Northern countryside of Homs faces similar fate to Daraa

 

 Suhail al-Ghazi:

 'The northern countryside of Homs holds great importance in the context of the Syrian civil war. The people of Homs city, known as the “capital of the Syrian revolution,” are tribally linked to its northern countryside and its strategic location connects the capital Damascus and Aleppo. Its provincial cities and towns have also participated in the demonstrations since the Syrian uprising in 2011.

 Residents and defectors from the Syrian army established armed groups to fight against the Bashar al-Assad régime in 2012 and controlled the area until 2018. The northern countryside of Homs witnessed increasing episodes of sectarian violence throughout the conflict. It was subjected to siege and bombing by the Assad régime from 2014 until its recapture and a subsequent reconciliation agreement in May 2018. But, recently, a series of attacks against régime forces and threats by régime commanders are exposing the region to a similar fate as Daraa governorate. In June 2018, locals in Daraa reached a similar reconciliation agreement with the régime, only for the Syrian army to launch a military attack against Daraa al-Balaad to fully capture it and force a new deal that allows the régime to enter all areas.



 In April 2018, after the Assad régime recaptured Eastern Ghouta, Syrian army forces headed to the northern countryside of Homs to retake control. Military operations began, accompanied by aerial bombardments that targeted civilians and civilian objects, including hospitals and schools—a common tactic used by the Assad régime against opposition-held areas, which also constitutes a war crime. After less than a month of intermittent fighting and negotiations, the Syrian army and a committee comprised of local figures, opposition commanders, and the Syrian al-Ghad Movement—an opposition political party led by former Syrian Coalition President Ahmad al-Jarba—reached a reconciliation agreement under Russian auspices in May 2018.

 The agreement displaced civilians and fighters who refused to stay and sign the reconciliation agreement; offered civilians and defectors six months before being required to join compulsory military service; banned Syrian régime forces entering the region for the first six months since recapture; and transformed the Jaish al-Tawhid faction, an armed opposition group from Talbise town, into a local police force under the command of the Russian military police. However, as with other instances, the Syrian army violated the terms of the agreement and entered the area earlier than agreed.

 Régime forces immediately started to arrest civilians following the former’s return to the northern countryside, including civil defense volunteers, defectors, and even members of the local reconciliation committee. After the reconciliation, Russia followed the same tactic in Daraa governorate by using former opposition fighters to its benefit. The Russian military police issued identification cards for the local auxiliary force after the fighters finished the settlement process. The auxiliary force was eventually dissolved and some fighters were either transferred to the Fifth Corps—a Russian-backed division of the Syrian army that consists of reconciled former opposition fighters—or went back to civilian life.

 Following the May 2018 reconciliation agreement, Iran-backed forces, such as the Fourth Division, expanded their presence in the northern countryside. The régime’s continued neglect of these areas in terms of services and reconstruction as well as continued human rights violations—such as arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, and personal grievances cases filed by pro-régime locals, who accused opposition fighters of killing and kidnapping loved ones or destroying their properties—contributed to growing resentment against the Assad régime. Despite this so-called reconciliation agreement, several members of the reconciliation committee fled to Lebanon out of fear of being detained.



 In June 2019, a year after the Syrian army took control of the northern countryside, a channel on Telegram announced the establishment of a group calling itself “The Resistance Brigades in Homs.” The statement said that the group formed due to Russia’s failure to fulfill its obligations to the region and the régime’s use of conscripted youth in the battles in northwest Syria against opposition forces. The Resistance Brigades claimed nine attacks on régime forces between September 2019 and December 2020, targeting checkpoints and military bases.

 In October 2020, another armed group calling itself the “Brigades of 2011” announced that it would start carrying out attacks against the Syrian army, security services, and national defense militias—a local pro-régime militia affiliated with the security apparatus—in the northern countryside due to rights abuses committed by the régime in the region. In mid-November 2020, the armed group announced that they targeted a building belonging to state security in the city of Talbiseh in the northern countryside, a day before a scheduled celebration for the Baath Party. A statement published by the Brigades of 2011 said that the rapid increase in COVID-19 cases was the reason behind the attack. In May, while the country was preparing for the presidential elections, the armed group took credit for attacking an election celebration in the village of Farhaniya. Armed men on a motorcycle shot into the crowd, killing one person. Then, in July, the armed group again took credit for assassinating an army corporal at his home and assassinating another first lieutenant in mid-August.

 After these developments and, following the decision of the régime to send military reinforcements to the region, Major General Hossam Loqa, director of the General Intelligence Branch, met with local figures and the reconciliation committee in late August. Loqa threatened to launch a military operation unless the perpetrators involved in the attacks were handed over, in addition to handing over individual weapons and demanding six hundred personnel of Jaysh al-Tawhid for military service. Thus far, there has neither been a military operation nor a new settlement.



 The northern countryside of Homs is facing a scenario similar to Daraa, as the Assad régime has shown a lack of commitment to the settlement agreements signed by several regions across Syria, and countless human rights violations have continued. However, because the northern countryside of Homs is a tribal society and many army officers are from the area, especially Rastan—the biggest city in the northern countryside—the region may avoid a siege scenario like Daraa and a large-scale military operation if they reach an agreement with the Assad régime. This is partly because of the limited sleeper cell attacks against régime forces compared to those in Daraa governorate.

 Still, the Assad régime’s condition of six hundred young men joining conscription will be the biggest obstacle to implementing any agreement. This is yet another example of the so-called reconciliation agreement’s failure to bring stability and peace to Syria, as these agreements are built over destruction and rights abuses rather than any genuine and sustainable reconciliation. It is also another example of failed Russian promises to provide security for Syrians and how Moscow uses temporary reconciliation settlements as a step to execute its longer term, wider agenda in the country.'

Syrian exiles forced to prop up régime with fees

 'Early this year, Yousef, a 32-year-old Syrian living in Sweden, found himself faced with an impossible choice: either enlist in the army of the government that made him a refugee, or risk his family losing their home back in Syria.

 Military service is mandatory for Syrian men between the ages of 18 and 42, and the stakes rose significantly in February when an army official announced on Facebook that a new regulation would allow authorities to confiscate the property of “service evaders” and their families. Pressure was mounting on Yousef to decide.



 And so, in June, he made his way to the Syrian embassy in Stockholm with $8,000 (£5,876) in cash, ready to pay the fee to have his name taken off the conscription rolls. A shiver ran down his spine as he collected his receipt.

 “This money will be used by the Syrian régime to buy weapons and kill more people,” Yousef told the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), his voice trembling.

 He is far from alone. About a fifth of Syria’s population of 17 million are men of military age, according to data from the World Bank, and studies have shown that the threat of conscription is a major reason many refugees fear returning.

 The Syrian régime has been able to leverage this anxiety into revenue, harvesting foreign currency from the roughly 1 million Syrians who have settled in Europe to help prop up its ailing budget after US sanctions cut the country off from the international banking system last year.



 Syrian embassies, which used to only process paperwork for the military exemptions, have recently begun collecting cash payments. Two researchers, an airport official, and a former diplomat interviewed by OCCRP and the Syrian Investigative Reporting Unit (Siraj), said they suspected the cash made its way back to Syria via diplomatic pouch. Such a move would violate the 1961 Vienna convention on diplomatic relations, which says “packages constituting the diplomatic bag […] may contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use.”

 Government documents and official statements show Bashar al-Assad’s government projected the policy would raise substantial income, revealing the lengths the Syrian government is going to in order to raise cash. Syria’s army, finance ministry, foreign ministry, central bank, and military recruitment service did not respond to requests for comment.

 The US sanctions implemented in 2020 under the Caesar Act have worsened an already difficult financial situation for Syria. Processing payments for vital imports such as wheat and oil products have become even harder as a result, and the Syrian pound, now worth barely 1% of its pre-crisis value against the dollar, has suffered further losses.

