Idlib, Syrian capital of despair

 

 'At the foot of the concrete gray wall that rises along the Turkish border, Ahlam Rashid walks around the tents in the camp for displaced people of Atmeh. Every day, this Syrian humanitarian walks the aisles and tries to bring some comfort to the families she has been working with for several years. “I don't even have words to describe the difficulty in which these millions of people survive. There is no hospital, no school, no solid house. In fact, there is no future for all these families, for all these children. ” The young woman sketches a forced smile, but her lips curl, her anger mingles with the pain of helplessness.

 According to the UN, the situation in Syria constitutes "the most serious humanitarian crisis in the world today". The number of people living in the Idlib region, which the Syrian reégime wants to regain control of, is estimated at more than 4 million people, including one million children. The majority of these people are displaced, living in tents among the rocks or sheltered under a rickety olive tree. Each month, the humanitarian situation worsens a little more, food aid is not sufficient to cover the needs of all the displaced people.

 Since July, the situation has been even more alarming after the closure of one of these sites, that of Bab al-Salamah, north of the city of Aleppo, following the Russian and Chinese veto at the United Nations Security Council. Today, the only trucks that can still access this rebel enclave must pass through Bab al-Hawa, north of Idlib. Since the start of 2020, their number has been divided by four. According to UN figures, last May 9.3 million people were food insecure in Syria, some 56% of the population.



 For now, the ceasefire signed between the Turks and the Russians, staunch allies of the Damascus régime, has withstood a few strikes and violations. Ahlam Rashid remains on the alert. “If the bombardments were to resume, we wouldn't have enough to help the population. Landlocked, the Syrians lack everything, medical facilities are too rare and in any case, they have nothing left. "

 For three years, the Idlib region has had a so-called “salvation” government. Officially, this local administration is separated from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), heir to Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. This group, which dominates the region, is included in the list of terrorist groups by the UN, a blacklist which limits the support of international organizations to the Syrian population.

 In his office, Ali Keda, the prime minister of the local government, appealed to the West: “The European Union must recognize the reality of the situation in Syria. The Syrian people want peace, but the régime at the head of the country is terrorist. We need to establish international relations with other countries in order to fight against it. We need everything, water, electricity, food, jobs for the Syrians who have nothing left… For that, the international organizations must coordinate with our government.”



 Like him, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman Atoun, head of the Sharia Council at HTS, underlines the need for the local population to obtain more support. “We are currently trying to present our true image. The point is not to make a darker or more beautiful portrait, just to show reality. The people here are not like those in Raqqa during the days of the IS caliphate. ” And to add: “Our group is not a threat to the West. The region needs international help to rebuild itself. We are the last to fight against the régime and its allies, but we will not be able to eliminate it without help.”

 At the end of August, the first inhabitant of Idlib died of the coronavirus. Currently, around sixty residents are believed to be infected. If ever the pandemic were to spread in the region, the situation could very quickly become catastrophic. As Ahlam Rashid underlines again, in the middle of the tents of displaced people: “How do you want to set up a containment? The population already struggles to survive.” '

"Assad has ruined everything'" Inside the buffer zone keeping a tenuous hold on stability in northern Syria

 

 'If there are symbols of just how indebted the Syrian opposition forces are to Turkey, then the new army base in Aleppo Province for its elite al-Hamza division is evidence of this.

 The Turkish red crescent flag is given as much prominence as the Syrian opposition one.


 In the grand greeting rooms where commanders and visiting dignitaries will meet to discuss tactics, it is the Turkish flag which is placed side-by-side with that of the opposition's.



 The commander is a defector from the start of the civil war in 2011, who used to work in Bashar al-Assad's intelligence unit.

 He is anxious to press home time and again the same twin messages.

 "We are not extremists," Commander Saif Abu Baker of al-Hamza Divison says repeatedly.

 "ISIS has not gone. There are 3,000 ISIS fighters in the desert of east Syria being supported by Assad's régime and the separatist PKK (Kurds). They will only go if we, the opposition, are supported and the régime is finished."



 The Syrian National Army, as it is now called, was born out of the Free Syrian Army and is largely backed by Turkish funds and Turkish weaponry.

 Without Turkish support, it's unlikely the opposition would be able to hold the so-called buffer zone.

