Wednesday 9 December 2020

The Biden Administration Can And Should Rectify America’s Failures In Syria

 

 Mohammed Alaa Ghanem:

 'It has been almost a decade since the Syrian people rose up against the Assad regime, demanding their freedom. While the world was hesitant to support the protestors, malign powers gladly stepped in to help Assad, creating an unmitigated disaster that has devastated Syria and sent shockwaves around the world. Half of the population, around 13 million people, has been displaced, and more than a quarter of all Syrians have fled the country. Over 50% of the country’s critical infrastructure has been destroyed, over 80% of the population lives below the poverty line, and an entire generation of children knows nothing but war, dilapidated tents, and the squalor of camps. Still, the crisis has yet to be addressed in any clear and meaningful way by the most important actor on the world stage, the United States.

 The Biden Administration’s primary goal in Syria must be a genuine political transition as envisioned in the Geneva Communiqué and UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015). As long as Assad remains in power the conflict will never end, it will just evolve, and the millions of refugees will have no hope of safe return. While the goal of political transition and the many steps needed to reach it will be a heavy lift, the Biden Administration has several advantages over its predecessors. For one thing, after years of mismanaging the economy and neglecting the country to fund the military, Assad has created a financial meltdown. This crisis is causing unrest within the regime’s political base and even Assad’s own family. Another important advantage is that when President Biden takes office, the US will have ten years of experience and institutional memory in Syria to draw on. To tap into that, however, will require that America have an honest reckoning with its past mistakes in Syria and learn from them. Here are three key lessons that the Biden Administration should take to heart:



 Leverage is critical. The regime and its backers have broken every multilateral agreement they have made. After years of bad faith talks it is clear that the US must enter future negotiations with sufficient leverage to induce Assad, Russia, and Iran to take them seriously. This means keeping US Special Forces in the northeast, resuming support to the Syrian opposition, working closely with Turkey to shore up the fragile ceasefire in Idlib, and maintaining a political and economic pressure campaign in coordination with US allies.

 Deterrence works. To be effective, American diplomacy in Syria must be backed by the credible use of force. Early on many US officials argued that any strike against Assad would spiral into a broader conflict. This risk aversion hindered decision-making during the Obama Administration, resulting most notoriously in the failure to enforce President Obama’s chemical weapons “red line.” In hindsight, it is clear that this was a mistake because, with the credible threat of retaliation gone, the Assad regime and its backers escalated their attacks to unprecedented heights and Syrian civilians paid the price. By contrast, when the regime launched chemical attacks in April 2017 and April 2018, President Trump ordered retaliatory missile strikes. Not only did these strikes not spark wider conflict, they effectively ended Assad’s use of proscribed chemical weapons. These and other military actions since 2016 reinforce the fact that the US can use targeted force in Syria to protect America’s allies and uphold its red lines without getting sucked into deeper entanglements.

 What happens in Syria never stays in Syria. Syria sits at the crossroad of civilizations and its decade of tragedy has reverberated around the world. Refugees have overwhelmed Syria’s neighbors and caused instability in Europe. Propagandists have used Syrian refugees to fuel rising right-wing nationalist movements, to justify regressive anti-immigration policies in the US and Europe, and to encourage Britain’s exit from the EU. After using Syria as a testing and training ground for new weapons, militias, and tactics—and emboldened by the lack of repercussions—Russia and Iran have taken their enhanced military capabilities on the road, fueling new conflicts from Ukraine to Yemen. Since the consequences of the Syrian conflict are global, US policy must evaluate Syria within the wider foreign policy context. This is particularly true in terms of the Iran deal. When the Biden Administration seeks to reenter the deal, it must be clear-eyed about how the deal will impact Iran’s regional expansionism and have a plan to address its baneful consequences.



 The Biden Administration must consolidate and expand the leverage that it will inherit from Jeffrey and Rayburn. This means enforcing the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which singled out the most malign actors within the regime, and further expanding targeted sanctions. Similarly, the Biden Administration should go beyond just maintaining unilateral US pressure on the regime and its enablers by getting its allies to commit to these same measures. This could take the form of a signaling summit in 2021 where participants make a collective commitment to withholding reconstruction funds and refusing diplomatic normalization with the regime until there is a genuine political transition.

