Crimes, Occupation, Fragmentation and Impunity: 12 Years of the Struggle for Syria Part 3

Ziad Majed: 

 ‘…a crime that will last long, meaning you will keep thinking of it. It will go with you, not like rape, there’s nothing like rape, but it’s in a way; instrumentalising the rape as well, is to target the person, but also the whole social environment, and the whole society, with crimes that we go with you, as the régime says, forever. Marking the bodies of the people, through torture, through hunger, through rape; so that the crime will live with those that survived, and with their families, as long as possible. That is a policy, it’s not just violent thugs who go and torture and kill.

 So this was also one of what we learned from the Syrian war, and finally, conspiracy theories. Since September 11th, anything that happens, you might have conspiracy theory about it. Who’s behind it, who’s responsible, who benefits from this, etc. And with the age of social media, you do have on Syria lots of conspiracy theories. Who is behind what happened; is a matter of pipeline that should have passed by Syria, that’s why Westerners created the war; Assad is a resistance against Israel and imperialists, so the imperialists created all that.

 And you have unfortunately, on the left part of the political maps, in many European countries, but also the region, and in Turkey, in many places: those who believe of a plot against Assad because his resistance, because he’s anti-imperialist; and they supported him for that. And that was horrible, because as if they contributed to a racist approach, when it comes to thinking of Syrians as people manipulated by remote control, by invisibilising them, by bringing them out of the picture, and just talking about few geostrategic concerns, that anyone can talk about, without knowing anything about the region.

 Plus, there was also in some places, this attempt at telling the Syrians what is better for them. I’ll give you the advice, because I’m wise. I will tell you what you should do and should not do, and we have seen it a lot, and this is unfortunately related, not only to the Middle East, I think the approach towards some African countries could also be the same, in Asia as well. Even in our societies here, the class issue might lead to something similar; but Syria showed us to which extent we can invisibilise people, we can dehumanise them, and just talk about some borders in our café, giving the impression that we know much more than they do, because we are progressive, so they should listen to us, and forget about their dignities and rights.

 When I said it’s documented, we know who killed whom in Syria. It’s not true that no one knows who killed whom, as some people started to say. Regions and neighbourhoods who are bombed, we know who bombed them, because everything is filmed, because military operations are documented, because flights are documented.



 And you can see that 87% of the civilian victims of the conflict, who are documented - because this is also another thing, always figures can be questioned, right, but usually in conflicts that last more than a year, two three, four, we’re talking about ten years, you have many other victims that are not in the statistics, because they die for other reasons. When you are displaced, you might die in an accident, in an area that you don’t know quite well. When all hospitals are saturated, many people with chronic disease, or with other problems, might not have health care, and will die. In these kind of contexts, cancers and heart attacks, are much higher than in normal contexts. So the figures might be much more important when it comes to the civilian losses, and we’re not talking about military losses, that might bring the figure up to more than half a million.

 So 87% were killed by the Syrian régime. 3% by the Russian forces, making that 90%. 2.19% by ISIS, 1.83% by the opposition, 1.32% by the Americans and the US-led coalition, 0.62% by the Kurdish militias, and 0.23% by al-Qaeda or al-Nusra, and you have 3.65% by unidentified. This is one indicator about criminality, but not only, it’s also about the firepower, or about the intensity of the bombing that we saw in Syria. And those figures here, when I said we know the names and IDs of the people, it’s not just estimations.

 When it comes to those who were forcibly disappeared, we have 120,000 until today. 85% disappeared in the régime, 7.71% in the ISIS or Daesh, the rest in the jails of the other groups.



 So, the question of impunity, and I conclude with this. There are a few developments recently, which might be interesting developments. They are not sufficient, but something is maybe changing. In Germany, you have many cases, due to the fact that some of the perpetrators, or some of the criminals, live in Germany. And some of their victims live in Germany. There were many cases brought to court, and many decisions that were taken by the German justice, that are encouraging in the struggle, or in the fight, against impunity.