 It's an area where Turkish troops have moved 30km inside Syria and stretch nearly 100km along the border - pushing out ISIS fighters but also the Kurdish-dominated SDF and keeping Assad's régime troops at bay.

 "We have no choice," Commander Moatasm Abbas of the Al Moatasm Division said. "We either fight with what weapons we've got or we die. Withdrawing is not an option. It does not exist in our dictionary. Our dictionary is revolution. We are continuing with what weapons we have, whatever happens, and Turkey is the only one who is with us on the ground, with its weapons and military equipment."



 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has always insisted he does not want to remain inside Syria indefinitely and his troops respect the sovereignty of their neighbour.

 But withdrawal is unlikely to come anytime in the near future - and those we spoke to in the buffer zone know only too well that the tenuous hold on the stability that they have in the area, is dependant right now on the Turkish military presence.

 When we visit Al Bab, in the centre of the town square, once an ISIS stronghold where they planned attacks on Aleppo, there's now a huge red Turkish crescent.

 The shops and stalls are bustling with business and packed with people.

 But whilst we are there, there's a vehicle explosion.

 A car parked outside a mosque has been rigged with a small amount of explosives.



 Not enough to kill, although four people were injured, but enough to scare and frustrate the people of Al Bab who are weary of constant instability and desperate for change.

 One man standing over the mangled wreckage of the car tells us: "We have terrorists here... they're ISIS terrorists and the are the separatist parties, the Kurds. They are doing this... causing all these attacks... it's the PKK and ISIS and we have suffered from this for a long time. Since we were liberated until now, we're suffering from this. We are sending a message to the world to please find a solution."



 In the new 200-bed hospital built by the Turkish authorities in Al Bab, we find the battered and mutilated war wounded.

 Abdul Rahman, 9, has not known anything but war his entire life.

 His leg was blown off by a régime bomb, but for the first time he's been fitted with a prosthetic limb courtesy of the Turkish-run health facility which has seven operating rooms.

 Prosthetics which would cost between $5,000 to $10,000 are being provided free by the hospital.



 Turkey seems to be the country which is metaphorically and physically holding out its hand to help the battered people opposed to Bashar al Assad and who've been running from his régime - many since 2011.

 "I don't want war," says nine-year-old Abdul Rahman.

 "I can't take it. Assad has ruined everything." '

Fears of new bloodbath in Idlib as Assad troops go on the offensive

 

 'Bashar al-Assad has re-mobilized his forces in northwest Syria, raising fears of a new bloodbath in militant-controlled Idlib province.

 The move follows Russia’s suspension of joint military patrols with Turkish armed forces along the M4 highway in what is supposed to be a de-escalation zone.

 The patrols began in March, along the Aleppo-Latakia road. The last one took place on Aug. 12 and Moscow suspended them two days later.

 Since then, Assad régime forces have launched rocket attacks against Al-Fterah, Sfuhen and Kansafra in Jabal Al-Zawiyah in the southern countryside of Idlib.

 The stage may be set for a new “battle of Idlib”. 

 Navar Saban, a military analyst at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies in Istanbul, said the combatants were treading a thin line.

 “Hezbollah moved some of its forces in a bid to launch an attack to the area in the south of the M4 highway. This zone where the joint patrols are suspended is elevated, and whoever controls this region can control the whole of Idlib. So, it is a very strategic area where sooner or later some skirmish will happen. There is a high percentage chance of an operation by the régime. It will be a narrow-scale battle. The Turks are not ready to withdraw from this strategic area or allow the opposition to withdraw either. Sooner or later, the Russians will control this area. Moscow initially planned to monitor the area with no opposition forces present, but that did not happen because Turkey, unwilling to concede to Russia, mobilized some of its forces and opposition forces there, triggering another source of tension between Moscow and Ankara.”

 Kyle Orton, a Middle East analyst, said Russia’s suspension of joint patrols in Idlib may be a temporary security matter as they consider their options.

 “The patrols have been coming under attack, from peaceful protesters at first, but increasingly militarily, especially since last month. Moscow’s intentions are obviously always suspect in Syria and there have been signs of a renewed régime coalition offensive against Idlib in recent days, so Russia’s suspension of the patrols could be a tactical issue related to that. Turkey, likewise, continues to have the same policy of preserving at least northern Idlib as a buffer zone to avoid a destabilizing wave of refugees laced with terrorists being pushed into Turkish territory.”

