Tuesday, 13 October 2015

The Israel-Russia ‘Axis of Resistance’: Its place in regional geopolitics

Michael Karadjis
 "Iran, Russia and Israel have the same fundamental view on Syria.
 Of course, Iran and Israel haven’t much looked like they do over 2013-2015. That’s because Israel and Iran have a clash over the broader region, which then gets partly played out in Syria when Iranian proxy forces (eg Hezbollah) get close to the stolen Golan, or when Iranian missiles are getting moved across Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. But that’s not really about Syria, or Assad, as such; that’s about Assad’s survival becoming increasingly dependent on the Iranian occupation.
So what do I mean the three countries, including two declared enemies, “agree” on Syria?
Basically, Plan A is that the the Assad regime must be preserved, and if possible restored to control over larger areas of Syria, as the power to look after their interests in Syria. These interests include, for Russia, its Mediterranean naval bases in Tartous on the north coast; for Iran, its connection to Hezbollah in Lebanon via the Qalamoun region between the Lebanese border and Damascus; for Israel, restoration of Assad to his role as best border cop protecting Israel’s control over the Golan.
More generally, all three are threatened by a revolutionary uprising dominated by the largely Sunni Arab masses of Syria, but then again, so are the Gulf states, Turkey, US imperialism etc, without such specific interests; and all three, like their mutual friend al-Sisi of Egypt, are particularly good at using “anti-jihadist” language to justify this stance.
However, if this is impossible, then Plan B calls for the creation of an Alawite-dominated statelet (even if unofficial), consisting of the heavily Alawite coastal provinces (Latakia and Tartous) through the Lebanese border region (Homs and the Qalamoun) down to Damascus. Such a sectarian partition would aim to keep the “great unwashed” Sunni masses of “jihadists” (ie, the worker-peasant Sunni Arab majority, the backbone of the revolution) at bay behind defensible lines.
Such a statelet would serve the key Iranian interest, which is centred on the Qalamoun, and the key Russian interest, which is centred on the coast. But if it didn’t reach beyond Damascus down to the Golan “border,” it would not be able to serve the key Israeli interest."

No comments:

Post a Comment