 You also have the Netherlands and Canada, that did send, in fact, a case to the ICJ – International Court of Justice – when it comes to crimes against humanity committed by the régime. They talk about torture and rape specifically, and that is important, and the ICJ accepted the case, and it will continue working on it, so that is also another sign of hope.

 Now France did issue an arrest warrant, to three generals of the régime; Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and I forget the name of the third. Who are responsible for the death of two Syrian-French citizens. The father Mazzen Dabbagh, and his son Patrick. They have the French nationality, and their brother lives in France, so he brought the cause to court, and there were investigations about the place where they were arrested, where they died. Their families were just sent certificates of the death, without the bodies of course. But there is a clear case, leading to those arrest warrants.

 And more important, two weeks ago, an arrest warrant against Bashar al-Assad himself, his brother Maher, and two other persons working for him who were in charge of the chemical programme. Why? Because this is a crime against humanity, with the chemical programme, and there were enough documentation, by Syrians who are in France now, and by relatives of victims who are in France now, allowing the French justice to start working on the case.

 So these are some examples. There are others that will follow in Sweden, in Belgium, in other places. There were attempts also here in England. There was the case of the American journalist Colvin, who was killed in Homs, in the US. Even the officer who gave the order of bombing her was revealed. And what happened to him, after his name was revealed in the court in America? He was killed in Syria, by the régime, by some people who eliminated him in Deir Ezzor. Exactly as most of those who were involved probably with the assassination of Hariri, or at least their names were known as possible people who have liaison with that, were also killed; Kanaan, and then Rustom Ghazali, generals of the Syrian army.

 So this is an indicator as well that the Syrian régime takes into consideration, that maybe something might move when it comes to the justice. Even if so far, impunity gave this régime, and many other Arab régimes, but also the Israeli state, lots of arrogance. And when you have impunity, why not commit more crimes to protect yourself, to “defend” yourself, or to impose yourself?

 But maybe if something starts to change, and if the régime is a bit alarmed by it, it means it is a bit serious. So hopefully, this sign of hope, with the other sign of hope, which is the work of the Syrian diaspora, on cultural questions, on documentation, on legal issues, on preserving the memory, and preserving the names and the hopes of the people who fought for twelve years in Syria; maybe this would be a note of hope with which I will finish my presentation, and I thank you for your patience.’

Crimes, Occupation, Fragmentation and Impunity: 12 Years of the Struggle for Syria Part 2

 Ziad Majed: 

 ‘… in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, where Daesh imposed itself.

 Now, regardless of all that, the social basis of the régime, and the demography supporting the régime, was becoming more and more tired with the war. By 2015, with all those complications, and lack of international political investment in Syria, lack of initiatives - there was a UN initiative in Geneva bringing some representatives of the régime, and different opposition groups to talk about a possible constitution, reconciliation, ending the conflict – all of that is agonising in fact, not progressing.

 But on the ground, the régime is losing control over more and more territory. By summer 2015, the régime controlled only between 18 and 20% of Syria. Mainly Damascus, the area around Damascus, and all the areas close to the Lebanese borders, plus the Mediterranean coast, where is the majority of the Alawite community, that Assad was trying to mobilize as much as possible, and connecting his own destiny to the destiny of the whole community. And when it comes to the Lebanese borders, that was strategic for the Iranians and to Hezbollah, not to lose that area, because this is the connection between Syria and Lebanon, for the weapons, for strategic consideration; and they kept as well a kind of corridor, connecting that area to Iraq. Because if you look at the map, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, they needed a territorial continuity. That’s why Hezbollah’s efforts were mostly around Damascus, and around the Lebanese border.