 As far as negotiations, the diplomatic process today has devolved into farcical ‘Constitutional Committee’ talks dominated by Russia. These talks, which most Syrians view as irrelevant, have been stagnant for over a year and have been exploited by Russia and the regime to delay progress while they consolidate military gains. It is time for the US to take back the reins. After restoring its support to the Syrian opposition, the Biden Administration should launch new, reinvigorated transition talks in cooperation with the UN and its allies.

 In terms of the Iran deal, the Biden Administration should renegotiate the terms to address Iran’s aggression across the Middle East. President-elect Biden recently wrote that the US would lift sanctions and “rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations,” but what incentive would Iran have to negotiate further if it’d already received what it wanted? Since the original negotiations, the US has, among other measures, levied new sanctions against Iranian financial institutions, creating greater leverage to push for better terms. The new administration should not squander this new leverage by lifting all sanctions without addressing the other regional threats posed by Iran, including its most lethal weapon: its vast and growing network of proxy militias. Iran is the primary underwriter of Assad’s war, and any sanctions relief to Iran that is not highly targeted will end up going to arm and train militias in Syria, as much of the 8 billion dollars in assets unfrozen by the Obama administration inevitably did. The US must not repeat the mistake of sacrificing the rest of the region on the altar of this singular end by giving Iran an unconditional windfall to destabilize the region. Instead the administration must take concrete steps inside and outside of the deal to deter Iranian expansionism and malign regional behavior.

 To create fertile ground for a successful national political transition, the US must also rethink its policies towards the political and armed opposition and the Kurdish-dominated SDF. A credible political opposition is needed so that Syrian civilians are effectively represented in negotiations, but with Etilaf, the main opposition body, dependent on Turkey, and the High Negotiations Commission beholden to Saudi Arabia, opposition figures have been turned into proxies for regional powers. The Biden Administration should reinvest in Syria’s political opposition, helping them to regain the independence needed to credibly engage in negotiations and reestablish legitimacy on the ground.



 With regards to the armed opposition, the US erred in abandoning vetted moderate forces in favor of the YPG and narrowing its scope in Syria to just defeating ISIS. The Kurdish YPG is the group behind the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF), which it created as a rebranding exercise to present itself as a more palatable partner. Although it was a reliable ally against ISIS, this group has fallen far short of the democratic fighting force that America envisioned. In 2017, then former Obama official (and current future Secretary of State) Antony Blinken wrote an op-ed about arming the Kurds in which he said the US “should insist that [the YPG] commit to not use any weapons against Turkey, to cede liberated Raqqa to local forces, to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and to dissociate itself from the P.K.K.” This advice was ignored, and to date the US has made no effort to hold its Syrian Kurdish allies accountable. The YPG has maintained its ties with the PKK (a designated terrorist organization), failed to diversify its ranks, refused to devolve control to local authorities, cozied up to the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran, and committed serious human rights abuses against Kurdish and Arab civilians.

 At odds with Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, other Syrian Kurds, local Arab communities, and Syrian opposition groups, the YPG is a destabilizing force that lacks local legitimacy and long-term governing capabilities. Unless it plans to maintain America’s troop presence in Syria indefinitely, the Biden Administration must address this untenable situation and condition support on measurable reforms. It should also reinstate support to vetted moderate opposition forces, particularly in the south. Since the Trump Administration cut all support to these partners and Assad was allowed to recapture Daraa in 2018, conditions in the area have grown worse, not better. Government forces have murdered hundreds of “reconciled” opposition fighters and people live in fear of detentions, assassinations, and the low-level insurgency that regularly boils over into violence. A credible armed opposition is needed to provide security and stability to Arab-majority liberated areas and prevent the reemergence of ISIS.

 Syrian civilians and civil society must also be central in the US strategy because a strong civil society is needed for long-term stability and local resilience. The incoming administration should restore Syria stabilization funding and expand this support to liberated areas in the northwest where civil society organizations and local governing institutions have withered after years of neglect. Similarly, the US must extend humanitarian support to the extremely vulnerable communities in Rukban in the south, and Idlib in the northwest, working with our ally Turkey to stabilize the population there. Millions of displaced Syrians remain in Idlib, hundreds of thousands of them are in IDP camps that threaten to become regional coronavirus super spreader centers without US-led international action.

