Friday 11 August 2023

Alawites in Syria breaking silence?: Criticizing the dictatorship from within

 

 Mohammed Alaa Ghanem:

'Recently, a notable trend has emerged among Alawites in Syria's Assad regime-held areas, including those from powerful families. Writers, journalists, and rank-and-file Alawites have taken to social media platforms to express their deep frustration with the regime's economic policies and the centralized nature of the dictatorship under President Bashar al-Assad, as well as his wife Asma al-Assad’s outsized influence and corruption linked to her secretive “economic council.”

 The case of Lama Abbas, a loyalist writer from the city of Jableh in Lattakia Province, illustrates this intriguing development. Abbas’ recent livestreams and posts on Facebook criticizing the regime's decision-making and the obsequious bowing of its Alawite base raised eyebrows and called into question the regime's narrative of winning the war.

 In a major departure from her loyalist discourse, Abbas took to Facebook in late July to voice grievances about the disastrous economic policies implemented by the Assad regime. She criticized a recent "extraordinary session of parliament," during which the prime minister absolved himself of responsibility, claiming the economic problems were beyond his control. The lament highlighted not only the issues with economic mismanagement but also the highly centralized decision-making structure and Assad’s total control of power. In her impassioned rant, Abbas went on to further criticize the citizens in regime-held Syria, likening them to sheep that follow the regime blindly and obediently. She argued that this passive attitude allows the regime to operate without accountability, enabling it to do as it pleases without fear of repercussions. Moreover, in a thinly-veiled reference to Iran’s demographic change scheme in Syria —Tehran's efforts to buy up land and systematically repopulate areas from which Sunnis have been displaced with Shi’a Muslims from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran— Abbas claimed in two Facebook posts that the same actors were behind the recent catastrophic fires in Old Damascus and the wildfires in the coastal region, and criticized the regime for failing to extinguish the flames.

 Shortly after her Facebook posts, the regime's security apparatus attempted to detain Abbas in her home. Given her powerful and well-connected Alawite familial background, she and her family confidently rebuffed the security forces and demanded a proper warrant for any potential arrest, broadcasting the whole episode live. This incident sparked further controversy and prompted debates about the regime's priorities in allocating resources.



 Bashar Barhoom, a pro-Assad influencer based in the Alawite heartland, criticized the raid, describing it as an act by the "occupiers" and expressing disapproval that security forces are not directed against foreign enemies like Israel. He also mocked the lack of an arrest warrant for the writer, implying that such incidents were routine in the Ba'athist state. Barhoom condemned the government’s corruption, stating that even in the security raids, officials use one car while claiming fuel allowances for four cars.

 Ahmad Ibrahim Ismael, another Alawite influencer, also took to social media to lambast the “extraordinary” parliamentary session. Drawing from his experience as a former employee at the Military Housing Establishment, he revealed that seats in parliament are sold, resulting in MPs who are handpicked by the regime and thus never stand up to it. He referred to the whole process as a "farce" and emphasized that Syria lacks independent institutions. Ismael concluded by asserting that the motto of MPs is "long live the Emperor" and that decisions are solely made by a centralized authority referred to as "the Superman." When security forces attempted to detain Abbas for her statements, Ismael openly endorsed her views, stating, “It’s high time ‘the General’ [Assad] understood that we want to live. […] You can’t arrest all Syrians.”

 Dr. Ammar Yousef, a pro-Assad economist living in a regime-held area, went on a live radio broadcast to say that Caesar sanctions are just a pretext for policy failures: “These sanctions do not include food, medicine, cooking gas, or anything related to the livelihood of citizens.”

 Bassam Hussam al-Deen, the commander of “Usoud al-Jabal,” an Alawite militia, went on his personal Facebook page to decry that there is “no justice” in regime-held areas because a corrupt judge did not rule justly in a manslaughter case. Hussam al-Deen promised to take justice into his own hands moving forward.

 Kenan Wakkaf, an Alawite Syrian journalist from Tartous who fled Syria last year following a nighttime raid on his home by the intelligence services after he criticized the regime, also belittled the parliamentary session and the policies of Asma al-Assad’s corrupt economic council. He went online to blame Assad and Asma for the rapid collapse of the Syrian pound and said that current policies mean that the Syrians who “did not die in war will die from starvation.”

 Rami Makhlouf, Bashar al-Assad's maternal cousin known for his vast wealth and holdings in nearly every industry in Syria, posted a prediction on social media that the Syrian pound will become so worthless, it will be measured by the kilogram.