 But that was not enough any more. So the Iranians did negotiate, as of March 2015 until June 2015, with the Russians. On a possible Russian intervention, to save a régime, that the Iranians said we cannot continue any more. Because, at the time, Iran brought not only Hezbollah, that was securing the part in Syria that was close to the Lebanese borders, but they brought as well Iraqi militias, they then brought Hazara from Afghanistan and refugees in Iran militia, then there would be Pakistani militia Zainebiyoun; they brought them, and they were supporting Assad. Plus there was a kind of decentralisation of the security machine of the régime, by allowing local militias, pro- régime, in the Alawite areas, in some of the Christian areas, and in many other places, to emerge, and to control the ground, so the army of the régime that is losing men, and cannot recruit any more, could be on the fronts with the militias that Iran brought.

 And this is what would lead finally, in September, to Russian intervention in Syria. Russian intervention, that in a way, would show that, overthrowing Assad is not possible any more. It became an illusion to consider, after the Russian intervention, that militarily on the ground, we can overthrow Assad.

 And gradually, in fact, the Russian intervention will allow Assad to start seizing the territories that his régime lost during the four previous years. Moving from around 20%, to what is today between 60 and 62 or 63% of the territory of Syria, with all major cities under his control. And that was one objective, to have urban Syria under the control of the régime, and to keep a divided, fragmented, rural Syria outside the control of the régime, if he can not seize it back.

 So the war that Russia will lead, two years later will see its impact, after seizing back eastern Aleppo, after taking over the Ghouta and Daraa, ending with Homs before and then with northern Hama, pushing away any threat on the city, plus Deir Ezzor. So the régime will connect most of its cities, except for Idlib and Raqqa, as important cities, will control them.

 And in between, due to the fact that the Kurdish militias supported by the Americans were fighting Daesh on the ground, there would be an expansion of the Kurdish territorial control, that pushed Turkey to intervene directly, after being indirectly behind some of the opposition groups.

 So by 2018, and after the two summers of 2017/18, by March 2019, because this is when Trump declared the war on Daesh as mission accomplished; since that time, we have a kind of statico. It’s not always 100% the same map, sometimes there are a few clashes here and there, that might change part of the control in this territory or the other; but in general, the map is the same since 2018. The régime controls 60% now of the territory, the Kurdish militias supported by the Americans control around 20-25%, and then you have 10-12% in two different enclaves controlled by the oppositions. One of them directly supported by Turkey, the other by the Americans in the south. And you have the Russian army, the Iranian forces and the series of militias they brought, you have the American army, the Turkish army, and you have regularly Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah bases and on Iranian convoys in Syria. So, a country with different occupation forces.



 So, this is the map now of the control. You can see it in red you have the régime, the Russians, the Iranians and their allies. In green you have the oppositions. When I say the oppositions, it’s rival groups, they’re not like a unified camp. So you have here in the Tanf area military bases, some refugees living down there, and supported by the Americans. In that area, some forces of the opposition were trained exclusively or only to fight ISIS, when ISIS existed, and they refused. They said we want to fight the régime and ISIS, so their mission was put on hold. And since that time, they have been in those bases. Sometimes they are attacked by Iranian drones, sometimes nothing happens and the Americans retaliate and bomb Iranian militias, but this is an area controlled by the opposition.

 And that area in the north, where you have as well al-Nusra or Tahrir al-Sham, former al-Qaeda, in Idlib; and different groups of oppositions in the other part, directly supported by Turkey. In this area, you have the Turkish army present as well.

 What is in yellow is the Kurdish controlled territory, with American bases, and a few special forces from France and Britain. And you have as well camps in this area, of the families of former Daesh fighters who were killed or captured by the Kurdish militias or by the Western allies. That is a big issue, whether they should return or not return. I think in different European countries, the debate exists, and each country adopted a different approach to it.



 So, a fragmented country, an occupied country, and at the same time the destructions in Syria – that’s why I said at the beginning it’s a laboratory, maybe now in Gaza the destructions are more important too, the intensity of the bombing is much higher, and the space is much smaller - but what they call in French urbicide, you can say it; this urbicide, whether in Aleppo, whether in Homs, whether in some other places, the amount of destruction you see, was clearly also on purpose. To displace people, to make it impossible for them to return, because the question of the refugees, and the question of the displacement, was the policy, was the demographic policy based on sectarian or confessional lines.

