Friday, 25 August 2017

Something better change



 Abu Summiyah Khalidi:

 'Disunity, fighting over the few areas liberated, bending over backwards to please foreign nations, accepting the role of becoming proxies instead of having an independent voice, etc are some of the reasons which have led to this position. On the other hand Russia has played this one smart and has outmaneuvered their opponents inside Syria as well as in the international stage. ‬

 ‪The Russian strategy is working and the opposition are to blame above all else. The Russian strategy of enforcing "cessation of hostility zones" is very VERY clear in its motives and inevitable outcome. Russia is attempting to create these "ceasefire zones" with regional and international backing to enable the regime to recapture all of eastern Syria from IS. When this task is done, the regime (with full Russian and probable western aide) will try to recapture Idlib under the guise of fighting "AQ" in Idlib which doesn't exist. The remaining pockets of resistance whether in Ghoutta, Homs, Dara, etc will then be offered a humiliating "political solution" which will include Asad remaining - and if they refuse - the regime (w/Russian backing and western negligence) will finish off these few remaining areas. This is the plan, and EVERYONE sees it coming. Now what can be done to avert this? Is there any way out of this seemingly "inevitable" finale? ‬

‪ Yes. But with this opposition as it stands it seems very unlikely. This clear plot - of allowing the regime to retake east Syria then enabling a global alliance to fight HTS- had a huge impact on the latest HTS/Ahrar dilemma. Let me put it very clear - the oppositions only real hope is IDLIB all other areas mean very little if Idlib falls. And let me put it even clearer, if something didn't change and real fast in Idlib and the opposition remains divided IDLIB WILL FALL. Frankly put no ONE group can take the fight to the regime alone. We saw this clearly in the HTS led offensive in reef Hama which faltered near Qomhana at the gates of Hama city. In Idlib, Reef Hama, and Reef South Aleppo there are over 40,000 fighters - they can take the fight to the regime and change the current dynamics - but unfortunately the opposition has instead chosen division and has become content with the current state as "proxies" - which will lead to their demise. ‬


 Whether you agree or disagree with the recent HTS positioning after the infighting between them and Ahrar, one thing is for certain. The "international community" is all to willing to hand Syria to the regime on a silver platter under the guise of fighting "AQ". This poses a problem of its own and HTS has to be wise enough to make the correct decision. ‬

‪ HTS has to remove these justifications no matter how unjust and false they may be. Their are several ways this can be done and recent leaks from HTS figures have revealed that HTS is in fact undergoing a new project in northern Syria designed specifically for this task. ‬

‪ A) HTS has to hand over civil administration to local bodies selected by the noteable figures in the designated locations. In short the affairs of the cities and their administration has to be run by local bodies free from any groups ‬

 ‪B) The task of administrating justice and the courts, police, etc has to be tasked to a united justice administration and not the task of any one group‬

 ‪C) All groups must disband into one unified military body led by a unifying figure - some have floated the name of the first FSA leader Riyaad Al As'ad (whom in my opinion is the perfect candidate)‬


 Recent meetings including HTS leader and ex-Ahrar leader Abu Jabber Al Sheikh have hinted that this project is in fact underway and HTS media outlet Aba news covering the local Idlib civil administration meetings further solidifies that HTS is pushing in this direction. ‬

 ‪Recent leaks from Turkish officials including Turkish media outlets have mentioned in detail that Turkey made it very clear that in order for Turkey to oppose a Mosul like operation targeting Idlib - there are 3 demands as they put it: ‬

 ‪1. Civil admin‬
 ‪2. Free police force (as they put it) ‬
 ‪3. HTS disbands ‬

‪ These "demands" no matter how unjust HTS may see it are all plausible and this opportunity should now be missed. Now more then ever, all groups in Idlib need to disband and unite in one body. HTS essentially handicapping Ahrar and removing them as the largest group in Idlib makes this scenario far more likely. Keep in mind that the failed merger which would have united most of Idlib under one command failed due to Ahrar rejecting the proposal after they initially accepted the proposal. ‬

 The next few months are crucial for the fate of Syria, unless it is played well everything can be lost. And if it is played well - I say this with certainty - everything will change for the better. The regimes biggest ally has been the opposition which has shot itself in the foot and has refused to win! Insha'Allah this will all change if everything goes to plan.'

Wednesday, 23 August 2017

I covered his ears to block out the screams


 'Omar had been imprisoned for 14 months when he learned to walk.

 His mother can’t recall the exact date, all she knows is that they were in the Adra jail outside Damascus.

 “I didn't recognise whether it was day or night,” she says. “We weren't allowed to leave, for the bathroom or for a shower.”There wasn’t much legroom in the dark and airless room that she and her son shared with their fellow prisoners.

 “I would stand up and create some space so I could teach him how to walk, playing with him,” says Om Omar from her new home in the countryside of Idlib.

 She does not reveal her true identity for fear of her life and asks to be referred to as "Om Omar" - which translates into English as "mother of Omar".

 “I was on one side and another girl named Marwa was in front of me, about one-and-a-half metres away. I would walk with him, using my hands, towards her. Then we would swap over.”

 When Omar fell, his mother would catch him. Slowly but surely, with uncertain steps to begin with, he found the confidence to walk.

 “He was strong,” she says. “He was the only baby there. It made the other prisoners happy to look at him. It was one happy time amid the darkness of this prison and its cruel guards.”



 Omar spent the early years of his life in a Syrian jail while his mother was tortured. This is their story.

 When she was younger Om Omar, now 38 and originally from Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria, would imagine what life might hold for her.

 “Like every woman in the world, I would dream of having babies,” she recalls, “of raising my family in a good decent house like every family in the world.

 “When I was teenager, I was so obsessed with babies, taking care of our neighbours’ babies and friends’ when they used to visit my mother. I dreamt I would have at least one, and I did. But unfortunately it wasn't the life I expected."

 Om Omar and her husband Khalid, also from Deir ez-Zor, married in 2006 and moved to Aleppo before the war, where he was employed in a fabric manufacturing business by his uncle.

 When conflict broke out, the city, the country’s second largest, rapidly became a focus for protests against the government of President Bashar al-Assad.

 Khalid lived in the rebel-held eastern neighbourhoods: He joined the Free Syrian Army but was killed by mortar fire during a battle against government forces in August 2013. He was 44 and had been married to Om Omar for seven years.