Don't shoot the messenger

 

 Yvonne Ridley:

 'The controversial American journalist who sued the US government for putting him on a “kill list” in war-torn Syria, was arrested yesterday by a Sunni Islamist militant group in rebel-held Syria, sparking outrage both in the Middle East and across the West.

 Yesterday’s arrest came hours after Bilal spoke to me about his growing concern over the use of torture and indefinite detentions by Idlib’s ruling force Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). He showed me some of the evidence, including a graphic video exhibiting the torture methods he says are being used by HTS.

 Having seen the images I can say these are all too familiar and are similar to the methods used by the Assad regime, and includes foot whipping known as “the bastinado” which involves blows delivered to the soles of the feet and executed with great brutality.

 The discussion with Abdul Kareem was prompted by the re-arrest of another popular figure, British aid worker Tauqir ‘Tox’ Sharif by HTS, following a bruising encounter outside a courtroom with a member of the group accused of torturing Sharif during his 24 days in custody.

 Abdul Kareem, a convert to Islam who co-founded the independent media outlet OGN, On The Ground News, has become a familiar figure since he began covering the Syrian revolution since 2011. However, the veteran war correspondent’s fearless style of journalism and brash delivery of speaking truth to power has made him unpopular and a target by many groups and governments, including his own in America.

 Abdul Kareem first began to suspect he was being targeted by the US government after narrowly surviving five separate drone strikes in 2016. He was also told by a source working at the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey – where US drones often take off for missions in Syria – that his name was on a list of targets.

 Hiring lawyers, he sued the US federal government in 2017 asking them to clarify whether or not he is on the kill list and, if so, to give him his day in court rather than execute him in Syria. In one of his most recent interviews he joked: “Most of my drama revolves around having a big mouth; I got it from my mother.” He was referencing his alleged placement on the notorious American drone “kill list” programme.



 However, his outspoken manner has obviously upset others in Syria where he has become a target. His insightful coverage of the war and ability to interview without fear or favour Islamist groups such as al-Qaida and HTS appeared to have made him a US, Russian, Iranian and Assad regime target. However, it now seems that same ability to annoy governments has also jarred with some of the people fighting to bring down the Assad regime.

 In recent days he has been working on a human rights charter with a group of Muslim scholars to protect prisoners following the number of unaccountable and forced disappearances and rumours of torture by HTS. It was this work which it is believed first led to the arrest of British aid worker Sharif, another popular figure in Idlib.

 His investigation into practices of torture has cast doubt on the revolutionary and Islamic credentials of the group and appears to have precipitated yesterday’s violent arrest near the Turkish border town of Atmeh. According to one eyewitness account the journalist was “battered to the ground and there was a lot of blood”.

 HTS media relations office issued a statement to me confirming “an arrest warrant was issued” and it adds: “There are a number of allegations surrounding the accused which are currently being investigated.” At the time of writing HTS failed to respond to or address any of the allegations over the use of torture in custody. Their media spokesman also urged me not to post any incriminating videos.

 The Sunni group was formed in January 2017 by a merger between Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham, the Ansar Al-Din Front, Jaysh Al-Sunna, Liwa Al-Haqq and the Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki Movement. There are concerns that it has become lawless and authoritarian as Idlib slides into further chaos under attack from Assad regime forces, the Russian military and Iranian-backed militias.

 Idlib is regarded as the last major stronghold for anti-Assad rebels and jihadist groups in Syria. While pro-Assad forces and their allies have captured parts of the border province, rebels and Islamist fighters still control strategic areas. HTS is the main Islamist group operating there.

 Ancient Greek writer Sophocloes of Kolōnos coined the original phrase: “Don’t shoot the messenger. Don’t blame the person who brings bad news.” That was as far back as 442 B.C. but it seems even today delivering the truth can be a costly business, but for what it’s worth maybe HTS should reflect on the way it conducts its business in terms of justice.

 The good people of Syria did not rise up against the Assad regime to simply replace it with another that also relies on torture and brutality to oppress. Bilal Abdul Kareem might be an annoying presence but both he and OGN were proof that at least in rebel-held Syria, transparency and truth were in evidence. As long as the journalists remains locked up, that can no longer be said.'

