 "There are also positive aspects," he said, recalling when everything was locked down during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. "It didn't make such a big difference for me because I had lived this experience before." When social media apps like Facebook, Whatsapp and Instagram also temporarily shut down this week, he mentioned that it did not bother him because "I lived in situations where they were not available."

 The siege reportedly gave Khatib immunity against certain aspects of life, as well as allowing him to see the true value of things. "We have to realise that we live in a consumerist world. We value things that pass by, that can break, like a refrigerator. We do not consider the true values like the relationships between people, for example, or the human being itself."

 When hearing about the growing and increasingly vocal class of public figures, academics and journalists who support the Assad régime and echo its claim that it is only fighting terrorism, Khatib compared them to a thief who "would ask himself for a moral excuse to rob the bank."

 By using the rhetoric of fighting terrorism, Damascus and its supporters aim to justify their atrocities and crimes against humanity. "Everyone always tries to find the moral justifications, although in the end they are political and economic interests."

 He added that the entire concept of fighting terror using atrocities is "the rhetoric of the superiority of the West," referring to the popular narrative following the state of the US-led 'war on terror.' "This serves the interests of the West, so the whole world circles around them and their interests. We should not accept in the very beginning this rhetoric of fighting terrorism," Khatib insisted.

 Abdallah Al-Khatib's film 'Little Palestine: Diary of a Siege' is, therefore, the intimate and revealing—with dashes of humour and wisdom—account of that siege of Yarmouk camp, brought to us by hard copy footage smuggled by Khatib's friends, once he fled Syria to Turkey and then Germany, where he now lives.'

Syrians in Tadef town running out of options

 

 'The town of Tadef is contested. Part of it is run by the Syrian opposition, and the rest by the Assad régime. Khalil Ibrahim has lived here all his life. 

 "We are here, and the Assad régime is about 100 metres away from us. We live in constant danger, close to the front line and the line of fire. We are forced to live here. We have nowhere else to live."

 From the rented property where he lives, Ibrahim can see the home he grew up in. It's just out of reach. 

 "We moved to many places during the period of our displacement, until they told us we could return to our city. My house in on the side of the régime, but I can't go there, and they won't let me stay there."

 Up until a month ago, 300 families lived in opposition controlled Tadef. Another 300 families have recently arrived, and many more are expected soon. 

 Omar al-Omar, an activist, said: "The devastation in Tadef is terrible. 50-60% of the town and the homes were destroyed. People tried to return several times, but that did not happen. Not a single civilian lives in the areas controlled by régime forces. That's because people are not safe from the practices of the régime, and the return of people to the city is banned."

 The future of the town is stark. Control has passed from the Assad régime to Daesh, and then back to the régime. The uncertainty is very stressful for residents. Khalil Ibrahim continued, "If the régime forces advance on our areas, we will flee from them. But we don't know where to go."

 Because northern Syria hosts millions of displaced people, the decision to move here is less often a choice than a last resort. With Assad's foces no more than a few dozen metres away, the people live in constant fear of what happens if and when the Assad régime decides to claim control of the entire town and all of Syria.'

Biden is tacitly endorsing Assad’s normalization

 

 'Ever since he met President Biden at the White House in July, Jordan’s King Abdullah II has been leading a rapid regional normalization of the Bashar al-Assad regime. This runs counter to U.S.-Syria policy and counter to U.S. law. But the Biden administration has decided it no longer will actively fight this trend. The consequences could be disastrous.

 When Abdullah took a phone call from Assad this week, he ended a decade-long policy of isolating the Syrian dictator for his mass atrocities and unrestrained violence on civilians, which have had catastrophic effects across the region and beyond. Members of Congress and Syrian opposition groups — aware that Jordan had reopened its border with Syria just a few days before — were rightfully outraged and called on the Biden administration to act.

 The Arab push to normalize relations with Assad isn’t new. But its advancing speed is alarming to many. Salem al-Meslet, president of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, led a delegation to Washington last month to urge the U.S. government and the international community to keep pressure on the regime.



 “How can you reward a ruler who killed his own people with chemical weapons and who made refugees out of half of the country’s population?” he told me in an interview. “Now, it seems like nobody is saying no to this. One word from this administration would make a huge difference.”

 But the State Department actually welcomed the border announcement, at first, and has said nothing about the Abdullah-Assad phone call. Jordanian media reported that Biden gave Abdullah explicit assurances he would not be sanctioned under the Caesar Act, the U.S. law meant to prevent normalization of the regime until Assad stops the slaughter.