 Omar was born in March 2014 in Eza’a in western Aleppo. Father and son never met.



 Om Omar was widowed, alone and had no contact with her family, who disapproved of the couple’s activism against the government. She had already been detained in 2011 and 2013 for her opposition, the second time for three days.

 “I didn't bother trying to talk to them or convince them,” she says. “I continued with my activism.”

 Her life now, Om Omar says, is like that of a single woman. But while she grieved for the loss of her husband, she also worries for the future of herself and her son.

 Even before Khalid’s death, Om Omar feared arrest by the government. For almost two years, she had moved much-needed medicine to eastern Aleppo through Bustan al-Qasr, a rebel district and home to opposition groups.

 The neighbourhood, which was a frequent haunt for snipers, provided a corridor between the divided city before it became a no-go zone after clashes in 2014.

 Om Omar knew that her activism carried a high risk - but still regarded it as her duty. “I was reckless, yes. But I had to do it and don't regret it. I had a priority, which was the sick people who needed the medicine.”

 She thought those hopes of her younger years would never come true. “This was my life after giving birth and Khalid's death,” she says. “I was struggling to breastfeed my baby because of the intensity and pressure I was living under at that time.”



 And then, in September 2014, Om Omar's life took another turn for the worse.

 One night, five men from a government intelligence agency burst into her home while she and Omar were asleep. She believes they were betrayed by a neighbour.

 The men broke the crockery and chairs and overturned family possessions.

 They searched the house, swore at Om Omar and took away packets of medicine.

 They accused her of helping injured terrorists with medical supplies.

 Om Omar denied the allegations and refused to provide the names of her social circle, lest they also fall under suspicion and face arrest. When she began to scream, the men put guns to her head. “The raid was the straw that broke the camel's back," she recalls.

 She and Omar were then taken to the agency HQ in Damascus, more than 200 miles away where, Om Omar says, “the horror began”.

 Om Omar was blindfolded when she first entered the state’s prison system – but she could already detect the “stinky, dirty smell” that would permeate her life during the coming years.

 “I felt shocked,” she says. “I was shaking with my crying baby, wondering what my or his destiny would be.”



 Mother and son were to spend nearly a month there, then shuttled between other prisons across the capital, including that at Al-fiha'a. “They took the baby from me on the first night, to put pressure on me, then they gave him back after the first interrogation."

 Omar was two months old at the time.

 “When I entered, there was water on the ground that smelled terrible," she says. "The walls were full of words, the names of previous prisoners who used be in the same room. It was like an abandoned basement that had not been fixed for ages. I could barely walk because I felt dizzy. I had not slept and it was night.”

 The room was crammed with other women. There was no ventilation: Instead, prisoners resorted to digging holes through the walls to try and let in air. Throughout her first night, Om Omar could hear the sounds of men and women screaming.

 For her first interrogation Om Omar was led into a room. Her hands were bound. Her eyes were blindfolded. She was hit with every step she took.

 The interrogator asked her about her family, about her husband, about her work. She was accused of taking medical supplies to help the Free Syrian Army.

 When Om Omar started to answer, her interrogator hit her on the head. "Stop lying and tell me the truth about your work and husband!” she recalls him shouting.

 "In the beginning I was utterly terrified because of the torture and beating,” Om Omar says. “I was afraid of being raped, or killed.”

 And then there was the threat to Omar. Human rights groups have documented how the Assad government has tortured and killed children to punish, or extract information from, their families.

 “My child had nothing to do with jails or anything else," says Om Omar. "But the Syrian regime is criminal enough to kill and imprison children or babies. My son was always on my mind. Who's going to take care of him? Are they willing to kill him too? Or beat him in front of me?”



 In the days after her first interrogation, Om Omar was left in an overcrowded room. Omar cried all the time. The guards paid no attention to her appeals for food or baby supplies. Eventually she had to improvise diapers by ripping up pieces of old clothing.

 Soon the torture sessions became a regular part of prison life. “When I came back after every interrogation, I held my son and cried,” Om Omar says. “So did he.”

 Om Omar also had to face torture sessions at night, the first after she had been detained for a week. She recalls how she handed Omar to one of the friends she had made in prison before she was dragged to a large room and faced, as she puts it, by a “fat middle-age man, with a big stick in his hand. He started to come close to me, and said: ‘Tell me everything or you will never return to see your baby tonight.' I said nothing. I was shocked.”

 The man screamed at Om Omar to confess, then beat her to the ground. She was covered in blood and already barely able to stand. Later he returned with an accomplice and a rope, which he hung from the ceiling. Om Omar was then suspended by her bound hands, her feet only just touching the ground.

 What she describes is a common and well-documented form of torture practised by the Assad regime. Prisoners call this method "shabeh" (hanging), according to a report released by the Violations Documentation Centre in Syria in September 2013, which inflicts “awful pain, ligament rupture and semi-permanent paralysis in the hands".

 Om Omar was left strung up for hours. Then, more questions. Still, she said nothing. “I knew that if I said anything then they would keep on torturing me and increase the level and the brutality of the torture.”

 This treatment continued for almost two months. She recalls fellow detainees being repeatedly raped and tortured, dying from hanging or lack of medical treatment.



 At one point Om Omar was moved to the notorious Branch 215 where, the VDC reported, up to 70 prisoners would be crammed into a cell four metres by four metres. Consistent testimony from survivors describes how prisoners were starved or thrown onto the floor “swimming in a pool of blood and pus that oozes out of their bodies due to the lack of sanitisers and hygienic conditions”.

 In December 2015, Human Rights Watch reported that at least 3,532 detainees had died at the centre, based on evidence smuggled out of Syria, although the group regards this figure as an underestimate.

 To many Syrians, the centre is simply known as “the Branch of Death”.



 In December 2014, Om Omar and Omar were taken to Adra prison, where they were to spend the rest of their imprisonment.

 About a year after they were first arrested, Om Omar started telling Omar about the outside world, “about real life, about parks, school and so on".

 Omar began to form words when he was nearly 18 months old and his mother was teaching him parts of the Quran. “His first word was 'mommy', which he said very roughly,” she recalls. Teaching her son the word "daddy" caused great sadness - but Om Omar wanted Omar to remember that he had a father.