'They killed us twice': finding loved ones at last among Syria's tortured dead

 

 'Some families say it is better to know and mourn. Others say finally learning what happened is worse than dying themselves.

 Hundreds of victims of Syria’s torture chambers are only now being discovered, thanks to a new effort to identify bodies from tens of thousands of photos smuggled out of Damascus seven years ago. For their families, an image of a broken body with a number tag is all that lies at the end of the quest.

 “They died starved and naked,” said Um Munzer Yaseen, 58, who, after sifting through countless photos of emaciated corpses, finally found her son, Jamil, last month.

 A computer engineer, Jamil had been missing since one night in June, 2011, when he was taken by secret police from the family flat in Damascus. In the picture his mother found of his body, his eyes had been gouged out and his legs were broken.

 “If they had shot my son it would have been better to die with a bullet than go through this hell,” she said in Amman, where she and her husband have found sanctuary since fleeing Syria in 2013.

 Her husband, a doctor, said: “They killed us twice: when they arrested him and took him, and the second time when we saw the pictures.” He asked: “Are we not human?”

 Jamil’s image was among 53,275 photos smuggled on discs and thumb drives out of Syria by a former Syrian army photographer, codenamed Caesar, who fled in August 2013. It was his job to record the deaths in military prisons.



 Caesar in hiding in an undisclosed country out of fear of reprisals against him and his family, some friends said. Now, years after Caesar’s photos first came to public attention, they are back in the spotlight. The toughest U.S. sanctions yet came into force in June for alleged war crimes against the civilian population, under a law named after Caesar.

 President Bashar al-Assad has not commented directly on the Caesar photographs since a 2015 interview, when he dismissed them as “allegations without evidence”.

 The Syrian information ministry and the Syrian U.N. mission did not respond to Reuters emailed requests for comment about the Caesar photographs and evidence of systematic torture.

 Human rights groups believe Caesar’s photos contain images of 6,785 detainees, most tortured to death by the Syrian authorities in the early months of the uprising that evolved into Syria’s civil war, now in its ninth year.

 The state of the tortured, mutilated and starved bodies makes it hard to identify them, said Fadel Abdel Ghani, the Doha-based chairman of a group, the Syrian Network for Human Rights, which says it has identified 900 victims so far.

 With the renewed attention, campaigners have launched a new push to identify the dead.

 The images first came to light in 2014, the year after Caesar defected, but after the sanctions were imposed they have been re-released on activists’ social media platforms, giving families a fresh chance to find missing loved ones.



 For Syrian artist and teacher Fida Al Waer, whose 19-year-old brother Mohammad Mukhtar was taken at a checkpoint in Homs in 2012, finding his photo ended hope the family had of seeing him alive.

 “I would see him in my dreams alive and that he would return,” said the young artist, who now lives in a flat in the Lebanese capital. “We mourned him again when the photo was found. We always had hope he would be released.”

 She recalls how the family had implored the young man not to go to an area of the city where demonstrators were protesting against Assad’s rule, in the early days of the uprising when security forces were arresting youths at random at checkpoints.

 “For them, he is just a number. A number is on his forehead. He was just a number.”



 Sara Kayyali, a lawyer and Syria expert at U.S-based Human Rights Watch who has researched the photos, says they make it impossible to deny the systematic use of torture in the Syrian security prison system.

 “They have shown us irrefutable proof the Syrian government had truly detained and tortured thousands who disappeared — and denied they exist — and that it has tortured them to death,” Kayyali said in Amman.

 For Mariam Alhallak, identifying the photo of her son, Ayham, 25, a postgraduate dentistry student abducted on the campus of Damascus University in November 2012, ended years of doubt. She had spent more than 17 months knocking at the doors of every government bureau looking for a certificate of death.

 “Thank God he died early and did not get ... starved until he became a skeleton,” said Mariam from her flat in Berlin.

 A faculty colleague detained with her son and later released told her Ayham was tortured for at least two hours before losing consciousness after being hit on the head with a metal bar, after which the torture stopped.

 He died five days after his arrest, in his colleague’s arms. In Caesar’s photograph of his corpse there was a sticker on his forehead that read: “corpse 320 belonging to detention facility 215”.

 In a camp for displaced people in opposition-held Idlib, 74-year-old Jouriya Ali finally found an image of her son Jumaa, who was taken off a public bus near Qutaifa on the edge of Damascus on his way to work in the capital.