 “Shortage in foreign currency has become an acute problem, especially after the Caesar Act came into force,” said Armenak Tokmajyan, a researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. “The régime needs foreign currency. The more it has, the longer it will survive.”

 The government has leaned increasingly on its diaspora to fill its coffers. A Syrian passport is now one of the world’s most expensive to obtain abroad, at about £220 for a new passport, and about £600 to get it expedited.

 Syria’s 2021 budget projection predicts revenues from the military exemption fees to reach 240bn Syrian pounds (£140m), up from 70bn Syrian pounds in 2020, according to copies published in Syria’s Official Gazette.

 The estimated revenue makes up 3.2% of this year’s budget revenue, up from 1.75% in 2020, the Syrian economist Karam Shaar told OCCRP.

 Sweden illustrates how the new amendments have played out among Syria’s diaspora. The Scandinavian country hosts about 114,000 Syrian refugees and is home to tens of thousands of relatively new arrivals.

 Between June and August, OCCRP reporters made three visits to the Syrian embassy in Stockholm. They counted an average of 10 applicants a day waiting in the queue for military service exemption.

 Another hint of how many people were paying the exemption fees came a year earlier, in June 2020, when the embassy website published the names of 43 Syrians cleared to pay the fee. It is unclear exactly when those on the list applied, but for other procedures, such as passport issuance, the embassy usually issues its lists once a month. The June post was the last such public announcement.

 An embassy employee, speaking to an undercover OCCRP reporter, said he could not say exactly how many had applied for the service exemption, but that there had been a “significant increase” in the first half of 2021, which he attributed to the February announcement.

 “On some days, 10 come to us and on other days the figure can go up to 50,” the employee said. If accurate, this would mean the embassy could be taking in as much as $400,000 in cash on some days.

 OCCRP spoke with 10 Syrians, eight in Sweden, one in Germany, and one in Lebanon, who decided to pay the conscription fee. Some, like Yousef, were frightened by the prospect of asset seizures in Syria. But others had more practical reasons.

 One 29-year-old named Ali said he paid the fee at the encouragement of his family, who considered the payment to be “a form of direct participation in the Syrian war effort”.

 Gian, a Syrian who works at a home for elderly people in Frankfurt, Germany, said he had no issue in paying the money. “I am getting a monthly salary, the exemption process is easy, and I want to safeguard my family’s property in Syria from being seized,” Gian said. He said three relatives with asylum status in Germany also paid the fee.

 But many Syrians are still leery of funding the government they feel was responsible for sending them into exile.

 Abdullah Jaafar, a 35-year-old who has been living in Gothenburg, Sweden’s second-largest city, for eight years, said he saw the exemption payments as a kind of extortion.

 “I have the full amount, and I can pay it, but I will not do it,” Jaafar said. “This government is illegal.” '

Afrin attacks show political solution with régime impossible

 

 'The latest attacks by the Bashar Assad régime and its backer Russia on Syria’s northern Afrin prove that reaching a political solution with the régime is impossible, Abdurrahman Mustafa, head of the Syrian Interim Government said on Sunday.

 In a written statement, Mustafa said that in a dangerous escalation “confirming the continuity of the criminal approach of the régime and its allies against the Syrian people” warplanes targeted a school in the village of Barad, in the south of Afrin province, which lead to deaths as well as injuries.

 The attack also caused material damage to surrounding buildings, he added.

 “The crime adds to the criminal record of the murderous régime and its allies, and confirms the impossibility of reaching with them any political solution on the future of Syria,” Mustafa said.

 He also accused the international community of not being able to deter the regime from carrying out such attacks.



 Mustafa underlined that “the régime must be held accountable for all war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against the Syrian people.”

 Condemning the attack, Mustafa said that these acts will not undermine the determination of the Syrian people to achieve victory.

 The increasing attacks on Afrin and Idlib come ahead of a meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to take place in Russia's Black Sea resort of Sochi.

 Russia is the main ally of the Syrian régime, while Turkey supports groups that have fought to unseat Bashar Assad.'

The Assad Régime’s Business Model for Supporting ISIS

 'The régime of Bashar al-Assad consistently supported the Islamic State (ISIS) when the group controlled significant amounts of territory, even as the régime struggled to retake control of Syrian territory from the various rebel groups engaged in the Syrian civil war, including ISIS. One key tactic of the régime’s strategy was to focus its military efforts against the moderate Syrian rebel groups opposing the Assad dictatorship, in particular the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and not the Islamic State group. Assad typically would be involved in any major decisions, and government officials would be wary of the consequences of making sensitive decisions or taking sensitive actions without Assad’s prior approval. It is therefore inconceivable that Syrian intelligence could have assisted, facilitated or tolerated ISIS operatives without prior decision-making at the highest levels of the Syrian government. The Syrian régime made this strategic decision to enable and facilitate the continued survival of the Islamic State in Syria in an effort to paint all of the Syrian opposition as “terrorists.”

 In May 2011, in the wake of some of the early Arab Spring protests in Syria, the Syrian government began to release hardline Islamist terrorists in the first of a series of official government amnesties. Decree No. 61, for example, issued in May 2011 covered “all members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other detainees belonging to political movements.” Several of the terrorists released in these first amnesties went on to head Islamist extremist groups in Syria, including Hassan Abboud, a founder of Ahrar al-Sham; Zahran Alloush, the commander of Jaysh al-Islam; and Ahmad `Aisa al-Shaykh, the commander of Suqour al-Sham, as well as senior figures in ISIS such as Ali Musa al-Hawikh (aka Abu Luqman). Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat with Syria’s foreign ministry who later defected to the opposition, told the Wall Street Journal in 2014 that “the fear of a continued, peaceful revolution is why these Islamists were released. The reasoning behind the jihadists, for Assad and the régime, is that they are the alternative to the peaceful revolution. They are organized with the doctrine of jihad and the West is afraid of them.”

 By housing the jihadists together in the notorious Sednaya prison before the rebellion, the régime effectively networked together formerly disparate and unconnected jihadists, who came to refer to themselves as Sednaya graduates. According to one released Sednaya jihadist, “when I was detained, I knew four or five or six, but when I was released I knew a hundred, or two or three hundred. I now had brothers in Hama and Homs and Daraa and many other places, and they knew me. It took only a few short weeks—weeks, not a month—for us, in groups of two or three, in complete secrecy, to start.”

 Beyond strategically and intentionally releasing jihadists from Syrian prisons, the Assad régime also frequently refrained from attacking ISIS positions. At times, the Assad régime and ISIS agreed to several evacuation deals, and sometimes the régime appeared to collude with ISIS in an effort to encourage the group to attack moderate rebels rather than the régime. In other cases, ISIS appeared to take actions favorable to Syrian government interests. For example, in July 2014, ISIS forces withdrew from the northern suburbs of Aleppo just as the Syrian régime was trying to outflank FSA forces in the city. The ISIS withdrawal enabled régime forces to take the city’s northern suburbs without firing a shot and then outflank FSA forces in the city from three sides.

 One reason the Assad régime may have elected not to target ISIS positions in Eastern Syria was the régime’s business dealings with the organization. The U.S. State Department has stated unequivocally that “the Syrian régime has purchased oil from ISIS through various intermediaries, adding to the terrorist group’s revenue.” This started around 2014, when ISIS seized control of the Deir al-Zour region of Eastern Syria, and gained control of more than 60 percent of the country’s oil fields, including Syria’s largest, the al-Omar oil field. By September 2014, ISIS’s daily income from oil from Iraqi and Syrian oil fields was estimated to total some $3 million a day, with sales of around 50,000 barrels a day in Syria alone.