 The toddler's progress had a positive effect on the other prisoners. “The atmosphere in the jail room was happy, despite the desperate conditions we were all living under,” Om Omar says. “Everyone gave Omar a kiss. But then the guards heard that it was getting noisy and started to hit the metal door quite hard, which made Omar cry.

 “They didn't supply me with milk or any other items that I needed for my newborn baby. His size and weight were low because of the lack of food when he was meant to be growing.

 “Once he got an infection because of the hot weather in the prison. It was so incredibly bad, he couldn't sleep, or calm down, until the prisoners came and took me to the prison doctor and gave him medicine.” Still Omar did not get better. Eventually some friends "had some leaves which we put in water and after half an hour he fell into a deep sleep".



 Prison was Omar’s home. Sometimes he might toy with a blanket – but it was a world where he was too young to make friends.

 “That broke my heart,” his mother says, “because I looked back at when I was pregnant with him and the life I dreamt of him having in the future. Of buying his small bed and toys and everything any mother dreams of getting for her baby.

 “It's heart-breaking. It made me cry many times at night, thinking of a bright future with his dad, who is dead already.”

 Om Omar would sing to lull her son to sleep or else “start to tell him short stories about the Prophet Muhammad and his fellowship, trying to reassure him”.

 But sometimes Omar could not sleep because the weather was too hot or too cold - or because of the sounds of torture from the prison yard.

 “I was covering his ears to prevent these voices from entering his head,” Om Omar says. “I couldn't do it in the end, he was crying so intensely when he heard these voices.”

 For support, Om Omar clung to her faith and the struggles of the prophet as well as the love of her son and encouragement from fellow prisoners.

 “Many times I burst into tears out of pressure and desperation. I thought I would die here and never get out to live a normal life and in a house. They were the worst days of my life.

 “I took an oath that I wouldn't give up, because of Omar, so long as he's with me... for him and his beloved dead father, who left me a piece of him. I'll be taking care of him for the rest of my life."



 And then Om Omar and Omar were free. On 8 February 2017, the government cut a deal with opposition forces that resulted in the release of 50 women from government prisons. As part of the agreement, Om Omar had to pay a judge just under $6,000.

 Her relief was uncontainable, she recalls, as she told Omar that they would return home and see the sun, people, children. “I cried a lot,” she says. “It was unbelievable, the reaction on his face. He was crying and happy.”

 Om Omar now lives with a friend in the countryside in Idlib and is in contact again with her sister, with whom she lost touch while she was imprisoned. She also has space to reflect on what her years in detention did to her and her son, who is comprehending the outside world for the first time.

 "One time he asked ‘Are we in heaven, Mum?' because he saw birds and cats and wanted to know,” she says. “You can imagine how surprised he was when he was realised it was the actual world.”

 Omar, who now sports short brown hair, lives at a rehabilitation centre with other children in an attempt to reintegrate him back into society. His mother visits her son as much as she can.



 Ahmad Khaldon, assistant manager at the facility, said that Om Omar’s case is not that unusual amid a conflict that has left more than 470,000 people dead, according to the Syrian Centre for Policy Research.

 “They have been through similar circumstances, of struggling from the aftermath of the war and its physiological effects and losing their childhood," he says. "We try to give them the proper atmosphere of bringing up a family, which they miss back in their home.”

 At first Omar had problems interacting with other children, including fighting, but is now more relaxed and playing and eating. Om Omar says: “It’s like he's born again, seeing everything new and adapting to aspects of his new life. He has flashbacks about what and how it was like in the prison, but he's got better recently."

 He is forming new memories of things he had never seen before, of animals, buildings, cars and food.

 “I hope he gets rid of all the bad influences from the first three years of his life and starts a new page with no bombing or death or fighting, just craving a normal, decent life where he can have what he wants."



 Will Om Omar tell Omar the full story of those years spent in prison?

 “I will tell him what happened,” his mother says. “I won't lie to him ever. He will know from the internet what has happened to his country, his land, his dad and how death and devastation were brought to his land.

 “The media tells people everything, so I would rather tell him myself. I will tell him how they were torturing men and women. And how hard it was to carry on and be positive and have a dream.” '

Image result for Bringing up baby in a Syrian jail: I covered his ears to block out the screams

ISIS Jurist Conspired With Hezbollah to Defeat Rebels




















 'Jihadist fighters have blamed Islamic State (ISIS) jurist and commander Ahmad Wahid al-Abd (Abou al-Baraa) for losing rebel strongholds at the Syrian-Lebanese border following the commander's recent surrender to the Lebanese Hezbollah militia.

 In an exclusive interview with Zaman al-Wasl, rebel commander Samer Mohamad al-Masri said Hezbollah members were able to advance and take control of the Jurd Jiyet and Maraat Yabroud areas without facing any notable resistance.

 Masri said his faction had imprisoned members of the ISIS forces, including Abou al-Baraa, but that other parties intervened to see their release because those arrested were locals. No foreigners were among the group members being held by Masri.

 The ISIS fighters were released after they pledged to return to their homes and abandon the organization, except they soon returned to fight the Free Syrian Army factions until Jurd al-Qalamoun fell and rebel fighters were forcefully displaced to Idleb.

 In the interview, Masri claimed that Abou al-Baraa’s faction in Qalamoun received half a million dollars a month from oil billionaire George Hassouani for more than two years. Hassouani, who is closely tied to the Assad regime and is facing sanctions from the U.S. and EU, is known to have financed and purchased oil from ISIS.

 Despite claims it was fighting the Hezbollah forces, ISIS forces based in the Qalamoun were secretly coordinating with the militia to kill rebel fighters in the area, Masri said, adding that the Lebanese group's shelling never targeted ISIS areas.'

Monday, 21 August 2017

Remembering Ghouta: Obama's meaningless red line



 Sam Charles Hamad:

 'Winston Churchill once remarked about appeasement that it's like someone feeding a crocodile and hoping that it will eat them last.

 This was true of the threat posed to the world by an expansive superpower like Nazi Germany in the 1930s, but when it comes to the Syrian civil war and its allies, the appeasers do so without any fear of being consumed by the war that has been unleashed by Assad and his allies.

 They do so without the fear of ever having to face death squads, or torture dungeons, or missiles, or barrel bombs, or napalm - or, of course, poison gas. Only nameless and faceless Syrians must suffer these things.

 It was on this day four years ago, and a week after Sisi made his brutal name on the world stage by massacring hundreds of people at Rabaa and Nadha, that Bashar al-Assad poisoned to death over 1,000 innocent people with sarin gas in the Ghouta area of Damascus.