 And Assad did not hide it in two occasions when he mentioned that the Syrian social fabric or social tissue is much better now, when he said that those who left, he did not say they could not return, but he said that the country is much better now, and is more homogenous after their departure. Plus he refused their return during the process of normalisation with Saudi Arabia recently. After the normalisation with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The three also who normalised at the same time with Israel their relations.

 Now, what I said at the beginning about this laboratory, in addition to the map and the layers that we saw, with a conflict that had many wars at the same time. There is a kind of Kurdish/ Arab tribes war in the east, there are wars between many opposition groups, there are rival groups loyal to the régime, there is a war between the régime and the oppositions, there is a war between Russia and Iran on the one hand opposing them to the opposition, there were clashes between Turkey and Russia and then they reconciled, there are clashes between Turkey and Kurds that are negotiated regularly by the Americans and the Russians in order to contain them, Israel bombs Hezbollah and sometimes Hezbollah retaliates.



 So you have different conflicts taking place at the same time, and the national cause of the Syrians in that sense, got lost. It did not disappear, it did not vanish, but it was lost in between all those ongoing conflicts and struggles on the Syrian land. It became an incarnation of the UN inability to deal with the situation, 14 vetoes. Sometimes, some diplomats say the vetoes were not that bad, because if there was no veto, we need to be able to impose what the UN resolution might stipulate. So, in some cases, it was not like a terrible arrangement, even for Western powers who were protesting against the Russian use of veto.

 So, the inability of dealing with the conflict, and the fact that it kept evolving one year after the other, created questions and problems that we will live with for a long period of time. Definitely we cannot explain the Russian war in Ukraine based on the Syrian model. For sure, there are historical contexts and reasons for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But if Russia was not allowed to intervene the way it did in Syria, I’m not sure the same configuration in the invasion of Ukraine that happened; Syria allowed Russia to feel much more confident in its aggressive policy, and made its invasion of Ukraine, I think, more possible.

 The other thing, is that the refugee crisis, did lead in some places to hysteria. Not only in Europe, by the way, in Lebanon also, in Turkey in the last few years also. But parts of the reasons for this hysterical rise of the far right in many places, is related to migration and refugees, and for sure the Syrian crisis and the millions of Syrian refugees, in a way were part of the reason of that. Which means leaving the country, abandoning the country, and allowing a régime and some forces to displace people the way this happened, without any intervention, also had consequences elsewhere. In Europe, around the Mediterranean, and in the neighbouring countries where racism, crisis, instrumentalisation of the misery of the refugees, are now parts, characteristics, of the domestic political scenes.



 And, of course, Syria is given as an example now in the Arab world. Whoever speaks again about revolution, revolutionary attempts, revolutionary aspirations, democratic transition; ah, you want to become like Syria. Exactly as a few years before, they use to say, ah, you want to become like Iraq. Or like Libya at the beginning of the revolutions. So Syria became a kind of a model. A kind of example given, always, you want Syria, or stability, even if under a dictator. You want Syria, and becoming a refugee, or you accept a Sisi or a Saied or many examples can be given.

 And of course, Gulf countries used that example on many occasions as well, promoting what they call stability, rather than what revolutions create in terms of instability. So the counter-revolutionary model took Syria as an example, and built on it to end any democratic aspiration; even if that did not really work well, because remember 2019 Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria, the second wave of Arab revolutions. But once again, they were defeated, like most of the previous ones. They were defeated, but it showed that the story is not over in a way. That there are still dynamics, and there are still factors that might bring people again to the streets; even if two defeats, and the second defeat immediately after it, Covid, and all the crisis that followed, and then the collapse of the Lebanese economy, and the civil war in Sudan.