 A senior administration official told me that it is still U.S. policy to discourage any country from normalizing relations with Assad.



 “We did not give Jordan a green light or an orange light. We did not support the call” between Abdullah and Assad, the official said. “We’ve made clear that sanctions restrictions remain in place and nothing should come for free.” Yet the same official conceded that the Biden administration will no longer actively work to stop countries from engaging with Assad, except when the law specifically requires it.

 This new approach, in which the United States publicly opposes normalization but privately looks the other way, was on clear display in the weeks after the Biden-Abdullah White House meeting. Soon after, a deal was struck to pipe Egyptian natural gas to Lebanon through Jordan and Syria, which will surely result in cash payments to Assad. Rather than stand in the way, the Biden administration advised the participating countries that they could avoid sanctions by financing the deal through the World Bank, essentially promoting a loophole in U.S. law.

 Regional countries got the message. At last month’s U.N. General Assembly, Syrian officials met with several Arab leaders, after which Egypt’s foreign minister pledged to help “restore Syria’s position in the Arab world.”

 Proponents of normalization argue that 10 years of isolation and pressure on Assad have not produced any progress on a political settlement, while sanctions have exacerbated Syrians’ suffering. They also argue that Arab engagement can dilute Iranian power in Syria.



 One main proponent of such an approach over the years has been Brett McGurk, the Biden White House’s top Middle East adviser. In a 2019 Foreign Affairs essay entitled “Hard Truths in Syria,” he argued that the United States should cease opposing efforts by its Arab partners to normalize Assad. He also wrote that the United States should encourage its partners within Syria, such as the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, to strike a deal with the Assad regime so U.S. forces can leave and Russia and the regime can take over responsibility there.

 The glaring problem with this approach is that the Assad regime and Russia have violated every deal they’ve struck with local groups, subjecting them to new cruelty and suffering. The long-term result will be more extremism, refugees and destabilization.

 “The conflict in Syria has destabilized the entire Middle East region. Normalizing relations now will only allow that destabilization to continue,” the ranking Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees said in a statement.



 The only hope for real peace, stability and justice in Syria is for the United States to reengage diplomatically and work to revive and lead the international political process. Meanwhile, the United States should help to improve the lives of Syrians living outside of Assad’s control, rather than advising them to strike bargains with their oppressor.

 There are no good choices in Syria, but tacitly allowing a mass murderer to be welcomed back into the diplomatic fold is not an acceptable choice. Normalizing Assad won’t end the war, and looking the other way is a morally and strategically bankrupt strategy.'

Northern countryside of Homs faces similar fate to Daraa

 

 Suhail al-Ghazi:

 'The northern countryside of Homs holds great importance in the context of the Syrian civil war. The people of Homs city, known as the “capital of the Syrian revolution,” are tribally linked to its northern countryside and its strategic location connects the capital Damascus and Aleppo. Its provincial cities and towns have also participated in the demonstrations since the Syrian uprising in 2011.

 Residents and defectors from the Syrian army established armed groups to fight against the Bashar al-Assad régime in 2012 and controlled the area until 2018. The northern countryside of Homs witnessed increasing episodes of sectarian violence throughout the conflict. It was subjected to siege and bombing by the Assad régime from 2014 until its recapture and a subsequent reconciliation agreement in May 2018. But, recently, a series of attacks against régime forces and threats by régime commanders are exposing the region to a similar fate as Daraa governorate. In June 2018, locals in Daraa reached a similar reconciliation agreement with the régime, only for the Syrian army to launch a military attack against Daraa al-Balaad to fully capture it and force a new deal that allows the régime to enter all areas.



 In April 2018, after the Assad régime recaptured Eastern Ghouta, Syrian army forces headed to the northern countryside of Homs to retake control. Military operations began, accompanied by aerial bombardments that targeted civilians and civilian objects, including hospitals and schools—a common tactic used by the Assad régime against opposition-held areas, which also constitutes a war crime. After less than a month of intermittent fighting and negotiations, the Syrian army and a committee comprised of local figures, opposition commanders, and the Syrian al-Ghad Movement—an opposition political party led by former Syrian Coalition President Ahmad al-Jarba—reached a reconciliation agreement under Russian auspices in May 2018.

