Tuesday, 3 September 2013

I Don't Want To Know


 In the first couple of months of 2009, I was a gardener in London Fields. We'd get in quite early, but then sit around in the canteen for half an hour before going out to do any work. Often we'd discuss whatever was in the Metro freesheet, which at the time was all about Israel bombing the shit out of Gaza. Everyone was appalled, especially Tony, the Jamaican who otherwise spent his time talking about how he'd have to beat up any transsexual who successfully chatted him up. Marxists call this sort of thing contradictory consciousness.

  Anyway, that's the war that crystalised my view about the proper application of the word "terror". There was a teenager on the news one day who'd managed to get out, and was explaining that anyone who could get out was doing so, because it was constantly terrifying.

 By contrast the fears of the Israelis that they would have rockets from Gaza causing the sky to fall on their heads were much more irrational. Not wholly so, but if I was asked what needed to be stopped in that war, it would be the Israeli assault. And I wouldn't think that the Israelis and their American backers were so powerful that some other solution must be found to end the war. And that it might be understandable that the Israeli public has a fear of Hamas, it doesn't mean that proposing solutions to the conflict based on that fear were going to help. Many Israelis would say that they pulled out of Gaza, and look were it got them, so the best thing to do was to squeeze Gaza until Hamas "stopped the violence". I tend to think the opposite, that even before Hamas took over Gaza they'd bombed the crap out of it, bombing the airport at the first opportunity, and so making it more likely that Hamas would come into the ascendency as Gazans felt they had nothing to lose by full spectrum resistance.

 I think there is a parallel with Syria. When we see a laundry list presented of bad things America has done elsewhere, and no attempt is made to say how likely they are to be employed in Syria, I don't think a rational argument is being presented. When we're told that the US policy cannot be altered, or that the Russians are all-powerful, I think the evidence is all to the contrary. I think I've put forward a fairly clear case for why fear of intervention in Syria is an irrational fear, because none of the Western powers wants to get involved, as shown by their behaviour over the last 2½ years. As somebody pointed out on al-Jazeera last week, if the Americans wanted to invade, they had the excuse of the failure of the Annan mission, the failure of the Arab League mission, previous chemical attacks, the list goes on. And so the debate about intervention is largely a distraction from any real solution, which would involve somebody arming the revolution.


 So if somebody says, "but missile strikes are bad", my first impulse is to ask them to go back and re-read what I've written, because I haven't argued that they are good. If they say "the most important thing right now is to stop missile strikes", I want to know what exactly the problem is supposed to be, because the actual problem in Syria seems to be something quite different, and given the death and destruction wrought by Assad's forces, I think it is incumbent on those claiming that something else would be worse to make their case.

 I'm not that concerned if people don't agree. I tend to believe in a mix of free will and hard determinism, that people can make their own choices, but they'd make the same ones if history is re-run. I'm more concerned with being right than convincing other people that I am. So if anybody feels I adopt a hectoring tone in response to criticisms, it isn't intentional. Like many Syrians, I can get tired having to point out the difference between the régime and the revolutionaries trying to overthrow it. Which is a pity, as when people are most isolated, the more they need to patiently explain.

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