 Reports emerged in 2015 that the Islamic State was selling at least some of its oil to the Syrian government. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, in 2014 “ISIL may have earned as much as several million dollars per week, or $100 million in total, from the sale of oil and oil products to local smugglers who, in turn, sell them to regional actors, notably the Asad régime.” In March 2015, the European Union blacklisted prominent Syrian businessperson George Haswani, explaining that “Haswani provides support and benefits from the régime through his role as a middleman in deals for the purchase of oil from ISIL by the Syrian régime.” Meanwhile, according to a Financial Times investigation, there were reports that Haswani’s company, HESCO, “sends ISIS 15m Syrian lira (about $50,000) every month to protect its equipment, which is worth several million dollars.” Haswani’s son denied this but confirmed that ISIS did, in fact, “partly” run the company’s Tuweinan gas plant.

 The Assad régime’s business dealings with ISIS did not end with oil and gas, however. The régime also purchased and sold grain from areas under ISIS control. Samer Foz, a Syrian businessman blacklisted by the European Union in 2019 for providing financing and other support to the Assad régime, reportedly transported grain from Syrian government-controlled areas to territory controlled by ISIS. According to other reports, he also moved wheat from ISIS-controlled areas through Turkey into Syrian régime-controlled territory.

 The Syrian régime also supported the financing of ISIS by allowing Syrian banks to continue to function and provide financial services within ISIS-held territory. In a report on ISIS financing issued in February 2015, the Financial Action Task Force—the multinational body that develops and promotes policies to counter illicit financial activities—found that “more than 20 Syrian financial institutions with operations in ISIS-held territory” continued to do business there. Moreover, these bank branches remained “connected to their headquarters in Damascus; and some of them may maintain links to the international financial system.”

 The Assad régime also looked the other way and allowed ISIS to conduct financial transactions through informal financial networks, even once these illicit terror-financing channels were publicly exposed. For example, in April, September and November 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department designated a series of ISIS financial facilitators and money service businesses that had been enabling ISIS activities in Syria and beyond. But the Syrian government took no action against these publicly outed ISIS financial intermediaries, which continued to function unmolested.

 The ISIS financial networks in question were not insignificant, making the Syrian government’s decision not to act against them, even once their activities became public, all the more galling. They included, for example, the ISIS “general financial manager” Abd-al-Rahman Ali Husayn al-Ahmad al-Rawi, who according to information released in the Treasury Department press release announcing his designation in April 2019, “was one of a few individuals who provided ISIS significant financial facilitation into and out of Syria.” Moreover, “Abd-al-Rahman had a hard-currency liquidity of several million dollars in Syria. He served as ISIS’s general financial manager, and prior to his relocation to Turkey, he traveled around Syria on behalf of the group.”

 The territorial defeat of ISIS, coupled with the relative increase of the Syrian régime’s strength, means the group’s utility to Damascus has largely run its course. ISIS cells primarily attacked régime-aligned forces in the Badia (the Syrian desert) in 2020, régime forces have carried out operations targeting ISIS forces rather than letting them relocate as before, and the group has become even more reliant on illicit money service businesses in the region to transfer funds internationally.

 While ISIS remains an insurgent threat in Iraq and Syria and a global threat as a terrorist network, it no longer controls significant territory and the risk it poses is a fraction of what it once was. But there is no clear global coalition—political or military—to address the threat posed by the Assad régime, which has killed exponentially more people than ISIS, facilitated the group’s terrorist activities, and caused population displacement, migration flows, and tremendous regional instability. The international community stepped up to the challenge of ISIS, but it has failed miserably to address the multifaceted challenges presented by the Assad régime, let alone address the calamity that is the Assad régime itself.'

Torture after returning to government-controlled Homs

 

 'The Assad régime with the support of its Russian ally has blocked aid into the Rukban camp along the border with Jordan since September 2019, forcing some 21,000 people to leave the desperate situation in Rukban.

 The estimated remaining 12,000 people are left with next to no food or water and a lack of sanitation in the camp.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) spokeswoman Danielle Moylan, 88 individuals have registered to leave the camp as part of the UN-supported mission.

 “On September 11, a convoy of five trucks entered Rukban with the sole purpose to support these registered families to voluntarily leave Rukban with their belongings,” Moylan claimed.

 “However, while inside Rukban a small group of individuals obstructed the convoy and assaulted a driver. As a result, the mission was cancelled and the convoy immediately departed Rukban.”



 A 28-year-old Rukban camp resident, who asked to be identified by his initials IA, told Al Jazeera there were many Syrians protesting at the gates of the camp against the entry of transfer trucks.

 “I am one of those people who would never return back to areas under Assad’s control, no matter how bad my situation gets,” IA, originally from al-Qaryateen village in eastern suburbs of Homs, said.

 “I will never return to an area ruled by the criminal régime who still kills civilians and treats them brutally.”

 Rukban lies in an arid “no-man’s land” between the border of Syria and Jordan, close to the US military base al-Tanf.



 The majority of the displaced Syrians in Rukban fled from the armed group ISIL (ISIS) when it controlled Raqqa in 2014, and once Jordan stopped accepting refugees into the country in 2016 it became a de facto camp.

 Living in the camp since 2015, IA explained the conditions in Rukban could not get any worse because of the blockade of aid. On some days, he, his wife, and three daughters do not get anything to eat, and generally, there is a shortage of basic items.

 “For example, today we ate rice with some yoghurt on the side, and we thank God for that,” IA said.



 The thousands who have already left the camp were sent to “transition centres” set up by the régime in Homs, though they more resemble detention facilities where people are interrogated and sometimes forcibly disappeared.

 Amnesty International recently documented that some of the returnees were transferred to intelligence centres where they were tortured.

 In its latest research on human rights violations in Syria, Amnesty said Syrian security officials detained 10 individuals who returned from Rukban camp, and three were “subjected to torture or other ill-treatment, and two were forcibly disappeared”.

 SACD also documented the arrest of 174 people who were sent to “terrorism” courts following their transit from Rukban to the Homs centres, despite Russian and Syrian régime safety guarantees.

 As Atassi from SACD pointed out, the Syrian regime “really enjoys humiliating” opposition areas and civilians previously critical of it.

 “We think the UN in Syria is failing to properly inform Syrians of the situation and their activities in returning Syrians,” Atassi said.

 “The research shows a pattern with which the regime treats people coming back from Rukban. These people are not coming back to their homes, they’re going to their death.”



 IA said he is at an increased risk of being detained if he left Rukban because he joined “the revolution” in 2011 and protested against al-Assad’s régime.

 “Many of our friends who returned from Rukban were actually detained and until this day, no one knows anything about them,” IA said.

 “Some were taken to Sednaya prison and it is still unknown whether they will come out alive or not,” IA added, referring to the Assad régime military prison known for its torture and execution of thousands of Syrians.



 The UN said it was aware of reports, including the recent Amnesty research, on detentions and abuse of individuals who returned to government-controlled areas.

 Moylan said the UN continues to make every effort to independently verify reports and to follow up with Syrian officials.

 “It remains the UN’s position that conditions in Syria are not conducive for large-scale, organized returns,” Moylan said. “The UN is not in a position to make security guarantees and has not made any such guarantees to people living in Rukban.”

 There are no follow-up mechanisms for the UN to assess the fate of people they assisted in leaving Rukban and access to the centres are blocked by Syrian authorities.

 “The UN at this point in time have the responsibility to inform people that it is not safe to return, rather than facilitating their return,” Atassi said.

 “When you’re left between two choices – of either staying in a camp and dying from starvation or cold, or going to Assad detention centres and dying under torture – they choose the lesser evil,” Atassi said.



 IA expressed his interest in returning to Homs with his family, “but not with the presence of killers and criminals”.

 “Homs is very dear to our hearts. It is the most beautiful city, but without Assad.” '

Idlib residents fear renewed Russian-backed offensive

 'On Sept. 1, eight raids targeted a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) camp in the forest of al-Hamamah village in the western countryside of Idlib, while four raids hit two frontlines in Kabana in the countryside of Latakia and Duwayr al-Akrad village in the northwestern countryside of Hama.