 Sarin, it ought to be noted, brings a particularly brutal form death, and before it strips of you of your life, it strips you of dignity. This is precisely its function - cruelty and terror.

 Those of us who live far away from such horrors can barely begin to understand the personal aftereffects of this violent chemical weapon on those who survive. Pictures and eyewitness testimonies of whole families lying dead in their beds were widespread, while survivors spoke of stepping over bodies trying to look for friends and loved ones.



 However, while Assad's 2013 Ghouta attack was a particularly vicious one, it must be remembered that it was but one atrocity within the much larger atrocity that is his genocidal war against those Syrians who revolted against his tyrannical regime. Most of the murder, maiming, torture and trauma in Syria is carried out by so-called "conventional weapons", but it was Barack Obama who famously said that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be a "red line" – one which, if crossed, would see US action taken against the perpetrators.

 When this red line was finally crossed at Ghouta, it turned out to be little more than a red herring. One of the most perverse narratives concerning the events after Ghouta was that there was a "drive to war" by the US and its allies. At its very worst, this narrative produced conspiracy theories, mostly emanating from the alt-Left and alt-Right, which claimed that the Ghouta attack was a "false flag" used to justify western "regime change" against the victim, Assad.

 Of course, these conspiracy theories have been firmly debunked, but even the conventional narrative seems to in some way accept that the US failing to live up to its promises to the Syrian opposition was in some way a triumph for "peace". Firstly, following Ghouta, there was no "drive to war" - Obama reacted to the attack with characteristic hesitance and indecisiveness.

 In truth, the calculation had been made long before Ghouta that the US would not decisively intervene to aid the Syrian opposition in overthrowing Assad. However, if Obama was to be taken at his word, the "red line" that was crossed at Ghouta might be the impetus needed for the US and NATO to act as they had done in Libya to avert further mass murder.



 This is what was rendered by a collection of so-called "peace" activists, Assad supporters and "anti-war" groups as a "drive to war", as if acting to protect Syrians in any manner would've been a greater injustice than atrocities such as Ghouta.

 The closest any "drive to war" came to materialising, was when UK Prime Minister David Cameron - one of the key proponents of NATO intervention on behalf of the Libyan revolution - held a vote in the House of Commons on whether the UK would aid the US in any strikes on Assad regime targets following Ghouta.

 The vote failed, mostly due to the squalid politicking of then Labour opposition leader Ed Miliband who thought he could exploit weaknesses in Cameron's coalition government.

 Watching Labour MPs who had voted for the catastrophic Iraq war based on the spectre of mythical weapons of mass destruction, trooping through the lobby to vote against protecting Syrians who had been the victim of real WMDs was sickening. Cameron, the alleged warmonger intent on overthrowing Assad as he had done Gaddafi, respected the decision of parliament and said no more about it.



 In the US, intervention following Ghouta was suggested in a bill that didn't even make the floor of the Senate. There was no real "drive to war" – military action was not favoured by Obama. Even when it looked like the US might be expected to act, John Kerry went out of his way to reassure Russia and Assad's allies that any such action would be "unbelievably small".

 What followed was not a drive for some US-driven fantasy war of regime change against Assad, but rather a Russian-driven drive to continue Assad's very real war of regime preservation. With the US allegedly poised to strike, far from the prophets of doom who very conveniently croak about World War III whenever the very notion of action against Assad is brought up, Russia didn't react with threats of military violence to defend its ally from a potential US strike.

 Rather, it came up with a plan that simultaneously got Obama out of having to act against Assad, while allowing Assad to get away with Ghouta entirely unscathed.



 The Kerry-Lavrov deal, as it was called, allowed Assad to allegedly get rid of his chemical weapons stockpiles under supervision. Some people perversely called this deal "peace", but it was merely a manner through which Obama's red line that morphed into a red herring, could now become a green light – a green light for Assad to continue his genocidal war by conventional means.

  As Syrian revolutionary activist and Ghouta survivor Dani Qappani put it, "If a murderer kills someone with a hammer, you don't just take away the hammer and leave the murderer unpunished".

 But this is precisely what happened. Russia and the US could act as if they were dealing with Assad's chemical weapons stockpiles, which are of course merely one aspect of his Iranian-supplemented, Russian-provided arsenal, as well as posing as "peacemakers", while the barrel bombs and missiles were falling on Syrians.

 Even on its own terms, the Kerry-Lavrov deal failed dramatically, assuming it was ever meant to succeed. Yet barely anyone has mentioned the great crime that was the US-Russia theatrics that followed Ghouta. When 130 people were murdered by Assad using sarin gas again at Khan Sheikhun earlier this year, the Trump administration at least responded with a warning that it wouldn't tolerate Assad using chemical weapons. But, as we've seen subsequently, no US administration cares about the genocidal destruction unleashed by Assad and his allies in its totality.



 It's of no surprise that following the brutality of Ghouta and the lack of any meaningful action to protect Syrians and aid rebels in fighting Assad, the region was partially eclipsed by the black banner of the Islamic State group, trading, as it does, on the perceived indifference of the world to Muslim suffering.

 That this entity has struck at the heart of Europe is certainly not in any sense a comeuppance, but there is a brutal irony at the heart of it. All this poison - whether sarin gas attacks in Ghouta or vehicle attacks on civilians in Barcelona - seeps out from the open wound that is Assad.

 As Qappani summed up, "[Western] governments have pretended to be interested in Syria, but they have never cared about the lives lost at Ghouta or the hundreds of thousands killed by Assad in general in the way they do about the innocents killed in Europe, most recently Barcelona."

 Today marks the fourth anniversary not just of a single monstrous attack on innocent people, but on the day where the world said that the hopes, dreams and lives of Syrians don't matter and seemingly never will.'

Syrian regime launched 174 chemical attacks in 4 years



 'The Assad regime has carried out 174 chemical weapons attacks since its attack in East Ghouta near Damascus that left hundreds dead, according to a London-based rights watchdog.

 In a Monday report -- released on the fourth anniversary of the East Ghouta attack -- the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) stated that the Assad regime had carried out a total of 207 chemical attacks since the first one in Homs’ Al-Bayyada district on Dec. 23, 2012.

 The SNHR also recalled April’s chemical attack on Khan Sheikhun, in which around 100 civilians in the opposition-held village were killed.