 “I wish I had died and not seen this picture. There is no one who was more caring than him,” the mother said. Every day since he disappeared eight years ago she would glance at the door in fleeting hope he would one day show up.

 “God deprive them of their youth, as they have deprived my son of his youth.” '

No Homeland, No Future: Alawite Youth the Backbone of the Assad Régime

 'The living conditions of the population in areas under the Assad régime control are constantly deteriorating, and their ability to secure daily necessities is becoming increasingly difficult. The régime’s ability to secure energy resources has diminished, as well as its ability to limit the rise of the dollar and foreign exchange rates against the Syrian lira, whose value is falling despite the régime’s “security” and economic measures to prevent its deterioration. With the US administration continuing its suffocation of the Syrian economy and the régime’s economic activities through the Caesar Act, population groups within régime-controlled zones have effectively turned into disappointed and disillusioned communities that have lost all hope for a bright future and are now merely trying to survive.

 In these disastrous conditions, young people are living complex tragedies. In this paper, we try to shed light on a sector of Syrian youth within areas under the régime's control, especially those coming from an Alawite background. We examine their reality and their political positions towards the régime – both in the near and more distant future – in the light of their confusion, their siege by the army, and the fighting that continues to kill them in vain, and the régime’s failure to deliver on its promises to them. The paper is based on field research and investigation conducted by the author, as well as in-depth secret interviews with many young people from different regions of the coastal area and numerous meetings and discussions with those interested in public affairs. It also draws on relevant public studies, research, articles, and investigations as well as material circulated on social media. It is worth noting that the security blockade imposed by the régime on activists and political actors has been a major constraining factor throughout the preparation of this paper.



 The régime reduced compulsory military service from two years to nine months after the March 2011 popular protests in Syria. Shortly after, it discharged two batches of conscripts in August and October 2011 after just a few months of service. Eventually, the régime stopped discharging recruits and kept them in reserve status for several years, where the recruit, or reserve soldier, receives a volunteer's salary of about USD30. At the beginning of 2012, the régime initiated a major reserve forces call-up, which continued for some time and looked more like a general mobilization. At the end of 2018, the régime discharged the first batch of reserves, which was a very small percentage of the total number of young soldiers. Alawite families are among the most committed to military recruitment and reserve service compared to others, making them the most affected by the system's conscription and standby policies. In an approximate statistic, A.M., a political activist from the city of Latakia, says:

 “The issue of the percentage of young Alawite recruits to young Alawite civilians is one of the most important topics I have worked on, but I have not been able to reach accurate figures because of the loss of a large part of the military records of the régime and its reliance on old methods in this matter, as its military records have not been completely automated. However, I was able to get approximate ratios. The percentage of Alawi young people aged 18 to 30 who serve in the army (conscripts, reserves, volunteers) is now between 65% to 75%, and the percentage of Alawi young people aged 30 to 40 who serve in the army is 35% to 40%.”

 In addition to the long period spent by the young Alawis in the army – which may be over seven years for many of them – they face many difficulties with long psychological and physical effects. Indeed, most are on the frontlines of the fighting where they witness the killing and injury of their colleagues, or have themselves been injured, which may cause lasting effects or disabilities. A large segment of them has also witnessed and carried out arbitrary looting and killing of civilians, making them unfit to return to civil life or properly engage in its civil activities. Moreover, young people often suffer from complex psychological crises throughout their years in the army, so they also lose the best years of their lives – when they’re most energetic and optimistic – to a frustrating and often deadly military life.

 Given all this suffering, what then keeps these young men in the army? And why do they not run away and start their lives instead of losing even more years? I will cite here the testimony of a soldier who fled the army three times and was arrested once at a checkpoint, and then sent back to the army after two presidential pardons. Now, he serves as a reserve soldier. He is 30 years old and spent seven years of his life as a soldier or a deserter. Answering our question, he said:

 “I tried to escape several times and spent nearly two years at my family’s house in the coastal village. For two years, I could not leave this impoverished little village, hiding from death, from my neighbours, and the police. The years were slipping through my fingers ... What do you think a young man of my age would do if he were confined in his house? My family's home turned into a prison, so I took a risk and left for Tartus to work, love, and live my life, and the result was that I got arrested. At least now I can breathe a sigh of relief during vacations, and I can also wait for news of my discharge.”