 It’s not encouraging any more, but for now we can see that revolutionary model was defeated, but maybe it’s not like a final defeat, or a definite defeat.

 Syria became a laboratory of violence. I think this is the most documented conflict in history. We’ve seen almost everything. Sometimes the criminals themselves filmed what they did. We don’t know if they did it in order to frighten the others, in order to be proud about what they did. I think you also recently in the Guardian the films that were brought from Tadamon massacre, where they are laughing, while asking people to run and then shooting them, and then burning them. There are tens of videos, if not hundreds of videos like that, filmed by the killers, the perpetrators, themselves.

 Plus you have lots of statistics, about all airstrikes. There are lots of satellites as well, filming all the time, showing all the time. There were some alerts about a possible airstrike would take place here, take place there. So it is extremely well documented. And that might be a basis, not only for a historical archive, but also a good basis for later judicial procedures, maybe some investigations.



 This is the most documented conflict, and the philosophy of violence of the régime is not like just it’s war and everything is allowed. No. There were clear messages through the violence. For instance, not giving the families the bodies of their beloved ones who were killed under torture, or were just killed and their bodies were taken, is not something because of lack of administrative capacities. No. It is not allowing them to turn pages, to consider that they can go on. It is to keep them suspended in time, always waiting, always paralysed. It’s a way of paralysing a whole society, and that’s why there are still more than 100,000 people in jail in Syria under the régime control. Why wouldn’t they release them, they’re not any more a threat? The régime is not threatened any more, with the Russians. To keep them is also to paralyse millions of people: relatives, friends, families; who don’t want to talk about them.

 There’s an economy that has been built, a mafia economy. I pay people money to get some information. And in many cases, the information is wrong, they are just lies, they are taking the money. Or I pay someone money, so they will treat my brother or my father or my son a bit better. They will give him some better food. They send food sometimes, and many people are still in Damascus. They don’t want to leave, because they hope that one day, maybe he is alive, maybe she is alive.

 So that kind of paralysing a society is not just arbitrary violence, it’s a well-thought and planned violence. Exactly as the destruction of all suburbs of cities, with the idea of one day reconstructing these areas with a different economic model, for other social classes, and maybe for people from other communities as well, in a sectarian system, and sectarian régime approach.

 The other issue, is allowing people to steal, what the Syrians call taafish, from afish, which means the furniture, meaning seizing the furniture. Taking what is so intimate. The idea of not only destroying the public space where you can live, but I will also destroy your private place. I will seize all your memories, all whatever you lived with, the furniture, your pictures; and I will sell them at markets, that were called the Sunni market, souk Sunna, in order to create more sectarian anger and hatred, and to divide the society even more. So this is also a well-thought policy.



 The question of imposing sieges. I don’t know if you saw pictures from the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp, or from the Ghouta of Damascus, or from many other places. Besieging people, without a military in fact need, because the balance of power is so clear. And they have the air force, and they have the Russians. But it is also, to keep in their mind forever, that they suffered hunger, that they were suffocating under the siege, that the régime can do whatever it wanted to do with them, that their lives were just the matter of a decision.’

Crimes, Occupation, Fragmentation and Impunity: 12 Years of the Struggle for Syria Part 1

 Ziad Majed:

 ‘…And the borders might be more important than the political sociology. Also see the conspiracy theories, we’ve seen it more than in other cases, maybe because of its geography, or political geography. It reflected lots of divisions, not only in Syria, or the region, but internationally as well, in the two sides of the political map, whether on the right, or on the left.

 After 12 years we can start examining some dynamics, that happened through the development of the conflict; or of the revolution at the beginning, then the war, then the series of military interventions. As you will see, the end result is today, a fragmented country, a destroyed country. We have records in terms of victims, in terms of internally displaced population, but also in terms of refugees.



 When we were discussing the topic, I thought of impunity, because I think impunity has been, and continues to be, one of the most important and dangerous questions; in the whole Middle East, maybe also an international question.