 The NGO went on to assert that the international community, including the U.S., had failed to prevent the Assad regime from carrying out chemical weapons attacks or confiscate its arsenal of chemical arms.



 According to Monday’s report, the regime carried out at least five more chemical attacks since April’s attack on Khan Sheikhun.

 “Over the course of the six-year Syria crisis, Russia and China have used their veto right seven times in favor of the Syrian regime, which has hamstrung the UN Security Council and stopped it from safeguarding international law and order,” the report states.

 On Aug. 21, 2013, more than 1,400 civilians were killed and more than 10,000 injured -- including women and children -- in the chemical attack on East Ghouta.

 In September of the same year, the Syrian regime signed on to a chemical weapons convention, but this did not prevent it from carrying out additional chemical attacks.'

Obama's failure to enforce red line emboldened Assad



 'In August 2012, the American journalist Chuck Todd, enquiring into Barack Obama’s “latest thinking” on the rebellion in Syria, which at the time was a year old, asked the now former president if he ever envisioned intervening militarily in Syria to ensure “the safe keeping of the chemical weapons” in Syrian president Bashar Al Assad’s arsenal. According to the Federation of American Scientists, Syria under the Al Assads had built up “one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapons programmes in the world”. Mr Obama answered the question with uncharacteristic unambiguity: “We have been very clear to the Assad regime”, the president said, “that a red line for us is … chemical weapons moving around or being utilised”.

 Mr Al Assad did not wait long to start testing president Obama’s red line. On December 23, he dropped bombs containing a toxic gas called Agent 15 on Syrians queuing for bread in the city of Homs. The White House not only did not take action, but it also issued a statement saying that reports of chemical weapons use were not “consistent” with its own assessments. Mr Obama’s failure to enforce his own warning clearly emboldened the Syrian regime. On August 21, 2013, four years ago today, Mr Al Assad rained bombs loaded with sarin gas on Syrian citizens outside Damascus. The images of suffering that emerged that day from Ghouta will long haunt humanity. They are a stain on our conscience.

 Even though the red line had been crossed, Mr Obama feared that intervention in Syria might turn it into another Iraq. This was the wrong lesson to draw from history. As events have shown, his refusal to punish the Syrian president has meant that, four years on from the massacre in Ghouta, Mr Al Assad has consolidated his position. The insidious narrative that Iran, Russia and Mr Al Assad are fighting terrorism, when if anything they are at the forefront of terrorising and killing Syrians, has taken hold. And Mr Al Assad is now treated as integral to any solution to the crisis in Syria, rather than as the person who precipitated the conflict. The Syrian president again used chemical weapons in April this year, killing dozens of people in Idlib. While the crossing of that red line once more was enough to stir the new US president, Donald Trump, to order a retaliatory cruise missile attack on Shayrat air base, the action appeared more symbolic than strategic. It was designed to prevent and deter the Syrian regime from launching future chemical attacks, but in reality served only as a light slap on the wrist to Mr Al Assad.

 No atrocity, it seems, can shock the world into acting against Mr Al Assad.'

Sunday, 20 August 2017

Syrian army pounds rebel areas near Damascus

Image result for Syrian army pounds rebel areas near Damascus after Russian brokered truce

 'Syrian jets and artillery struck rebel-held eastern Damascus suburbs on Saturday a day after a Russian sponsored ceasefire with a rebel group agreed a halt of fighting in the last opposition enclave in the capital, rebels and witnesses said.

 The Russian defense ministry said on Friday it had reached a ceasefire that took effect at 21.00 hrs Moscow time (1800 GMT) with Faylaq al Rahman, the main Free Syrian Army (FSA) group fending off a two-month widescale Syrian army offensive in Jobar district and nearby town of Ain Tarma.

 A spokesman for Faylaq al Rahman said both Jobar, which lies some 2 km (1.2 miles) east of the Old City wall, and nearby Ain Tarma on the edge of Eastern Ghouta witnessed army strikes and shelling soon after the ceasefire went into effect.

 "After the first few hours ... there were many violations midnight they dropped barrel bombs and from the morning there have been strikes across the Ghouta," Wael Alwan, spokesman for the group, said.

 At least five civilians were killed in the towns of Hamouriya and Zalamka and fighters said there were several case of suffocation from rockets filled with chlorine that were fired at the front lines of Jobar and Ain Terma, he added.



 The Syrian army elite 4th Division has been trying unsuccessfully to storm Jobar and residents say the army has retaliated for its heavy losses by shelling residential areas, leaving scores killed and wounded since the campaign was launched.

 Moscow said on Friday that the ceasefire meant an earlier one announced last month in Eastern Ghouta now included all the moderate opposition groups in the main rebel stronghold that stretches from eastern to northeastern suburbs of Damascus.

 The army has not commented on the latest Russian agreement with Failaq al Rahman whom it considers a terrorist group that threatens the capital. It however says it abides by truces Moscow has brokered.

 Many fighters welcomed the ceasefire to help alleviate plight of civilians most hurt by aerial strikes but remain deeply skeptical about Russia's readiness to get the Syrian army to stick to the terms of a cessation of fighting in several de-escalation zones that Russia has already announced



 Moscow had already began to deploy military police in several areas across Syria such as in southwestern Syria where "de-escalation" zones had been announced.

 "This shows the lack of seriousness by the Russia to put pressure on the regime," Alwan added.

 Failaq al Rahman said the Syrian army bombardment appeared to be an attempt to wreck a ceasefire deal whose main points included deploying Russian military police along the frontline, the release of detainees and allowing humanitarian goods into the besieged Eastern Ghouta.

 "It seems the regime wants to take advantage of the opportunity to take revenge for its big losses during their many attempts to storm the Ghouta before the Russian military police enter to disengage the forces," Alwan said.

Outnumbered and outgunned, local rebels fortified in elaborate tunnels and deploying ambushes have repelled repeated attempts to storm their stronghold, inflicting dozens of losses on the army since the campaign began.'

Thursday, 17 August 2017

Syrians in Montreal remember deadly chemical attacks



 'During the first attack, in the spring of 2013, Eman Shelh didn’t understand what was happening. It was the middle of the night and someone was shouting from the minarets to close your doors, close the windows, and cover your mouths.