 Another soldier who has now spent nine years in mandatory service says:

 “Nothing stops me from escaping other than the fear of arrest, imprisonment, torture, and ill-treatment. I do not care about winning the war, nor a homeland for the big “crisis” mongers, nor supporting anyone. I only wish for this nightmare to end.”

 Owning property and finding a job are critical factors in young people's lives. In a country with a severe economic crisis, the economy’s ability to provide jobs for discharged soldiers and officers cannot be predicted or relied upon. Even if employment opportunities are available, they are in fact unemployment in disguise: public and private workers are now paid below USD25 per month. In the private sector, employees have to work long hours for a wage of no more than USD20. With the relatively high cost of living, the average Syrian family needs at least USD150 a month to meet their daily needs. The crisis is now a matter of food insecurity, even for those who work. With the lack of jobs, the situation is dire for these discharged young people. Owning a property – a necessary step to start a family – remains a far-fetched dream for young people in the regions under the régime's control. Property prices have also risen along with the dollar, though at a slower rate, and have become very expensive. Any apartment in a suburban area would cost about USD10,000. Although the régime’s banks are offering mortgage loans, they are still not nearly enough to buy a house, and their long-term premiums seem impossible to pay: a 5m Syrian Lira loan will cost the borrower an additional 90,000 Syrian Lira over 15 years, which seems impossible in a country with a per capita income of not more than 80,000 Lira for all workers in both private and public sectors.

 A young man discharged from military service will, therefore, face difficulties in finding a job. If he manages to find one, he will face difficulties to meet the needs of a medium-sized family or secure a property. These are all factors that make the régime think twice before discharging young people, as it would effectively be releasing an army of frustrated people in its cities and villages.

 Militarization does not only ruin the lives of the youth enrolled in the military, but it also acts effectively as a death-trap for young generations, waiting for them to reach 27 years of age (for university students) or 18 (for non-diploma holders). Even after demobilization, the ghost of military service still haunts Syrian youth. Below are some of the most prominent phenomena imposed by militarization and the ongoing war on the young generation of Alawites.

 We’re talking here about the migration of the Alawite youth, not mass immigration and forced displacement from which the Syrian people have suffered, and are still suffering, due to the ongoing war in the country. Alawite youth migrate from environments that probably have not been subjected to bombing or famines; they migrate from environments that are still safe from the direct negative impacts of the war. The phenomenon of the Alawite youth migration is mainly a result of two issues: first, the lack of practical and economic perspectives in the country, and second, the need to escape the compulsory military service that represents the greatest concern of the Alawite youth with no solutions in sight. To them, military service seems like an uncertain fate that could ruin their lives or waste long years, in which youth would otherwise spend on building a normal future for themselves.
Drug addiction

 The drug addiction has now taken hold among the military and the pro-régime militias fighting in the war as a result of the chaos spread amongst the fighters. This led to the spread of weed consumption among the Alawite fighters and pushed them into the pit of drug abuse. Moreover, occasionally the consumption of pills known as Captagon has also spread among the fighters, and has sometimes been encouraged by security officials. Those pills help the fighters avoid feeling pain, as well as energize and empower them for two whole days, effectively boosting their efficiency on the frontlines. Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and pro-régime warlords have worked on growing weed and spreading its use amongst fighters, including Alawite youth. We conducted several confidential interviews with some of the drug users, and here we will cite the answer we got from (H.A) who is a former member of the National Defence Militia and fought with Hezbollah militia in Al-Nabek and Qalamun. He said:

 “Hezbollah fighters used to listen to “Latmiyat” (a style of the Shite religious songs), drink tea, and smoke weed every time they had a rest. They used to insist that we join them in that ritual, and they protected us in case we were arrested by some security officials or policemen for the possession of weed. They always said that we shouldn’t worry because they would always be there for us and that no security or police officer could bother us if we consumed weed.”