 The following day, six Russian raids targeted the hills of Kabana and Tallat al-Khoudur in the countryside of Latakia, as well as Sarmaniya in the countryside of Hama. And from Sept. 3 through Sept. 6, daily raids by Russian aircraft targeted locations in the Idlib countryside, with raids intensifying on Sept. 8 and showing no signs of slowing down.

 The ongoing Russian airstrikes raised the concerns of residents over the possibility of the Syrian government carrying out military action in those areas. As a result, some families decided to flee; others preferred to get rid of their furnishings to make it easier for them to leave in the event of battles.

 Hardly a day goes by without Russian planes carrying out a number of raids, especially in western Idlib and the Jabal al-Zawiya area.

 Omar Jumaa from the town of al-Bara in Jabal al-Zawiya said, “I fled to the northern camps near the Turkish border as the régime bombarded on a daily basis my town and the villages in Jabal al-Zawiya. Add to this the daily Russian airstrikes. Most of the residents of those villages fled to safer areas. Despite the so-called cease-fire reported in the media, it looks like there is war on the ground.”

 For his part, Sameh Nabil, a Free Syrian Army leader residing in Idlib, said, “As factions, we expect the régime to launch military action in Jabal al-Zawiya. After settling the Daraa issue, régime forces may head toward Jabal al-Zawiya. We have braced ourselves for such a possibility and developed appropriate military plans.”

 He added, “Unfortunately, Turkey is sitting idly by even though it is a party to the cease-fire that was agreed to on March 5, 2020, in Moscow. However, the Turkish side in Jabal al-Zawiya is merely watching as Russian planes bombard the towns of Jabal al-Zawiya near the positions of the Turkish army.”

 Naji Abu Hudhaifa, an Idlib-based spokesperson for the National Liberation Front, which includes several armed opposition factions in northern Idlib, said, “The escalation carried out by the Russian planes and the régime’s artillery has been ongoing. We responded by bombing several régime positions in Saraqib from where régime forces launch their attacks against civilians in Idlib.”

 He added, “We have declared full readiness to confront any military operation on the part of the régime, and we are monitoring the movements of the régime forces at the lines of contact.”

 Abu Muslim al-Shami, an Idlib-based military commander in HTS,said the "factions of Al-Fatah al-Mubin (Great Conquest) operations room, which is led by HTS, directly deal with the sources of aggression. After the bombing of Idlib city, we targeted locations deep within the régime [areas] inside the city of Saraqib, which resulted in several explosions inside the city. We also targeted several other areas. We, the military factions, are bracing ourselves for all kinds of possibilities. We are aware that our enemy is [murderous].”

 Majd Kilani, an Idlib-based researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies, said, “Turkey supports the factions to confront any infiltration in the wake of the recent Astana meeting, where it was agreed to support the factions’ bombing of régime sites in response to the escalation. However, field and political indicators do not point to a Russian or régime plan to start battles neither in Idlib nor elsewhere. Russia presents itself as a guarantor of the political track. On the ground, there are no indications of the régime’s intention to open battles, at least in the near future.”

 Kilani further warned, “The humanitarian situation is catastrophic in Idlib as winter draws near amid another possible coronavirus wave and more possible rounds of bombing operations.”

 Muhannad Darwish, a resident of Idlib, said, “I think the régime has settled the Daraa issue and is close to settling the issue of Syria’s Badia, which has been combed in search of Islamic State cells. I believe the calm that previously existed [in Idlib] was due to the régime’s plan to settle the issues of Daraa and the Badia desert. But since those issues have been settled, escalation will return to Idlib.”

 Darwish believes “Turkey is working hard to have the cease-fire hold in Idlib. Turkey has specific interests and is the weakest link in Syria, so it believes an escalation would not be in its interest. However, I believe if the cease-fire collapses and the battles resume, the Turks will not stand idly by. The quality of their military deployment is different today.” '

Nobody is safe under Assad

 

 'Things couldn't go any better for the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. The whole world watches with horror the takeover of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan and hardly anyone notices what Assad's henchmen are up to. These days they are doing what they have been doing for years, bombing them, driving them away and torturing them, but more unleashed than they have been for a long time. This is a popular strategy used by autocrats in the Middle East: as soon as global attention is focused on another region, they take action against their critics even more brutally than usual.

 For the people in Daraa, a province in southern Syria , on the Jordanian border, this is a disaster. They have been attacked by Assad's henchmen for weeks. For a long time it was relatively peaceful in Daraa. But now Assad is using the moment to submit the province and the provincial capital of the same name.



 Daraa was a center of the opposition for a long time, and protests against the régime began there in 2011. A couple of young people in town had sprayed the sentence "It's your turn, doctor" on a house wall, an allusion to the trained ophthalmologist Bashar al-Assad. He had her arrested and mistreated for it. The anger of family members and residents in Daraa sparked a peaceful uprising that soon spread across the country. But instead of resigning or introducing reforms, the dictator had the demonstrators beaten, arrested and killed. And with it started a destructive war that continues to this day.

 The Assad régime retook Daraa in 2018, but the rebels retained some areas under their control, including the southern part of the provincial capital, Daraa al-Balad. Most recently, Assad's henchmen had besieged it. The residents trapped there endured under inhumane conditions, with dwindling supplies of food, drinking water and medicines.



 With this looming humanitarian catastrophe behind him, Assad was able to blackmail his opponents into surrendering. Russia, the closest ally of the Assad régime, has now negotiated a ceasefire with the rebels, which has been in force for a few days. The agreement provides for a withdrawal of all fighters, the surrender of their weapons and an oath of allegiance by the residents to Bashar al-Assad.

 Since then, Assad's henchmen have been advancing further and further into Daraa al-Balad. Tens of thousands of people are on the run, whoever stays risks death. Assad regards all people who have lived in an opposition area as terrorists who need to be eliminated, even if they have never fought. As a result, many civilians fear massacres and acts of revenge by the régime.



 Their fear is justified. The régime has used tactics similar to those in Daraa in recent years, for example in eastern Aleppo and in eastern Ghouta. Assad and his Iranian and Russian helpers surround the opposition districts, drop more and more bombs on homes and hospitals and leave people starving. After taking the places, Assad's henchmen mistreat or kill many opposition fighters and civilians.

 These crimes are well documented. The fact that the régime is still committing and can commit them to this extent shows one thing very clearly: as long as Assad's régime is in power, there will be no peace, on the contrary. Assad will not stop his attacks until he has control of the whole country again.



 This is also evident in northwest Syria. In Idlib, the last province still controlled by rebels, the Syrian and Russian air forces have been massively bombing the civil infrastructure for a few days. Actually, there is a ceasefire between rebels and régime troops in the province. The attacks now are the worst in almost a year.

 According to the Syrian civil defense, more than five people were killed and at least eleven injured in the bombings, including children. The Syrian and Russian air forces attacked a refugee camp near the Turkish border and houses in the provincial capital of the same name, Idlib, where hundreds of thousands of people live. They also attacked a medical facility in Marayan village, which was one of the few medical centers in the area that served thousands of people.



 Around three million people live in Idlib, many of whom have previously fled there from other provinces. Many are now on the run from the bombs again. Even before the new attacks, the situation in Idlib was dire. Many people have set themselves up in tented camps or makeshift shelters without protection from rain or heat. Most of them just make ends meet.

 The supply situation in Syria and especially in Idlib is catastrophic. The country is struggling with an economic crisis that is exacerbated by the collapse of the financial system in neighboring Lebanon. Due to the currency depreciation, the prices for many products have multiplied. Even basic things like bread and gasoline have become priceless for many, and in some areas people are threatened with famine. According to the World Food Program (WFP), 12.4 million people in Syria can only find food with great difficulty .