 Then came the screaming and the ambulance sirens and the bodies of men, women and children with no injuries or blood — but with blue lips and swollen hands, some foaming from the mouth. There were so many bodies that they had to be buried together in tunnels, she said.

 “It was like a dream, at that moment I was in disbelief,” said Shelh, 37. “You see the dust and the people suffocating. Even now sometimes I think — was it a dream or was it real? There were people dying in front of me.”



 That first attack on Harasta would be followed by three more on the suburbs of Damascus, commonly known as Ghouta, each one more intense and widespread than the last. The fourth, on August 21, 2013, using the nerve agent sarin, would kill more than 1,000 people.

 According to UN inspectors, it was the deadliest use of chemical weapons since 1988, when Saddam Hussein turned them on civilians in Halabja in 1988.

 Though Wikipedia still lists the perpetrators of the Ghouta attack as “disputed,” it would force Syrian president Bashar al Assad to give up his chemical stockpiles — or at least pretend to do so.

 But for Shelh and her family, the attacks also precipitated their hasty exodus from Syria to Jordan and finally to Montreal, where they landed three weeks ago — to safety and comfort, if not peace of mind.



 At home on a quiet street in N.D.G., Abeer, Shelh’s eldest daughter, now 15, serves mint tea, complaining in jest of having to do all the housework while her mother nurses a sprained ankle.

 “At least we can still laugh,” says her mother, speaking through an interpreter.

 The family’s sponsors — St. Monica’s Catholic parish — have furnished the apartment and filled the fridge. The only personal item on view is a black and white photocopy of a family portrait taken in Jordan and thumbtacked to the wall. Ziad Jr., now 13, appears so much older than his years.



 Like many of the Syrians who have arrived in Canada since 2015 — at last count more than 40,000 across the country and almost 10,000 in Quebec — Shelh’s family had to leave everything behind. But as the fourth anniversary of the Ghouta attack approaches, they still carry with them the memories of the horror and mayhem.

 At the time of the second attack, a few days after the first, which they believe was using chlorine gas, it had been a year since President Obama had drawn a red line at the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. If that line was crossed, Obama had said, the U.S. would intervene.

 Already there was little bread, water or electricity and Shelh could no longer visit her father and siblings who lived only one street away, for fear of being hit by snipers near the security checkpoint. Finally, she thought, the international community will be forced to react.

 Instead, the red line kept shifting, further and further into irrelevance.

 Shelh’s husband, Ziad Alrayes, who was an ambulance driver and paramedic in Syria, says everyone had expected the United Nations or the foreign diplomats in Damascus to intervene.

 “When we went into homes after the attacks to try and give first aid, we saw whole families who looked like they were sleeping. The most difficult part was seeing the children. … What did they do to deserve this?”



 They didn’t expect the third attack, one month later, this time using sarin gas.

 For Shelh and Alrayes, it was the last straw. Both Yousef, 6, and Ziad Jr. still suffer from that attack, with ongoing respiratory problems. Yousef, who was 2 at the time of the attack, was too little to understand how to cover his mouth or try not to breathe. Ziad Jr., who helped bury the bodies, has suffered psychologically as well, they said.

 The family waited until after dark and walked four hours into the night, Alrayes carrying Yousef in his arms, until they reached a car and driver who would drop them off 20 kilometres from the border of Jordan.

 Mariam, who was five years old, was very tired, they recalled. Abeer, then 11, got separated from the family as they joined a throng of other Syrians walking the last few kilometres.

 “I was following a woman who I thought was my mother but it wasn’t her,” she said. “I was crying and looking for my mom for an hour before I found her.”



 By the time the fourth attack hit, they had made it to the Mrajeeb Al Fhood refugee camp, run by the United Arab Emirates and the Red Crescent society, where they stayed for three months, before moving into a one-room apartment in Zarqa.

 Life was hell in Jordan, the family says. Alrayes was not allowed to work, and when he worked illegally, he was often not paid. The boss would send him on his way, daring him to complain to authorities, at the risk of being sent back to Syria.

 Ziad Jr. was the only one working, at a vegetable stand on the street. The girls went to school sporadically, but only from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m., after the Jordanian children had left the building. Meanwhile the Jordanian hospitals refused to treat Yousef for his respiratory problems. It wasn’t until their church sponsors in Canada sent money for treatment in a private hospital that he started to improve.'

How Syria continued to gas people as the world looked on



 'In the spring of 2015 a Syrian major general escorted a small team of chemical weapons inspectors to a warehouse outside the Syrian capital Damascus. The international experts wanted to examine the site, but were kept waiting outside in their car for around an hour, according to several people briefed on the visit.

 When they were finally let into the building, it was empty. They found no trace of banned chemicals.

 “Look, there is nothing to see,” said the general, known to the inspectors as Sharif, opening the door.

 So why were the inspectors kept waiting? The Syrians said they were getting the necessary approval to let them in, but the inspectors had a different theory. They believed the Syrians were stalling while the place was cleaned out. It made no sense to the team that special approval was needed for them to enter an empty building.



 The incident, which was not made public, is just one example of how Syrian authorities have hindered the work of inspectors and how the international community has failed to hold Syria to account, according to half a dozen interviews with officials, diplomats, and investigators involved in eliminating Syria’s weapons of mass destruction.

 A promise by Syria in 2013 to surrender its chemical weapons averted U.S. air strikes. Many diplomats and weapons inspectors now believe that promise was a ruse.

 They suspect that President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, while appearing to cooperate with international inspectors, secretly maintained or developed a new chemical weapons capability. They say Syria hampered inspectors, gave them incomplete or misleading information, and turned to using chlorine bombs when its supplies of other chemicals dwindled.

 There have been dozens of chlorine attacks and at least one major sarin attack since 2013, causing more than 200 deaths and hundreds of injuries. International inspectors say there have been more than 100 reported incidents of chemical weapons being used in the past two years alone.

 “The cooperation was reluctant in many aspects and that’s a polite way of describing it,” Angela Kane, who was the United Nation’s high representative for disarmament until June 2015, told Reuters. “Were they happily collaborating? No.”

 “What has really been shown is that there is no counter-measure, that basically the international community is just powerless,” she added.

 That frustration was echoed by U.N. war crimes investigator Carla del Ponte, who announced on Aug. 6 she was quitting a U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria. “I have no power as long as the Security Council does nothing,” she said. “We are powerless, there is no justice for Syria.”