 Finally, the Biden Administration must lead by example with regards to the Syrian refugee crisis. It can do so by restarting admission of Syrian refugees and significantly increasing the cap above prior levels. This move will be a reaffirmation of American values and a clear stand against the ugly nativist fear mongering that caricatured these war victims as terrorists. Additionally, the administration should allow Syrians who have been living in the US under the uncertainty of the TPS program to apply for green cards, as was done last year for Liberians. Displaced Syrians who have lived in the US for years have become valued members in their communities and they cannot return to Bashar al-Assad’s Syria without risking torture and death.



 The state of affairs in Syria today is grim and shifting the momentum will require a significant commitment from the US, but it is both possible and necessary.'




Sunday 6 December 2020

Demographic change: The ultimate goal of the Syrian régime’s policy of forced displacement














 'For the Syrian régime and its Iranian and Russian allies the forced displacement of millions of Syrians since 2011 is not a mere consequence of the conflict, but a systematic policy to achieve strategic goals set out by Bashar Assad himself.

 Although the main target of this criminal policy of the Syrian régime seems to be the majority Sunni Muslims, who made up some 74% of pre-war population according to the International Religious Freedom Report 2006, and are seen as the main threat to the régime, yet in the implementation of this policy the régime targeted people of various backgrounds and affiliations, including Christians, Ismailis and other minorities. One person described the nature of the policy in these terms: “Demographic change that the Assad régime is undertaking seems not to be based on religion, but on the basis of political affiliation and loyalty to the ruler in order to build its own supportive society, his 'useful Syria'.” Considering the systematic nature of this policy and the scale of displacement committed to achieve it, there is a gap in the analysis informing the international policy-oriented discourse of this systematic effort to affect a permanent demographic shift.

 In 2016, Assad explicitly and publicly stated the goals of this strategy when he spoke of “useful Syria”, an area of the country both geographically and demographically crucial to the continuation of his rule. To achieve this utopia of a loyal population concentrated in areas seen as strategically important, the Syrian régime unleashed a campaign of forced displacement and replacement which continues in various forms to this day.

 The methods of forced displacement range from mass detention, torture and terrorising of people who raised their demands for reform to siege, starvation, indiscriminate attacks, including chemical attacks, on civilian population and infrastructure, to systematic repression and marginalization of entire areas seen as disloyal. In this effort, legislation was passed and measures taken to allow for confiscation of lands and property of the displaced people, to obstruct their return and to make it easier for foreign militia members and their families to obtain Syrian citizenship.

 The policy continues being applied to this date, as documented in the most recent Human Rights Watch Report which details attacks on Idlib, which were part of the policy of forced displacement: “One result of the Idlib offensive was mass displacement. According to the UN, nearly 1.4 million people across Idlib fled their homes during the period covered in this report, out of an estimated population of 3 million people. Many said they fled because of repeated attacks in populated areas, or feared ill treatment if Syrian régime forces were to retake the area. The repeated Syrian-Russian alliance attacks on civilian infrastructure in populated areas in which there was no apparent military objective suggests that these unlawful attacks were deliberate. The intent may have been to deprive local residents of the means to sustain themselves, to force the civilian population to flee and make it easier for Syrian ground forces to take territory, or simply to instill terror in the civilian population as a way to achieve victory. The Syrian-Russian alliance apparently intended to fulfil these aims with little regard for international law,” states the HRW report.

 To make the removal of the people seen as a threat to the régime from the targeted areas permanent, their forced displacement is always followed by a campaign of populating now empty areas with members of foreign militias and religious groups seen as loyal to the régime, mainly Shiites linked to Iran’s presence and Alawites, a majority of whom are loyal to Bashar Al Assad. Such policies closely resemble the policies of ethnic cleansing seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere, which aimed to affect a new reality by permanently removing the previous demographic majority and replacing it, at least partially, with population seen as loyal.'