 In addition to hunger and poverty, the lack of security affects people, especially in Assad's territory. Assad, who was re-elected president in May after a sham election, is punishing anyone who dares to question his rule. Intimidation, torture and extrajudicial executions are cruel everyday life for many people in Syria.

 Not only those who stayed in Syria suffer from this. In the course of the war, millions of Syrians fled, most of them to neighboring countries such as Jordan, Turkey or Lebanon, and many to Europe. There some politicians and parts of the public are increasingly convinced that now that the fighting in Syria has allegedly subsided, the people should return to their homeland.



 The Danish government, for example, has recently withdrawn residence permits from Syrian refugees because it considers parts of Syria to be safe. At the end of 2020, the federal government suspended the ban on deportation for Syrians in order, as it emphasizes, to be able to deport only serious criminals. Even in countries like Turkey and Lebanon, which are struggling with severe economic crises, resentments against the refugees are growing, and attacks on Syrian accommodation and restaurants are increasing. It is not safe for anyone in Syria, especially not for returnees. Assad regards people who have fled the country as apostates and traitors.

 A recently published report by Amnesty International shows how cruelly he is taking revenge on them. Assad’s secret services have arrested, tortured and disappeared Syrians who returned to Syria after fleeing. The human rights organization documented cases of Syrians who returned to Syria between mid-2017 and spring 2021. The result: 66 people were severely ill-treated upon arrival, including 13 children. Five people were killed and there is no trace of another 17. The report proves that Syria is not a safe place for returnees, said Markus N. Beeko, Secretary General of Amnesty International in Germany, at the presentation of the study. Rather, the secret services are specifically targeting returned Syrian refugees, and deportations to Syria are therefore "irresponsible, prohibited under international law and humanly disgusting".

 In the Amnesty report, the Syrian Sema, who returned to Syria in 2019, has a say. "I didn't flee because of the bombs, but because of the threats from the Syrian régime," she says. "The reasons I left my country are still there." '

Syria war crimes not considered news by half of Britons

 

 'War crimes in Syria are no longer considered newsworthy by almost half of Britons, despite most people thinking attacks on civilians happen regularly.

 Forty-nine per cent of people do not think the UK media would bother reporting on atrocities, such as attacks on schools and hospitals, in the Syrian conflict.

 This is despite the majority (63 per cent) of Britons believing such war crimes are common in the conflict, now in its 11th year.

 The reason is a combination of confusion, insularity, the spread of disinformation and a reluctance for Western countries to intervene, according to a report by the charity Syria Relief, which commissioned the YouGov poll.

 Attacks such as the deadly bombing of Afrin’s Al-Shifa Hospital in June, which left at least 18 people dead, are still a regular occurence.

 Since 2011, Syria has seen chemical weapon attacks, mass killings, the use of child soldiers and the targeting of religious minorities.



 Shamsa al-Ali, a 33-year-old Syrian refugee living in Lebanon, said: “The crisis didn’t end, it’s maybe greater than before.

 “Every day I receive or hear news about one of my relatives who is missing, and his family can’t reach or contact him, or [he’s] died.”

 Another refugee Asreya al-Hajj, 33, said: “Most of my family and siblings are homeless, the sweat we’ve given early before the war, building our houses and memories, are all now gone with a single airstrike.”

 Shaha al-Mohammad, 24, said that she believes there is a lack of interest in what is happening in Syria because of the complex nature of the conflict.

 “Because we kill each other as Syrians, others feel we deserve what is happening for us,” she added.

 Syria Relief’s head of advocacy Charles Lawley believes the main reason for apathy from countries like the UK is “the sheer frequency of crimes against humanity”.

 “We don’t believe that Syria should simply be condemned as just a place where bad things happen, but that every single attack on civilian life is an outrage, no matter how frequent they are,” he said.

 “In fact, we would argue that the more frequent they are, the more outrageous they are. However, sadly, the lack of political will has meant that because there are just so many war crimes being committed, there is less anger about it.”

 The report revealed that civilian victims of sniper attacks were injured in similar ways on certain days, suggesting shooters are having “competitions”. In some cases, pregnant women were found shot in the uterus.

 Brutal attacks on homes, hospitals and schools have forced millions to abandon their lives and seek refuge abroad. Since the start of the conflict, 6.8 million Syrians have become refugees and asylum seekers, with a further 6.7 million people displaced within Syria.

 Rami Elsayer, a refugee at the Atmeh refugee camp in northern Syria, said “international news channels talking about the improvement of the situation in Syria are incorrect”.

 “Our unemployment is high and the spread of coronavirus has affected us greatly, there is no healthcare,” he said.

 “The situation is really much worse than previous years and I hope my message will reach all people around the world – don’t leave us alone.”

 The United Nations (UN) says Lebanon has 865,530 registered Syrian refugees and estimates there are 1.5 million Syrians in the neighbouring country.

 An estimated 90 per cent of Syrian refugee households live in “extreme poverty” in Lebanon, according to the UN, up from 55 per cent in early 2019.'

How to resist siege in Bashar al Assad’s Syria

 

 Omar al-Hariri:

 'Daraa will terrify the régime every day. We will keep reminding them that we are the ones who set fire to this régime, and only we will extinguish it with freedom and dignity.

 We all know very well that when the buses come, we will have to make choices that are difficult, bitter, harsh and painful. It is not our first time seeing these green buses, and it won't be the last. They are always the régime's solution, and often the only solution for the trapped opponents of Bashar al Assad’s régime.

 On August 24, my friend Talal said goodbye to his son Yasser, holding his hand while leaving Daraa al Balad as part of the agreement between the opposition and the régime to transfer those who refuse the "reconciliation", to Idlib.

 Talal is one of the opposition fighters who defected from the Syrian army in 2012, refusing his officer’s orders to shoot protesters. He later joined opposition groups and fought the régime for years in Daraa. Yet now, it looks like he’s the one who has to say goodbye to his wife and two sons, Yasser and Sham. He may never see them again.

 In southern Syria, I experienced this in 2018. This type of settlement deal happened in al Sanamayn in March 2020, and in Umm Batinah in May 2021, and today in Daraa al Balad in August 2021. Disputes between the people of Daraa and the régime forces were always burning here and there, and the régime always stipulated the buses as the only solution.

 And when you leave Daraa you don't really leave, believe me. You leave your soul behind.

 No matter how hard I try to describe it, it is harsher than words can express. Suddenly, you are faced with two options. You can take the buses towards northwest Syria - to overcrowded camps filled to the brim, where there is no room for even a single new displaced person, where people are suffering under continued Russian and régime bombardment.

 Or, you can stay in Daraa, and wait for the régime’s revenge. Perhaps you will be arrested, or forcibly disappeared, or assassinated. And if you escape with your life, you have no choice but to live under the tyrannical rule of Assad.

 Some could not stand the idea of living under his rule, being forced to see pictures of the criminal on every street corner, having to salute him and his officers. They decided to leave in 2018, after a Russia-mediated ‘reconciliation’ deal, while I, and others, chose to remain and stick to what we have believed in since 2011.

 But this "battle" is not easy at all. It is a battle against fear, anxiety, disgust and despair. Many were defeated and left Daraa in succession. Daraa is that tree in autumn whose leaves die and fall slowly.



 Last May, the Assad régime organised presidential “elections”. Official media portrayed scenes straight out of a Syrian series - thousands celebrating the “victory” of Assad and thanking him for his “achievements”! What achievements?

 Only the people of Daraa al Balad and those in Al-Omari Mosque square - the birthplace of the revolution on March 18, 2011, decided to spoil these celebrations. The people of Daraa al Balad flew the flags of the Syrian revolution and raised their voices in anti-election slogans. The media saw that and circulated widely.