 The extent of Syria’s reluctance to abandon chemical weapons has not previously been made public for fear of damaging international inspectors’ relationship with Assad’s administration and its backer, Russia, which is giving military support to Assad. Now investigators and diplomatic sources have provided telling details to Reuters:

 - Syria’s declarations about the types and quantities of chemicals it possessed do not match evidence on the ground uncovered by inspectors. Its disclosures, for example, make no mention of sarin, yet there is strong evidence that sarin has been used in Syria, including this year. Other chemicals found by inspectors but not reported by Syria include traces of nerve agent VX, the poison ricin and a chemical called hexamine, which is used to stabilise sarin.

 - Syria told inspectors in 2014-2015 that it had used 15 tonnes of nerve gas and 70 tonnes of sulphur mustard for research. Reuters has learned that inspectors believe those amounts are not “scientifically credible.” Only a fraction would be needed for research, two sources involved in inspections in Syria said.

 - At least 2,000 chemical bomb shells, which Syria said it had converted to conventional weapons and either used or destroyed, are unaccounted for, suggesting that they may still be in the hands of Syria’s military.

 - In Damascus, witnesses with knowledge of the chemical weapons programme were instructed by Syrian military officials to alter their statements midway through interviews with inspectors, three sources with direct knowledge of the matter told Reuters.



 The head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international agency overseeing the removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, conceded serious questions remain about the completeness and accuracy of Syria’s disclosures.

 "There are certainly some gaps, uncertainties, discrepancies," OPCW Director General Ahmet Uzumcu, a Turkish diplomat, told Reuters.

 But he rejected criticism of his leadership by Kane and some other diplomats. Kane told Reuters that Uzumcu should have turned up the pressure on Syria over the gaps in its reporting and done more to support his inspectors. Uzumcu countered that it was not his job “to ensure the full compliance” of treaties on chemical weapons, saying that the OPCW was mandated to confirm use of chemical weapons but not to assign blame.

 Syria’s deputy foreign minister, Faisal Meqdad, insisted that Syria was completely free of chemical weapons and defended the country’s cooperation with international inspectors.

 “I assure you that what was called the Syrian chemical weapons programme has ended, and has ended with no return. There are no more chemical weapons in Syria,” he told Reuters in an interview.

 Sharif did not respond to requests for comment about the incident at the warehouse.



 On Aug. 21, 2013, hundreds of people died in a sarin gas attack in Ghouta, a district on the outskirts of Damascus. The colourless, odourless nerve agent causes people to suffocate within minutes if inhaled even in small amounts. Assad’s forces were blamed by Western governments. He has repeatedly denied using chemical weapons and blames insurgents for the attack.

 In the wake of the atrocity, the United States and Russia brokered a deal under which Assad’s government agreed to eradicate its chemical weapons programme. As part of the deal, Syria joined the OPCW, based in the Hague, Netherlands, promising to open its borders to inspectors and disclose its entire programme – after previously denying it had any chemical weapons.

 Syria declared it had 1,300 tonnes of chemical weapons or industrial chemical stocks, precisely the amount that outside experts had estimated. In an OPCW-led operation, costing hundreds of millions of dollars, that stockpile was shipped overseas for destruction with the help of 30 countries, notably the United States.

 But there were two significant problems. First, inspections did not go smoothly. Days after the Ghouta sarin attack, OPCW inspectors heading for the area came under sniper fire. They made it through to Ghouta eventually and were given just two hours by Syrian authorities to interview witnesses and take samples. The team confirmed that sarin had been used.

 And in May 2014 a joint United Nations-OPCW convoy was hit by explosives and AK-47 fire while attempting to get to the site of another chemical attack in the northern town of Kafr Zita. That mission was aborted. On the return journey some of the team were detained for 90 minutes by unidentified gunmen. Syria’s foreign ministry issued a statement blaming terrorists for attacking the convoy.

 Reuters was unable to determine exactly how many times the work of inspectors has been hampered, but Syrian tactics have included withholding visas, submitting large volumes of documents multiple times to bog down the process, last-minute restrictions on site inspections and coercing certain witnesses to change their stories during interviews, four diplomats and inspectors involved in the process told Reuters.

 The OPCW team has carried out 18 site visits since 2013, but has now effectively given up because Syria has failed to provide sufficient or accurate information, these sources said.



 The second problem was a switch of tactics by Assad’s forces. While the United Nations and OPCW focused on ridding Syria of the stockpile it admitted having, Assad’s forces began using new, crude chlorine bombs instead, according to two inspectors. As many as 100 chlorine barrel bombs have been dropped from helicopters since 2014, they said. Syria has denied using chlorine.

 Although less poisonous than nerve gas and widely available, chlorine’s use as a weapon is banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention that Syria signed when it joined the OPCW, an intergovernmental agency that works with the United Nations to implement the convention. If inhaled, chlorine gas turns into hydrochloric acid in the lungs and can kill by drowning victims in body fluids.

 A source involved in monitoring Syria’s chemical weapons for the OPCW said Damascus began using chlorine as “a weapon of terror” to gain a battlefield advantage when one of its bases in Kafr Zita was threatened with being overrun in 2014.

 “The base was surrounded by opposition. The government forces wanted to depopulate the area. That’s why they started using chlorine,” said the source.

 A senior official who has worked with United Nations and OPCW investigators said two helicopter squadrons dropped chlorine barrel bombs, drums filled with chlorine canisters, from two air bases. To produce such a quantity must have required technical staff and logistical support, suggesting the operation was overseen by senior commanders, the official said.

 The introduction of a new type of chemical weapon came at an awkward time for the OPCW, said the source involved in studying Syria’s chemical weapons for the weapons monitoring group. It was keen to remove Syria’s declared stockpile and reluctant to start a probe into alleged government violations that could jeopardise Syrian cooperation. The goal of removing the stockpile, which Western governments feared could fall into the hands of Islamic State, took precedence over the chlorine attacks, the source said.

 OPCW head Uzumcu denied there had been a reluctance to investigate reports of chlorine attacks, pointing out that in 2014 he set up a fact finding mission to look into them. This mission was not tasked with assigning blame, however. It concluded that the use of chlorine was systematic and widespread.

 Uzumcu said the team’s conclusions were handed to the OPCW executive council. It condemned the use of chlorine and passed the findings to the United Nations. A spokesman for the United Nations said it was the role of the OPCW to determine whether or not a member state was in breach of the chemical weapons ban.