 Some may be tempted to dismiss these recent reactions as isolated or sporadic, but the trend has been disconcerting enough to merit a response on social media by Waseem al-Assad, a Western-sanctioned Syrian militia leader, drug lord, and distant cousin of Bashar al-Assad. Waseem al-Assad criticized Bashar al-Assad's traditional supporters for their discontent over the worsening economic conditions, reminding Alawites of the privileges they enjoy today thanks to the regime and the Ba’ath Party. Speaking from a luxury hotel in Damascus, he dismissed their criticisms, telling them to “till the land” instead of engaging in protests and airing grievances on social media.

 Growing Alawite criticism also seems to have prompted Assad to travel on Aug. 3 to Lattakia, the site of the wildfires, to calm mounting anger against his regime. Addressing the outcry on social media indirectly, he reminded his contrived audience that “this is not the time to whine, even if there’s a legitimate reason. We’re at war. In times of war, one must fight, not cry.” Assad’s wife, Asma, also traveled to Tartous, where she visited a clothing factory. In a staged photo op, she told the predominantly Alawite factory workers that though there might be widespread suffering, the only “patriotic” solution is to double down on “dedication,” “hard work,” and “passion.”

 In conclusion, while the Assad regime may attempt to project an image of strength and victory, the underlying reality reveals a government grappling with internal challenges, severe economic hardships, and dissent even among its historically strongest base. Trips by the president and the first lady to the Alawite heartland and emollient words meant to nip dissent in the bud can only work for so long. Unless Assad can offer his base a way out of a morass of his own making, the phenomenon is likely to continue to grow, seriously imperiling a key pillar of his rule.'

Wednesday 9 August 2023

Daraa: Addiction, Assassination and Displacement

 

 'The residents of Daraa governorate in Syria face challenging circumstances that compel them to emigrate to any country that will offer better living conditions. While all focus was on the tragic end of the Titan submersible, 77 people from Daraa lost their lives when the boat that carried them and other illegal immigrants from Libya sank near the coasts of Europe.


 Since 2011, Daraa Governorate has been a key area in the Syrian crisis. It played a crucial role as the cradle of the Syrian revolution. The region saw frequent changes in control as opposing factions, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Jabhat al-Nusra, gained the upper hand. The Islamic State also had a presence in the governorate, prompting confrontations with FSA factions. However, like Jabhat al-Nusra, the Islamic State lost these fights and transformed into sleeper cells, taking advantage of societal incubators.

 In 2018, the Syrian régime and Russian air force launched attacks on the governorate, forcing the moderate factions to agree to a Russia-facilitated settlement with the régime. The settlement resulted in the partial restoration of the régime’s control in Daraa and weakened the factions, without eliminating them.

 The partial presence of the régime and partial absence of factions has made the current context highly complex. In contrast to other regions of Syria, like Deir ez-Zor, rural Damascus and some parts of rural Aleppo, Iran and Hezbollah were unable to assert complete control over Daraa.

 Nonetheless, Iran seems undeterred in their goal to pursue control over the southern governorate, given its strategic location bordering Israel and Jordan and its proximity to the capital, Damascus.

 An anonymous source told Fanack the youth emigration from the governorate is alarming, describing the numbers as “terrifying.” They attribute this migration to fundamental reasons related to the régime and Iran, including factors such as drug trafficking, security concerns and economic conditions.



 The source, opting for anonymity for security concerns, asserts that the reasons behind the emigration of Daraa’s people are interconnected.

 The economic situation is complex, with inflation, a significant devaluation of the Syrian pound’s exchange rate and a scarcity of job opportunities being prominent elements in driving migration. Notably, the exchange rate of the US dollar soared to approximately 13,200 Syrian pounds in July 2023, a stark contrast to the 50-pound rate in 2010.

The source highlights that the Syrian régime subsidises agricultural products from the loyal Syrian coast while neglecting production in Daraa. Daraa relies heavily on agriculture, but insufficient resources for agricultural operations create challenges. Some areas suffer from water scarcity, lack of fertilisers, electricity and reliable transportation. Moreover, finding a market for agricultural products poses significant difficulties. These challenges have exacerbated the economic hardship in Daraa, motivating its people to opt for migration as a solution.

 While the agricultural challenges affect Daraa’s entire population, specific drivers prompt youth emigration, one of the most prominent being the settlement process the régime has implemented in the governorate.

 According to Syrian researcher Maher Sharaf al-Din, the recent settlement announced by the régime in June 2023 has put thousands of young people in a difficult situation. Those who have not completed compulsory military service are given six months to join the régime’s army. Additionally, defectors are given one month to rejoin. The settlement further allows all defaulters and defectors to obtain travel documents, permitting them to leave Syria within a specified grace period before having to join the army.

 Sharaf al-Din contends that the régime has presented the youth of Daraa with two choices: “Either they join the army to fight in its ranks or leave the country permanently.” In his view, the régime intends to transform southern Syria into “a body without bones” that can be easily controlled. He warned that if the current situation in southern Syria, including the as-Suwayda and Quneitra governorates, persists, “the region will be devoid of its young population over time.”