 The agreement displaced civilians and fighters who refused to stay and sign the reconciliation agreement; offered civilians and defectors six months before being required to join compulsory military service; banned Syrian régime forces entering the region for the first six months since recapture; and transformed the Jaish al-Tawhid faction, an armed opposition group from Talbise town, into a local police force under the command of the Russian military police. However, as with other instances, the Syrian army violated the terms of the agreement and entered the area earlier than agreed.

 Régime forces immediately started to arrest civilians following the former’s return to the northern countryside, including civil defense volunteers, defectors, and even members of the local reconciliation committee. After the reconciliation, Russia followed the same tactic in Daraa governorate by using former opposition fighters to its benefit. The Russian military police issued identification cards for the local auxiliary force after the fighters finished the settlement process. The auxiliary force was eventually dissolved and some fighters were either transferred to the Fifth Corps—a Russian-backed division of the Syrian army that consists of reconciled former opposition fighters—or went back to civilian life.

 Following the May 2018 reconciliation agreement, Iran-backed forces, such as the Fourth Division, expanded their presence in the northern countryside. The régime’s continued neglect of these areas in terms of services and reconstruction as well as continued human rights violations—such as arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, and personal grievances cases filed by pro-régime locals, who accused opposition fighters of killing and kidnapping loved ones or destroying their properties—contributed to growing resentment against the Assad régime. Despite this so-called reconciliation agreement, several members of the reconciliation committee fled to Lebanon out of fear of being detained.



 In June 2019, a year after the Syrian army took control of the northern countryside, a channel on Telegram announced the establishment of a group calling itself “The Resistance Brigades in Homs.” The statement said that the group formed due to Russia’s failure to fulfill its obligations to the region and the régime’s use of conscripted youth in the battles in northwest Syria against opposition forces. The Resistance Brigades claimed nine attacks on régime forces between September 2019 and December 2020, targeting checkpoints and military bases.

 In October 2020, another armed group calling itself the “Brigades of 2011” announced that it would start carrying out attacks against the Syrian army, security services, and national defense militias—a local pro-régime militia affiliated with the security apparatus—in the northern countryside due to rights abuses committed by the régime in the region. In mid-November 2020, the armed group announced that they targeted a building belonging to state security in the city of Talbiseh in the northern countryside, a day before a scheduled celebration for the Baath Party. A statement published by the Brigades of 2011 said that the rapid increase in COVID-19 cases was the reason behind the attack. In May, while the country was preparing for the presidential elections, the armed group took credit for attacking an election celebration in the village of Farhaniya. Armed men on a motorcycle shot into the crowd, killing one person. Then, in July, the armed group again took credit for assassinating an army corporal at his home and assassinating another first lieutenant in mid-August.

 After these developments and, following the decision of the régime to send military reinforcements to the region, Major General Hossam Loqa, director of the General Intelligence Branch, met with local figures and the reconciliation committee in late August. Loqa threatened to launch a military operation unless the perpetrators involved in the attacks were handed over, in addition to handing over individual weapons and demanding six hundred personnel of Jaysh al-Tawhid for military service. Thus far, there has neither been a military operation nor a new settlement.



 The northern countryside of Homs is facing a scenario similar to Daraa, as the Assad régime has shown a lack of commitment to the settlement agreements signed by several regions across Syria, and countless human rights violations have continued. However, because the northern countryside of Homs is a tribal society and many army officers are from the area, especially Rastan—the biggest city in the northern countryside—the region may avoid a siege scenario like Daraa and a large-scale military operation if they reach an agreement with the Assad régime. This is partly because of the limited sleeper cell attacks against régime forces compared to those in Daraa governorate.

 Still, the Assad régime’s condition of six hundred young men joining conscription will be the biggest obstacle to implementing any agreement. This is yet another example of the so-called reconciliation agreement’s failure to bring stability and peace to Syria, as these agreements are built over destruction and rights abuses rather than any genuine and sustainable reconciliation. It is also another example of failed Russian promises to provide security for Syrians and how Moscow uses temporary reconciliation settlements as a step to execute its longer term, wider agenda in the country.'

Syrian exiles forced to prop up régime with fees

 'Early this year, Yousef, a 32-year-old Syrian living in Sweden, found himself faced with an impossible choice: either enlist in the army of the government that made him a refugee, or risk his family losing their home back in Syria.

 Military service is mandatory for Syrian men between the ages of 18 and 42, and the stakes rose significantly in February when an army official announced on Facebook that a new regulation would allow authorities to confiscate the property of “service evaders” and their families. Pressure was mounting on Yousef to decide.