 Hafez al-Assad managed to delude the Alawites into thinking that he dedicated the state’s capabilities to serve them and that he worked tirelessly to raise their status. Before Hafez came to power, the Alawites suffered from neglect and at times, threats. Then, they became the beneficiaries of the régime and rose to the status of authority, particularly among the ranks of the army, police, and security forces. This enhanced the value of the al-Assad family among the Alawites and eventually, the name of Hafez al-Assad was generally revered all over the Alawite areas. That is why Bashar al-Assad, as a successor to his father, enjoys a special status among the Alawites. Moreover, Bashar al-Assad’s position was further enhanced among Alawite youth following the relative economic prosperity experienced before the revolution, with Alawite youth rushing to defend the régime and what they gained during the forty years preceding the outbreak of the revolution. However, the course of events did not go as al-Assad had wished, as Alawite youth paid a heavy price for nine years, during which they gained nothing except death, injuries, disorientation, and absolute poverty.

 Activists estimate that the death toll of the Alawite youth is close to 100 thousand and 60 thousand injuries. They now face the renewed threats they have historically been subjected to as a minority and are losing trust in the role of the régime to protect them during the next stage. This is especially so after Alawite officers lost their prestige due to the interference of Iranian militias and the Russian forces. With the clear messages sent by the Russians to the Alawites and to the world of how Bashar Al-Assad has become their obedient servant, the Alawites have a strong feeling that the régime is now dependent on the Russians and that the countdown for the days when they enjoyed power and authority has started.

 The younger generation of Alawites is trying to earn a living or is counting the days to be discharged from the military service. They do not care about the régime, Bashar al-Assad, or the future of the country, and also remain unconcerned about the next president as long as they maintain the status quo or improve it a little bit.

 This is the case for a significant part of Alawite youth. The rest are sons of army officers, senior officials, and tycoons who are still dreaming of the revival of the régime and regaining power. They are an opportunist class who has become increasingly alienated from Alawite society and its general concern.

 (F.M.) an anti-régime Alawite political activist and a former prisoner of conscience says:

 “At the outbreak of the revolution, Alawite youth rushed to save and defend the Syrian régime. The barriers of self-organized vigilante groups spread at the crossroads of the villages, as large numbers of Alawites volunteered. Many of them had also served in the so-called qualitative reserve forces, where some went to recruitment divisions and handed over their civilian identification cards. According to Alawite communities, it was disgraceful for anyone to dodge conscription or calls to join the reserve forces. Indeed, some Ba'athists even took it upon themselves to draw up blacklists of residents in their neighbourhoods whose loyalty was questionable, so that Syrian Shabiha "militias" could beat them up and force them out of their homes and villages. However, now – and it is a strange paradox – it has become normal for someone in the Alawite community to say that he had made his son flee abroad to dodge conscription, and to have everyone agree with this decision. Moreover, people race to congratulate anyone who was discharged from military service or to cover up for an army deserter. A gradual shift in the viewpoint took place over the past nine years, and for many reasons.”

 In another testimony, (D.Kh.), the civil activist and anti-régime Alawite says:

 “We used to hear the hail of bullets in the Alawites villages and neighbourhoods when one of them joined the army; friends cheered up and the villages and neighbourhoods were abuzz with joy and pride… mothers got jealous of other women's sons. As years passed, we now hear the hail of bullets upon the death of someone as a martyr. Some congratulate the martyr's family; others find pride in martyrdom. The bullets are joined with the waiting of women, the fears of mothers for their sons on the frontlines, and the worrying of fathers. Now when we escort the martyr to his final resting place, silence and grief loom large, and nothing can console the victim's family. Neither the homeland nor the future is ours – rather, we hear cursing pouring on army officers and Bashar al Assad. Whenever we hear the sound of bullets, we know that someone was discharged from the army: the mothers ululate in joy, their friends hold parties, and the rest dream of the same fate for their sons when they hear “wish you the same.”



 A striking development has occurred among pro-régime Syrian youth, particularly Alawites, in their stand towards the régime and the al-Assad family. During the first days of the revolution, they rushed to feverishly defend the régime. Today, the voices of the youth who do not cling to the authority of al-Assad and do not see him as a solution are increasing. Many young Alawites are prioritizing their living conditions and believe that the régime is corrupt, responsible for all the successive crises that have been affecting Syrians, including youth, and incapable of finding solutions to any of them.

 However, it is hard to determine the prevalence of such discontent, due to their entrenched fear of the security apparatus. What is clear is that all the opposition forces must work on a comprehensive national project that puts Syrian youth from different backgrounds on track to employment and a viable life, as well as work to end a war that is severely affecting Syrian youth on both sides of the conflicting parties, as the youth always bear the bigger burden.'