 From that moment on, all of us in Daraa al Balad knew that the régime would take revenge on us. We knew that something was waiting for us soon.

 Bombing, destruction and — eventually — the green buses followed soon after. The siege began in June. More than 38,000 people, mostly women and children, became displaced. For two months, the régime has been doing only one thing: forcing its opponents out of the area through those green buses or killing them in Daraa.

 For two months, the remaining residents of Daraa al Balad have been waking up, looking for their food in the morning, asking each other what will happen tomorrow. And before night, they return to the shelters because they know that the bombing will start at night and will not stop before morning. And again the next day and the day after that.



 In 2011, my friends and I established Daraa Martyrs Documentation, a human rights organisation. Even after 2018, we decided to continue documenting human rights violations in Daraa without hesitation. My colleagues and I needed a "weapon" to confront the war we live in our hearts. We are in a war in which we have to convince ourselves that we made the right decision by taking this risk.

 Our office is our secret weapon. We wake up in the morning and ask ourselves, "How are we going to disturb the régime today?"

 The answer is easy. This régime is afraid of evidence of its crimes, afraid that the world will know what is happening in Syria. It wants us to die quietly.

 And we are telling the régime: Look at us. We are fighting you and you don't know who we are and how we do it. It is very dangerous to the point of death, but I feel the flavour of victory in my mouth every day.

 When the régime started its siege, our task became even more challenging. We were used to working in dangerous conditions for years, but this time we felt that it was different.

 Colleagues were split into teams to cover several places in and out of the besieged area to be able to contact colleagues outside Syria. Everyone has to submit their notes and documents every day, to not postpone the work by even one day, because who knows? The régime forces might attack us before we send the last day's work.

 After every night’s bombing, we start work in the morning to assess the damage, check on those who are alive, and to ensure the safety of the injured. The days are too short before the return of the night and the attacks.

 For days, the negotiating committees have been trying to reach a peaceful solution that prevents displacement and war, but it is clear to everyone that the régime is not negotiating to end the war - it came to take revenge on the place where it all began 10 years ago. Daraa al Balad is a major symbol for its people, and the régime wants to destroy it.

 We, in the office, have to defend Daraa in our own way.

 We refuse to let the world forget and forgive the régime for its crimes. We document every single crime, photograph it and record the names and details, and place them before the eyes and consciences of the world and in the records of history.

 Our motto is "we will not forget, and we will not accept that anyone forgets".

 Usually, I try not to lie to myself, I try not to get too hopeful, lest it get lost, but I am certain that we are not defeated yet. I consider what I have done during years of human rights work a victory. If I die today, I will be satisfied.

 There is an Arabic song that says "We will stay here," in which the singer urges university graduates not to emigrate and stay in their homeland. This song is my friend.

 "We will stay here," because if we leave, they will be here, and this place is ours, not theirs.'

This is how the US can (still) become kingmaker in Syria

 

Ömer Özkizilcik:

 'In the early years of the war in Syria, Hilary Clinton positioned herself as a strong supporter of the legitimate Syrian opposition against the Bashar al Assad regime. At that time many speculated about the probability of a US intervention, but the Obama administration’s decision not to enforce its “red line” on chemical weapons shocked Washington pundits.

 This was a demonstration of American unwillingness that ultimately facilitated the Russian intervention in Syria and became a symbol of the US’ failure there.

 However, an equally important failure — one that has cast it to the sidelines of the political process and the future of the country — is not only ignored, but whitewashed. This was the insistence of the Obama administration to only support anti-Daesh groups that neither targeted the Assad regime nor the Iranian-backed Shia militias.

 In Syria, the only group that fit this description was the Syrian branch of the US-designated PKK terror group, the YPG. To preserve the nuclear deal with Iran, the Obama administration not only alienated Turkey and misguided the international community, but also drove the US into a corner.

 In line with this strategy, CENTCOM officials who worked closely with Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq against Daesh, have repeatedly undermined alternatives. The train and equip programmes for the legitimate armed Syrian opposition were defamed as ineffective or unviable. Yet years later, the same armed units of the Syrian Interim Government now control vast territories and cleared several areas from the YPG.

 The US now has entered a state of negligible importance in Syria. After former President Trumps’ partial withdrawal decision, CENTCOM officials preferred seeing Russian, rather than Turkish boots in their former bases. Now the US local partner in Syria depends on Russia for its safety. US troops remained in a strip of land in the east to ‘protect the oil’, but the last reason for the US to stay in Syria vanished when the Biden administration decided to end the waiver for the American company operating the oil facilities.

 Since then, CENTCOM officials are increasingly emphasising the importance of their work in Syria against Daesh. Even though Daesh hasn’t controlled territory since 2019, American commanders regularly publish information about YPG’s counter-terror operations in Syria. In reality, these “counter-terror operations” by the YPG are about as effective as the operations of the Afghan National Army against the Taliban. The narrative over Syria is misguided, just as the narrative over Afghanistan was.

 Moreover, in contrast to the Afghan National Army, the YPG does not have a motivation to eliminate Daesh – their sole source of alleged legitimacy. The YPG wants to fight Daesh, but not eliminate it. While US statements suggest that everything is fine in Syria, the reality is otherwise. Daesh continues to operate in the country.

 The small zone of American influence, its reliance on Russia for protecting its local partner in Syria and the lack of reasons to stay in Syria are just one facet of the looming disaster. More important is that the US has sidelined itself from the political process of Syria.

 According to the UN, the political process in Syria has two sides: the Assad regime and the legitimate Syrian opposition. The US, however, works with a third party that follows a separatist agenda for just a part of Syria. The US has played no role in the decision-making process for the members of the constitutional committee and has lost its influence over the Syrian opposition.

 The Syrian High Negotiations Committee, consisting of all the political spectrums of the Syrian opposition, works closely with Turkey, and Turkey has evolved to become the sole guarantor of the Syrian opposition. American diplomacy remains on the sidelines with sanctions and blockades against some Arab countries normalising relations with the Assad regime.

 The US started by supporting the Syrian opposition and democracy. Now it contributes to a separatist agenda in Syria that will ultimately end with the US playing no role in the future of Syria if the US doesn't change policy.

 At the end of the day, the tactical decision by the Obama administration to partner with the YPG needs to be corrected. Biden has to re-evaluate the tactics of the former president he served under and make a smart decision.

 It’s not in the interest of the US to stay in Syria supporting a separatist agenda. The interest of the US is in supporting a political solution by strengthening the legitimate Syrian opposition.

 To do so, Biden needs to abandon the YPG and work on uniting the non-YPG elements of the Syrian Democratic Forces with the Syrian National Army and the Kurdish Roj Peshmerga under the command of the Syrian Interim Government. By bringing these elements together, the US would become the kingmaker in Syria and could facilitate a political solution for Syria.

 The proposed idea to unite these forces is founded on an already occurring phenomenon as a de facto regional alliance of Turks, Arabs and Kurds is forming against the PKK/YPG. The US only needs to surf this wave and bring non-YPG elements of the Syrian Democratic Forces and formalise the alliance. This would allow Washington to come out of the sidelines into the centre of the game without alienating the Kurds.

 Such a policy shift in Washington would be appreciated by Turkey, which would provide strong support to enable a smooth transition. Moreover, as a bonus of this decision, the US would eliminate the strongest spoiler in Turkish-American relations. The Biden administration would strengthen its relations with a valuable and important NATO and regional partner, easing the burden on the US and helping Biden to focus more on China.

 Finally, this shift in strategy would be a strong alternative to the other proposed idea of normalising the Assad regime that has used chemical weapons on the people and committed numerous war crimes and atrocities.'

Régime’s stereotyping of Idlib shadows its bright side

 

 'Before the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Idlib was known as the “Green Idlib” for its richness with olive trees. However, residents of Idlib have always considered their region as a “forgotten governorate” since Hafez al-Assad came to power in Syria. Residents claim that the Syrian government has ignored their governorate and failed to undertake urban development projects there.