 But in the Middle East specifically, you do have a number of UN resolutions, a number of agreements, you have many things that were never respected, and none of those who did not respect them ever paid the price of that. So, this culture of impunity also allows criminality to develop, because those that commit crimes consider that they can always escape, after a period of time. Because they are protected by some superpower, because there are members in the Security Council backing them.

 And the Middle East is the area where you have the highest number of vetoes. The United States used the veto 54 times, in relation to the Israeli question. Russia used it, in those 12 years, 14 times. China used it 13 times. So you have a concentration of what we call vetocracy in international relations, where we can sometimes not impose things, but we can definitely make things impossible or to happen; which allows impunity to continue to impose itself, and to modify lives of people and societies, and to contribute in a way to what we might call nihilism: this rejection, this anger, this frustration, against the whole world, since the whole world abandoned us, or is not seeing us as equals, or as if we are excluded from the international community, and international law was not designed to include us, to protect us, as it should protect other peoples.



 So, what I will try to do, is first of all go through the phases of this Syrian struggle, of the Syrian revolution and war. What changed in six summers. It happened that these developments always took place in summers, and we’ll see how each summer, the configuration, the physiognomy of the conflict, was changing, and evolving, and other actors were projecting themselves into the Syrian scene. Then I’ll talk about some of what Syria revealed to us throughout the years.



 So, for the chronology of events, in March 2011, many revolutions were already taking place. The whole movement started in Tunisia, then we had Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain. Then Syria surprised most people, because no one was expecting, in a country where you already have a régime that is not into just symbolic violence after imposing itself for years, or just using the police as in the case of Tunisia to control the society, or the army in the case of Egypt; leaving also some margin of freedom for some parties as long as they do not threaten the régime itself and the military; or as in Yemen due to the tribal structure, the political structure, some parties in the north or south.There were some spaces in which political activism can express itself , and then it threatens the existing régime, then there will definitely be violent repression.

 In the case of Syria, we were already into permanent violence, a State of violence. This happened in the 70s. It happened in Hama in ’82, and it was kind of a lesson for the Syrian people, in the sense that what you will expect if you think of rebelling against the régime, if you think of challenging, of defying the régime, is what happened to Hama, and what will happen to you.

 Hama ’82 is a trauma in Syria, because that city, in three weeks, was massacred, bombed. Thousands of people died, thousands disappeared, and maybe the Syrians thought in 2011, that this was possible, because no one documented what happened. Because no one covered what happened. There were no images. Victims were invisible. This whole orchestrated crime against the city happened without witnesses.

 So, maybe in 2011, because of the mobile phones, because of the daily coverage, because of videos, because of documentation, because of media; the world will not allow Hama to be reproduced, once, twice, three times, four times, as things will happen later.

 So Hama was a trauma, and many people after Hama thought it would take a long, long time before the Syrian people will try to challenge the régime again. And before Hama there was Palmyra or Tadmor, the famous prison in Syria, where torture was an industry, and where also hundreds of people died under torture.



 You have many events in Syria’s modern history under Assad’s father from 1970-2000, then Assad Jr from 2000 until today in 2023, so we’re talking about 53 years of the Assads, and in 2011 it was already 41 years of the Assads. It was a surprise for many observers, to see demonstrations are taking place, but in this kind of situation, and with the régime that already saw what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, immediately the brutal violent repression will start, and will target demonstrators, and soon the country will go into an armed struggle, where either soldiers from the army left the troops, or young men took the weapons to defend themselves, to protect demonstrations.

 So an armed struggle went in parallel with the demonstrations until 2012. So the first shift, or the first change, was the militarization of the revolution, as of August 2011, after a series of defections in the army, leading to the creation in June 2011, of the Free Syrian Army.

 The second crucial development was in 2012. In the summer as well, when the Assad régime used for the first time its air force, bombing the areas that went out of its control; used the ballistic missiles, Scud missiles, sending them from southern Syria to the north.