 And so, in June, he made his way to the Syrian embassy in Stockholm with $8,000 (£5,876) in cash, ready to pay the fee to have his name taken off the conscription rolls. A shiver ran down his spine as he collected his receipt.

 “This money will be used by the Syrian régime to buy weapons and kill more people,” Yousef told the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), his voice trembling.

 He is far from alone. About a fifth of Syria’s population of 17 million are men of military age, according to data from the World Bank, and studies have shown that the threat of conscription is a major reason many refugees fear returning.

 The Syrian régime has been able to leverage this anxiety into revenue, harvesting foreign currency from the roughly 1 million Syrians who have settled in Europe to help prop up its ailing budget after US sanctions cut the country off from the international banking system last year.



 Syrian embassies, which used to only process paperwork for the military exemptions, have recently begun collecting cash payments. Two researchers, an airport official, and a former diplomat interviewed by OCCRP and the Syrian Investigative Reporting Unit (Siraj), said they suspected the cash made its way back to Syria via diplomatic pouch. Such a move would violate the 1961 Vienna convention on diplomatic relations, which says “packages constituting the diplomatic bag […] may contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use.”

 Government documents and official statements show Bashar al-Assad’s government projected the policy would raise substantial income, revealing the lengths the Syrian government is going to in order to raise cash. Syria’s army, finance ministry, foreign ministry, central bank, and military recruitment service did not respond to requests for comment.

 The US sanctions implemented in 2020 under the Caesar Act have worsened an already difficult financial situation for Syria. Processing payments for vital imports such as wheat and oil products have become even harder as a result, and the Syrian pound, now worth barely 1% of its pre-crisis value against the dollar, has suffered further losses.

 “Shortage in foreign currency has become an acute problem, especially after the Caesar Act came into force,” said Armenak Tokmajyan, a researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. “The régime needs foreign currency. The more it has, the longer it will survive.”

 The government has leaned increasingly on its diaspora to fill its coffers. A Syrian passport is now one of the world’s most expensive to obtain abroad, at about £220 for a new passport, and about £600 to get it expedited.

 Syria’s 2021 budget projection predicts revenues from the military exemption fees to reach 240bn Syrian pounds (£140m), up from 70bn Syrian pounds in 2020, according to copies published in Syria’s Official Gazette.

 The estimated revenue makes up 3.2% of this year’s budget revenue, up from 1.75% in 2020, the Syrian economist Karam Shaar told OCCRP.

 Sweden illustrates how the new amendments have played out among Syria’s diaspora. The Scandinavian country hosts about 114,000 Syrian refugees and is home to tens of thousands of relatively new arrivals.

 Between June and August, OCCRP reporters made three visits to the Syrian embassy in Stockholm. They counted an average of 10 applicants a day waiting in the queue for military service exemption.

 Another hint of how many people were paying the exemption fees came a year earlier, in June 2020, when the embassy website published the names of 43 Syrians cleared to pay the fee. It is unclear exactly when those on the list applied, but for other procedures, such as passport issuance, the embassy usually issues its lists once a month. The June post was the last such public announcement.

 An embassy employee, speaking to an undercover OCCRP reporter, said he could not say exactly how many had applied for the service exemption, but that there had been a “significant increase” in the first half of 2021, which he attributed to the February announcement.

 “On some days, 10 come to us and on other days the figure can go up to 50,” the employee said. If accurate, this would mean the embassy could be taking in as much as $400,000 in cash on some days.

 OCCRP spoke with 10 Syrians, eight in Sweden, one in Germany, and one in Lebanon, who decided to pay the conscription fee. Some, like Yousef, were frightened by the prospect of asset seizures in Syria. But others had more practical reasons.

 One 29-year-old named Ali said he paid the fee at the encouragement of his family, who considered the payment to be “a form of direct participation in the Syrian war effort”.

 Gian, a Syrian who works at a home for elderly people in Frankfurt, Germany, said he had no issue in paying the money. “I am getting a monthly salary, the exemption process is easy, and I want to safeguard my family’s property in Syria from being seized,” Gian said. He said three relatives with asylum status in Germany also paid the fee.

 But many Syrians are still leery of funding the government they feel was responsible for sending them into exile.

 Abdullah Jaafar, a 35-year-old who has been living in Gothenburg, Sweden’s second-largest city, for eight years, said he saw the exemption payments as a kind of extortion.

 “I have the full amount, and I can pay it, but I will not do it,” Jaafar said. “This government is illegal.” '