 According to Sharaf al-Din’s analysis of the situation in the Syrian south, he believes that “the region is of significant importance in the Iranian scheme, even more so than the Lebanese south. While the Lebanese south is seen as a platform to put pressure on Israel, the Syrian south is regarded as a platform for exerting pressure on Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.”

 The anonymous source concurs with Sharaf Al-Din’s perspective, asserting that the forces exerted on Daraa and southern Syria are “part of a deliberate and coordinated plan backed by Iran.” “Despite previous settlements, Iran has not been able to fully force its control over certain areas in Daraa. Now, Tehran aims to gain control over the region by encouraging the departure of young men without engaging in battles that might reset the situation to its initial state,” the source added.

 The source notes that the settlements concern young individuals aged 18 and 19, implying they were still children when the Syrian revolution started, and their age did not allow them to partake in any acts of opposition against the régime. The source suggests there is a deliberate effort to depopulate Daraa, particularly from its youth. Young people in the governorate seeking to obtain passports face financial exploitation in the process.

 The source highlights that they are “coerced into paying ten times the regular cost for a passport that does not grant them permission to travel to immigration countries.” The source emphasises that even Gulf countries, which used to absorb Syrian labour, have ceased to do so. “The same challenges apply to countries like Jordan, which hosts millions of Syrians, as well as Lebanon and Turkey, which has been deporting Syrians to the Syrian north.”

 The source asserts that a considerable number of young individuals from Daraa have travelled to Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, in search of jobs. For some of these young people, Erbil serves as a place of departure in their quest to find a country where they can build a better life for themselves.

 Another significant factor pushing young people to emigrate is the prevalence of assassinations within the governorate. According to the source these can be divided into two primary types in Daraa. Local factions target young men previously associated with other factions or accused of affiliating with the military or its services.

 On the other hand, the Syrian régime carries out assassinations against its opponents. Consequently, many young people find themselves either at risk of assassination or pressured to carry out assassinations. Many therefore view emigration from Syria as an opportunity to escape these grim circumstances.



 The Syrian-Jordanian border in Daraa and as-Suwayda has been a route for drug smuggling, particularly Captagon, destined for Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

 The source identifies a significant connection between drugs and emigration: “Dealers used to manipulate young men, convincing them that narcotics are just stimulants to enhance their ability to stay awake during battles. Unfortunately, many of these young men fell victim to addiction, affecting both opposition and régime soldiers.

 However, the prevalence of drugs among young people has decreased compared to previous periods, which can be partially attributed to the cessation of armed conflict.”

 The deteriorating economic conditions in Daraa have also contributed to a decline in the use of Captagon. Despite the relatively low price of a single pill compared to a pack of local cigarettes, the economic hardships have made Captagon unaffordable for many.

 According to the source, the targeting of individuals involved in drug trafficking by unidentified groups has been another reason for the decrease in drug use in Daraa. These operations have resulted in numerous assassinations in the governorate.

 The most significant factor disclosed by the source is the control of the régime’s Fourth Division units over the Syrian-Jordanian border, particularly in as-Suwayda, an extension of the Daraa governorate. The Fourth Division has established its authority in the area to gain control over the drug trade and smuggling activities.

 As per the source, the Fourth Division’s intervention has “transformed the smuggling operations from chaotic to organised activities. The division has implemented a hierarchical system, with officers overseeing the roads and others escorting the shipments near the borders. If smugglers suffer injuries during the process, they can contact medical points affiliated with the Fourth Division for assistance.”

 “This approach indicates that the aim is not to prevent smuggling altogether but to control and restrict unauthorised individuals from interfering with the smuggling. Consequently, smuggling has evolved into a highly organised and structured criminal enterprise, with significant military involvement,” the source added. Moreover, the Fourth Division has barred residents from accessing vast borderlands without authorisation.

 According to the source, the Fourth Division’s control over the smuggling operations has resulted in significant gains for the division, led by Maher al-Assad. “With their dominance in the market, the Fourth Division has managed to reduce the wages of the smugglers.

 Previously, an individual who carried a 20-kilogram bag and crawled across the border to dump it would receive $14,000 for a single smuggling operation. Now that the division has monopolised the market, the wages of cross-border smugglers have been reduced to $5,000 per operation.

 Jordanian officials have stated on multiple occasions that militias aligned with the Syrian régime oversee smuggling operations into Jordan. The source adds that since the Fourth Division’s presence, drones have been used along the routes used for drug and weapons smuggling into Jordan. These drones are linked to Hezbollah and Iranian-backed militias, and made their appearance in the region at the same time as the Fourth Division.'