 During the revolution, Idlib governorate became the center of attention after becoming home to thousands of displaced Syrians from different regions and opponents evicted from their areas under settlement agreements imposed by the régime with Russian auspices.

 In May 2014, a settlement agreement stipulated the eviction of civilians and former fighters from the old city of Homs to Idlib. As more settlements were reached throughout Syria, Idlib became a large concentration point for displaced residents and fighters from Damascus and its countryside, Daraa, Homs, Hama, and other regions. It is estimated that over four million Syrians live in northern Syria, according to a study published by the Jusoor Center for Studies last March.

 Meanwhile, the régime was launching an information war, in which it presented itself as civilized to the West through holding artistic activities, including concerts and festivals. At the same time, the régime labeled those in northern Syria as extremists and terrorists, attempting to demonize them.



 Singer-composer Samir Aktaa chanted songs for the Syrian revolution and subsequent aftermath, some pressing issues, and cross-border humanitarian hardship. He told Enab Baladi that art has the power to break the régime’s stereotyping of Idlib.

 Art is a tool that allows people to freely express themselves and their society, Aktaa said. He added, artists’ genuine sentiments can reveal the most sublime human feelings away from insincerity and pretense and by having a deep belief in the righteousness of the cause and the revolution.

 According to Aktaa, an artist’s mission is to reflect reality with his/her work and be more attentive to pressing issues than other groups in society, adding that through words and songs, artists can mirror the suffering and injustice directed against people for daring to demand freedom.

 During the revolution, many artistic and cultural manifestations emerged in Idlib, seeking to send a message to the world and those far about life in Idlib and the true nature of its people.

 Aktaa has presented songs about vital issues, including the case of detainees (the living and the killed ones), internally displaced camps, the revolution’s tenth anniversary, and the killing of Abdul Baset al-Sarout, an icon of the Syrian revolution.

 Aktaa told Enab Baladi that Syrians’ battle against the régime’s tyranny and dictatorship is one and indivisible.

 “The world will not stand by a revolution that does not have a voice. Freedom and dignity are vital issues to all people of the free world.”



 The Syrian régime utilized state television, media outlets, and social media networks to polish its image against the international community, depending on repeating the same official version of being targeted by terrorists and foreign elements carrying out a conspiracy to undermine Syria.

 Aziz al-Asmar, a Syrian graffiti artist, living in Idlib, rose to fame after he started painting murals on walls of destroyed houses and buildings by the Syrian régime’s bombing and Russia in Idlib.

 Al-Asmar’s murals tackle humanitarian themes beyond the Syrian case. For example, he painted a mural in honor of George Floyd, an African American US citizen who lost his life to racism and police brutality. Al-Asmar also painted murals of football icon Maradona after his death, the Israeli forces’ assault on Palestinians in Jerusalem, the Syrian revolution, and the death of Abdul Baset al-Sarout.

 Al-Asmar told Enab Baladi that he chose to paint on destroyed buildings because “they mirror the level of tragedy and brutality that have been practiced against Syrians by the régime and its allies.”

 The graffiti artist painted murals on the régime’s bombardment, displacement, arrests, civilians’ daily lives, and the hardships they face, including poverty, unemployment, and rising prices throughout Syria.

 He added that a few colors explained a lot without words and sent a message to the world that the Syrian revolution is not merely weapons, killers, and victims, but it is a revolution of culture, art, and humanity.

 According to al-Asmar, the cities of Saraqeb and Kafr Nubul in Idlib countryside and Darayya in Damascus countryside were the first to use graffiti and colors in the service of the revolution.

 Today, al-Asmar is engaging children in murals painting to help them express their dreams and wishes, considering that their participation enriches and attributes more sincerity and human value to his cultural and artistic project.

 “We are still dreaming of a near victory to paint the victory mural on the walls of the presidential palace in Damascus.”



 Zafer Saleh Sadaqah, a Syrian poet who lives in Idlib, has written poems and composed lyrics of many songs chanted by Samir Aktaa. Sadaqah and Aktaa have formed a harmonious, artistic duo, where words and sounds combine to produce music.

 When asked about the role of intellectuals in bringing to light the bright side of Idlib, which the régime keeps trying to dilute and marginalize, Sadaqah said that a writer, a literary scholar, or artist who does not connect with the pains of his/her people and society is a servant intellectual.

 Sadaqah added, the fact that the régime has an organized media and information system compared to the situation in Idlib does not give primacy to it because it falsifies facts, and only words of truth prevail.

 During the Syrian revolution, many Syrian artists in various fields supported the régime, which used them as a vehicle to promote its media propaganda in television interviews, musical concerts, and other events. These artists positively talked of the régime and helped it look civilized away from its real image as responsible for bombing, displacing, arresting, and intimidating Syrians.

 Sadaqah said that Syrians of the northern region do not need to create an alternative or new society, for they already have an established rich, authentic, and diverse society, particularly after successive displacement waves from various Syrian cities to the north. He added that those who have the right tools must use them to highlight Idlib’s true face.

 “The loudness of guns does not guarantee the continuity of their sounds or give them power over words or songs whose impact goes beyond time and space.”



 The régime knew it could not regain control of all Syrian territories. It was also aware that groups fighting it in Idlib, mainly religiously oriented groups, can indirectly serve its position and offer a ready-made stereotypical image that would distort the Syrian revolution, political researcher Majed Alloush told Enab Baladi.

 Alloush added that the régime sought to turn Idlib into a center for Islamist factions, which at some point in time made mistakes contrary to revolutionary values advocated by Syrians, in reference to HTS, which was listed as a terrorist group after deviating from the revolution’s principles.

 He pointed out that the régime benefited from the armed factions’ mistakes in northern Syria as the West started comparing the régime and the factions’ methods of dealing with civilians in their areas of control.

 The régime was keen to send a message to the international community that it remains the least worst option for the West and its interests with all of its brutality.

 On the régime’s use of media to provide a misleading version of what is going on in Idlib, Alloush said that the problem is not the weakness of media in Idlib or the absence of information materials to be promoted, but the availability of many materials that the régime can benefit from and invest in for its interests.

 Alloush added that any talk of a cultural conflict between the régime and the models fighting it during the revolution’s armed phase would be illogical. The conflict with the régime is a moral one, between people lured by dreams of freedom and dignity and a régime that does not understand anything but killing as a weapon during conflicts.'

 

Do not forget Syria’s disappeared

 

 Mariam al-Hallak:

 'One of the hardest things we go through as families of the disappeared is the wait. For many years we have been waiting for answers, for any clue about the fates of our loved ones, and for justice and accountability.

 During the weekend, I joined fellow activists and Syrian families whose loved ones are still missing after being detained or disappeared by the Syrian régime and armed groups. We placed hundreds of landline telephones on the cobbles of Bebelplatz square in central Berlin as a call to governments to do more to seek information about our loved ones.

 My son Ayham Ghazoul was one of tens of thousands of Syrians who were detained and tortured for daring to peacefully oppose Bashar al-Assad’s régime. He was my youngest son, and the closest to me. His older brothers got married and moved out and my husband passed away in late 2011, so it was just he and I at home.

 During his teenage years before the revolution, he used to bring me stories written by former prisoners on computer disks. Those stories were banned in Syria but Ayham wanted me to know what it was like being a political detainee in al-Assad’s prisons.

 At the start of the revolution, he was studying for his master’s degree in dentistry and taking part in the uprising in Damascus. He joined the movement to defend freedom of expression and was so proud to be participating in the demonstrations, chanting and calling for freedom.

 He and some of his colleagues were arrested by the Air Force Intelligence Directorate and later taken to the notorious Fourth Division Branch where he was frequently tortured. His friends inside were amazed he was still alive after the torture sessions, his wounds were very serious but he always tried to smile until he was too tired to do so. They released him after three months with severe bleeding in his kidneys.