 And also in 2012, we have the Iranian involvement, in support of the régime, that became clear. It was in the beginning, maybe the first year, technical advisers, political advisers. Now we have more and more Iranian officers in Syria. And in that same summer of 2012, the first funeral of a Hezbollah fighter happened in Lebanon, showing that Hezbollah is involved, based on Iranian demands, in the Syrian war, that is now more and more a war.

 This is an intervention that is clear now, the Iranian and the allies of Iran, but this is also the summer when the first elements of what we can call jihadism appear in Syria.

 Let me just in a few words, distinguish between what we will call, and we will use that term later, jihadism, and what is kind of classical political Islam that already existed in Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood are a powerful group in Syria. Some other salafi groups also were present. What I mean by jihadists are not only those who are not Syrians, or coming from outside Syria, either from Iraq, or through the Turkish borders coming from Europe or sometimes from North Africa or from other places, with this idea of a jihad in Syria. What we mean by that is that they are not usually concerned with the territoriality of the conflict, or the political temporality of the conflict. They go wherever the conditions of jihad, according to the fatwa they receive, wherever those conditions are gathered, or they can prove them or find them or justify them. So they considered Syria a land of jihad, after considering Iraq a land of jihad, after being, or some of them at least or a previous generation, considering Afghanistan a land of jihad. Then Libya became a land of jihad, then Mali.

 So they are not into the territoriality, or the temporality, of the political cause. They started arriving in Syria, proclaiming that they are going to build an Islamic motherland, they would fight the enemies of Islam in Syria; and the early elements, or let’s say those that arrived first in 2012, either came from Iraq, where they were already fighting the Americans, and the pro-American and pro-Iranian government in Baghdad, or probably the Turkish services allowed them to enter Syria, because they thought they can instrumentalise them against the Kurds. You know, that Turkey immediately after the revolution, had the Turkish obsession, if we can put it like that, with the Kurdish issue. So, to keep an eye on the Kurds, and to have a powerful group that might fight them if they will expand in their territorial control.



 So there are a series of events in 2012, which will definitely modify the whole situation. And in summer 2013, a turning point with the chemical weapons. After a very sad statement made by Obama. Until now, no one knows if he was advised, and he said it after getting the advice of people around him, or it was just a statement made following a question by a journalist, “What is the red line in Syria?” That was the question. We have already thousands of people killed, tens of thousands wounded, many who disappeared, already stories about torture in jail are everywhere, rape is being used as a political instrument, we have displacement, refugees are arriving in Turkey and Jordan and in Lebanon, the neighbouring countries; and Obama was asked, what is the red line?



 He said the only red line is chemical weapons. Meaning the régime should not use the chemical weapons. Now, of course, we can interpret later you it was understood by Assad; as long as you say there is only one red line, that is chemical weapons, it means we can keep killing people without chemical weapons. Except that, and this is related to impunity, Assad wanted to show, to the Syrians, his social bases or those who support him, and those who are opposed to him, that even that red line, he can cross it, and nothing will happen.

 And though he was advised on that by Russians, there are already some debates about whether the Iranians wanted it or not, whether the Russians said we will test the American will, especially that Obama at the same time was negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran. And people around him were saying, we can’t negotiate with Iran, and then fight them in Syria. Others would add to this, that after the Libyan disaster as it was called in the American administration, following the UN resolution and the intervention against Gadaffi, the Americans didn’t want to intervene again in the region. He was promising he would withdraw from Iraq, and he withdrew in 2011 massively from Iraq. The American public opinion was opposed to any involvement.

 We can talk about lots of considerations and factors, parameters that are legitimate, they can be discussed. But that statement, about the red lines, was very strange in its timing. And Assad tested it.

 First in Jobar, which is a neighbourhood very close to Damascus, where it was used against fighters the first time. A French journalist brought samples from the hair and from the sand to prove it, that was what the laboratories wanted. And there was proof that sarin gas was used for the first time.



 Before, they used a few substances in Homs, where the Red Cross said that some of the people who were burned, they couldn’t deal with their injuries. Was it chemical or not chemical? There was a debate about it. But in May 2013, clearly it was used in small doses in Jobar; before the 21st of August when the massive attack with sarin gas targeted the two Ghouta of Damascus, the two large neighbourhoods not far from the capital, where more than 1400 people died in a few hours during that attack.

 So here it was clear that the red line was crossed on purpose, to test the US will or the Western will, during a moment of tension with Russia. Russia is supporting the régime, for different reasons, but is not yet involved directly.



 And what happened after it, the red line was crossed? Nothing, in fact, once again. There will be a statement by Kerry, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he said, following a meeting with Lavrov, that if the Syrian régime accepts to destroy, or to abandon its stock of chemical weapons to give it to a UN inspection mission, we’re fine with that. So it appeared as if once again, if I kill someone, and then I give you the gun, I’m fine.

 These kind of messages are extremely dangerous when it comes to impunity, because the régime and the Russians understood through that offer, that there is no will in the US to go into an intervention against Assad, following the crossing the red line. They knew they cannot go to the UN of course, there would be a Russian veto. But in the American constitution, the President, as long as the military operation would not require deployment on the ground, as long as it is less than 60 (I think) days; the President can order a military operation, which did not happen.

 In Britain, also, they voted in the Parliament, against it. In France, they were very hesitant about it. And then finally, the agreement was a UN resolution, that will impose on the régime, to abandon its chemical programme, and the stocks should be gathered by the UN inspection mission; and negotiations started about that. But the régime did prove, to its social bases, as well as to the Syrians and to those who are fighting him, I can even use chemical weapons, I can even cross the only red line that is set, and nothing will happen.



 And that was a game-changer in the case of Syria, because it’s not a coincidence that following August 2013, Daesh (or ISIS) will start its rise. At the time, we are still in a moment where al-Qaeda in Iraq is itself in Syria. Nusra is part of it, but not very happy with it, so you have within the jihadist map rivalries and different interpretations of who should take the lead, and Baghdadi is still in Iraq. And after 2013, with a certain consensus maybe among the Syrians, that no one is going to intervene to save them from Assad; this is the beginning of the rise of the two nihilist groups, of the two jihadist groups, Nusra and ISIS. ISIS is not always the exact translation, because it’s the Levant or al-Sham at the end.

 But this is a crucial moment in that sense, and this is also the beginning of the massive departure from Syria. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians reached Turkey and Jordan and Lebanon, because once again, they felt totally abandoned and vulnerable and no one is going to intervene, whatever would happen, and whatever kind of weapons would be used against them.



 And this is the fourth summer the summer of 2014. Baghdadi declares officially that he is now the Caliphate, and the Caliph, and the Caliphate is there, between parts of Iraq and Syria. He’s fighting mainly other jihadists, but also Islamist Syrian groups, because the extension of ISIS throughout the Syrian territory did not clash with the Syrian régime. They took over Deir Ezzor, then they took over Raqqa, all of the east of Syria that was already under the control of the Syrian opposition. So the expansion of Daesh weakened and fragilised the Syrian opposition, before clashing with the régime. And definitely the régime and the Iranians who were setting the strategy, were not unhappy with it. Because now the formula, and the equation, that Assad kept using in its propaganda, that against me we only have jihadists, we only have al-Qaeda, we only have Islamists who want to overthrow a secular progressive régime; all of that now, for Assad it’s a kind of prophecy that its propaganda used, and now he’s not far from realizing it, and talking more and more about it, which again is something that will change lots of approaches towards the Syrian situation.

 US intervention against ISIS, exclusively against ISIS, started following that rise, because they killed American, and I think a British as well, humanitarian aid workers in Syria. So Obama declared war on ISIS. And this is the beginning of the US intervention.’