 Once he recovered, he returned to his studies and started to attend activism workshops in Beirut. The night before he was meant to travel home he called me to tell me about the best night of his life on the beach in Beirut. “I’ll tell you about it when I get back, Mama,” he said. I was waiting to hear about that night.

 The day after he came back from Beirut on November 5, 2012, he went to work at the university and this was when he was arrested. They took him to a room inside the university, filled with torture tools.

 A fellow detainee told me they beat him severely all over his body. When they beat him on his head, Ayham lost consciousness and died a few days later. He told me they stuck a white piece of paper to Ayham’s forehead with a number on it.

 Three months after he was killed, I learned of my son’s death. We started to grieve and to accept condolences from friends. At his memorial, a government official arrived and told me that Ayham was actually alive. He gave us details and it was enough for me to let myself believe and have hope.

 My journey of searching for answers about his whereabouts lasted for 17 months, going  everywhere, asking everyone I could. I would go to the intelligence branches with other mothers and we would ask them to tell us about our children. They all denied having any information at all until one day one officer finally nodded his head at me. My son had died, he confirmed.



 When the Caesar photos were first released, it uncovered the horrific atrocities committed by the Syrian régime against political prisoners. It left the world in total shock. I tried to search for Ayham in the photos but looking through such horrific pictures was difficult. A friend of the family managed to identify him.

 Since then, I have not stopped campaigning. We families have spoken out against state-sponsored torture and detention at every opportunity. We went to the German city of Koblenz to file a lawsuit against two Syrian régime officials who have been accused of torturing detainees. Families who recognised their loved ones in Caesar’s photos have come together and are trying to find out where they are buried.

 I need to know where my son is so I can bury him and sit next to his grave. This is why I wait by the phone every day hoping for some sort of information about where his body might be. Nothing can bring back my son, but burying him would ease my pain and provide me with a place where I can grieve and tell him what I have wanted to tell him for years.'

Assault on Daraa Opportunity to End Assad’s Rule

 

 'The Syrian uprising erupted in the southern province of Daraa when kids wrote on public walls “your turn has come Doctor Assad.” Since then, Daraa has proven to be one of the icons of the Syrian uprising and calls for freedom, democracy, self-governance, and rule of law in Syria. The Assad government has responded to those calls with live bullets, siege, murder, and destruction. The city and province of Daraa hold a critical geopolitical role in the country. It borders two of the United States’ strategic partners, Jordan and Israel. The main trade pathways through Syria must go through Daraa, from the Arabian Gulf countries all the way to Lebanon, Turkey, and Europe. The Nassib Jaber border crossing port represents the busiest Syrian port of its kind.

 I, Dr. Ghbeis, write as an American medical doctor of Syrian descent. I was educated in Syria and the United States, and in the past decade returned to Syria several times to support those Syrians most in medical need. I witnessed first-hand the devastating, inhuman conditions internally displaced Syrians have gone through. I witnessed how whole neighborhoods have been affected by a strategy of siege by the Assad government and its backers, which have targeted the most vulnerable components of society in Syria, the elderly, and children.

 Unfortunately, that same strategy of siege has been used by the Syrian government on Daraa al-Balad for the past several weeks. As a result, the humanitarian and medical conditions of 55,000 men, women, and children have become unbearable. The régime is using collective punishment measures and reprisal against large groups of civilian populations in Daraa, both of which are recognized crimes against humanity. Furthermore, in Daraa, all the medical supplies provided to local hospitals and clinics by western NGOs were stolen by Assad’s government-backed militia for financial gain on the black market. What makes the situation even worse is the lack of doctors in Daraa because they, too, were targeted by the Syrian government since the peaceful uprising began a decade ago. Many doctors have fled, but others have not made it out. They and their families were assassinated before they could get out from under the siege.

 Since the uprising began, Bashar al-Assad has made every effort to label those opposing it, including doctors, as terrorists. The régime’s false narratives include stating that Daraa’s residents are seeking to build a radical Islamic government in the southern part of Syria. In fact, as time passed, the province has proven to be one of the most resilient against extremist ideologies, despite the terrible hardship. ISIS was unable to hold territory in the area despite the government’s efforts to infiltrate it with ISIS cells, such as the “Yarmouk Martyrs” militia. Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigades in Daraa seized the opportunity to fight extremist groups, including the Yarmouk Martyrs, and for several years, up until 2018, they maintained a tough stand against these groups. In 2018, Daraa province was handed over to Assad under the guise of “reconstitution. At that point, Assad claimed that his régime would take extremist elements and move them to other territories in the Syrian desert and areas near Deir ez-Zor under the watchful eye of the régime and its backers.

 Following a 2018 agreement, brokered mainly by Russia and the Trump administration, control of the southern region of Syria was handed back to Assad. Among other things agreed upon in 2018, it is important to highlight the presence of Iranian militias and the requirement to keep them at a distance of no less than fifty miles from the Syrian borders adjacent to Jordan and Israel. This condition, however, was never met. On the other hand, a number of other key provisions in the agreement were met, including régime forces not being allowed to enter Daraa; local FSA fighters handing over heavy weapons and maintaining only small arms, and some of the FSA fighters being rolled into a new brigade under Russian command.



 In the meantime, Iranian militias were infiltrating Syrian communities and neighborhoods in different ways across the country. Some of the militias operate under the leadership of Lebanese Hezbollah and other militias under different names, such as Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun. These foreign militias move around Syrian society wearing the same military fatigues as members of Assad’s army. Some are organized under the Syrian Army’s 4th Division, which is commanded by Assad’s brother, Maher. This Syrian army division is fully controlled by Iranian interests. The siege in Daraa and the effort to displace the 55,000 Syrian civilians from their homes there in order to tighten control of the southern Syrian region was notably conducted by Assad’s government forces and Iranian militias.

 Iran is clearly seeking to control areas in southern Syria, such as Daraa, in order to expand its influence in a wider space in Syria. Iran had done the same in southern Lebanon with Hezbollah. Eventually, Iranian influence expanded in Lebanon to areas far beyond southern Lebanon including the capital, Beirut. In fact, Iran would like to use southern Syria as it did southern Lebanon all in the name of the goals of the Islamic Revolution of 1979.



 The Iranian initiative in Syria is unacceptable to the people of Daraa. The opposite is true. While the residents of southern Lebanon may have shared sectarian beliefs with Iran, the same is not the case in southern Syria, which is a melting pot of Muslims, Christians, and Druze, and the Shia sect presence is weak in the area.

 Prior to 2018, the United States supported Syrian society in southern Syria and backed FSA fighters as well. It was a positive influence on local Syrian communities, in places like Daraa, helping to maintain stability and counter efforts at radicalization as well. However, in 2018, American engagement and influence were lost in that part of Syria to Russia and Iran. The recent escalation in Daraa presents an opportunity for the Biden administration to re-engage communities in this critical region of Syria and impact them in positive ways. Such U.S. engagement will in turn put pressure on Assad and his backers to re-engage diplomatically toward a negotiated settlement on the future of Syria.



 The recent events in Daraa make it very clear that the communities in southern Syria are not interested in taking orders from the régime despite the terrible human toll suffered because of it. It would be timely indeed if the United States and its allies fully understood this point and led a diplomatic initiative to end Syria’s decade-long humanitarian crisis by calling the régime to the table and insisting that it compensate the millions of Syrians that have suffered from its policies. Assad will not compromise if he is not made to understand that to do otherwise is far more dangerous for him. Daraa and southern Syria represent an opening to a much-needed political transition in Syria for the sake of all Syrians and the international community. The Syrian uprising was born in Daraa, and it would be poetic justice after all the loss if it is there that the Assad régime goes away for good.'