 Kane, the former U.N. high representative for disarmament, told Reuters that Uzumcu should have tackled Syria over its lapses in reporting to the OPCW, including undeclared chemicals and a failure to report the government’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre, which was, in effect, the programme’s headquarters.

 “Why, my God, three-and-a half years later, has more progress not been made in clearing up the inconsistencies? If I was the head of an organisation like that ... I would go to Damascus and I would confront these people,” Kane said.

 Uzumcu said the OPCW was constrained by its founding treaty, the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW has no obligation to act when one of its members violates the convention, he said. Determining blame for the use of chemical weapons is the task of a separate United Nations-OPCW mission in Syria, the Joint Investigative Mechanism, established in 2015. A spokesman for the Joint Investigative Mechanism referred questions to the OPCW.

 “The secretariat has fulfilled, accurately and entirely, the tasks they were asked to fulfil and will remain within our limitations as far as our mandate is concerned,” Uzumcu said.

 He said some states have suspicions that the Syrian government hid stocks of chemical precursors that might be used for the production of certain nerve agents, including sarin. But he said there was no conclusive evidence.

 Uzumcu said he regretted that relations had broken down between Russia and the United States on the OPCW executive council, which has the power to impose restrictions on Syria’s membership and report it to the U.N. Security Council for non-cooperation.

 Uzumcu said his office was still seeking answers from the Assad administration about undeclared chemicals, aerial bombs and the Scientific Studies and Research Centre, which has overseen Syria’s chemical weapons since the 1970s. Syrian officials have maintained that no supporting documentation exists for the programme, which included dozens of storage, production and research facilities.



 The Syrian crisis has had a profound effect on the way the OPCW operates. For two decades the organisation had reached consensus on most decisions, only calling on the 41-member executive council to vote on a handful of occasions. Syria marked a clear divide on the council.

 In 2016, when an inquiry by the United Nations and OPCW found that Syrian government forces were responsible for three chlorine gas attacks, the United States sought to impose sanctions on those responsible through the executive council, but then dropped the proposal, the details of which were not made public. A text drafted by Spain condemned the attacks but removed any reference to sanctions. It was supported by a majority, including Germany, France, the United States and Britain, but opposed by Russia, China, Iran and Sudan.

 The United States has since placed sanctions on hundreds of Syrian officials it said were linked to the chemical weapons programme. President Donald Trump ordered a missile strike on a Syrian air base, but division on the OPCW governing body and at the United Nations has prevented collective action against the continuing attacks.

 Western governments accused Moscow of trying to undermine investigations by the United Nations and OPCW in order to protect Assad; Syria says the inspection missions are being used by Western countries to force regime change.

 Russian officials did not respond to a request for comment.



 Former U.N. chief weapons inspector Ake Sellstrom, who is now chief scientist for the U.N.-OPCW mission, said it is critical that perpetrators of chemical attacks are put on trial to deter future use of weapons of mass destruction. His team should be reporting back to the U.N. by mid-October, he said.

 A key unsolved question is what happened to the 2,000 aerial bombs that Syria said it had converted to conventional weapons, a process that would be costly and time-consuming.

 “To my knowledge, the Syrian government never furnished any details of where, when and how they changed the bombs’ payload,” said an OPCW-U.N. source, who took part in investigations in 2015-2016. He said there clearly was “a real, high-level, command structure behind this.”

 Syrian officials did not respond to requests for comment about the bombs.



 The team is also examining the deaths of almost 100 people on April 4 when a gas attack hit Khan Sheikhoun, a town in the rebel-held province of Idlib near the Turkish border. Samples taken from people exposed to the chemicals and tested by the OPCW confirmed sarin use. Meqdad, Syria’s deputy foreign minister, said in the interview Syrian forces were not to blame, repeating earlier denials by Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem.

 Sellstrom said the presence of sarin so long after Syria was supposed to have dismantled its chemical weapons programme posed difficult questions. “Is there a hideout somewhere, or is there production somewhere and how much is available?” he said, adding that the reported use of aerial bombs in Khan Sheikhoun could point to the Syrian forces keeping some strategic weapons as well.

 The attack means either “that someone can produce sarin today, or sarin has been hidden,” Sellstrom said.'

The Exile



 Khaled Almilaji:

 'I always knew I’d become a doctor. I grew up in a family of physicians—three of my uncles were doctors, and one ran a big hospital in Aleppo. It was like a second home for my sisters and me when we were growing up. We would do our homework in the waiting rooms and follow my uncle on his rounds, a gang of little kids carefully washing our hands before we visited patients. When I finished medical school in 2005, I started working for a pharmaceutical company while completing my residency as an ear, nose and throat specialist. In 2011, I planned to move to Germany to train as a head and neck surgeon. Just as I was about to leave, the Syrian revolution started.

 Like everyone who grew up in Syria, I knew people who had suffered under Assad’s regime. I have an uncle who was imprisoned for 15 years. He died two years after he was released, mentally and physically destroyed by his time in jail. My father, who taught Arab literature, was forced to check in with the intelligence service every month so they could make sure he wasn’t becoming politically active.

 When the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya spread to Syria, I joined the movement in the streets. One morning in early 2011, I met some friends and drove to Homs, where the largest protests were taking place. We made our way to the site of the demonstration and heard the roar of thousands of people chanting and yelling. In that moment, I began to cry. I thought about my uncle and my father. I thought about all the sorrow brought on by this regime. It was the first time I had grieved. We returned every weekend, protesting with our people.

 The government’s response was bloody and terrible. They shot activists in the street. Doctors set up secret hospitals to treat people who had been hurt in the protests, and my friends and I joined them. We ran field hospitals in ground-floor apartments. We saw soldiers who had defected and were shot in the back by their own comrades. One man had been shot by a tank. His leg was a mess of shattered bones and bloody flesh. We knew what would happen if we were caught, but we didn’t care.



 In September 2011, I went to Damascus to meet with friends who were active in the protests. I stopped at an ATM and noticed a man looking at me intently. He asked for my ID. Terrified, I gave it to him and hurried outside. Within seconds, men appeared with machine guns. They shoved me into a car, and we sped off.

 A few minutes later, we arrived at the Air Force Intelligence Doctorate headquarters, where I was questioned for two hours, then sent to an interrogation prison. For two weeks, I was detained in a tiny room with 18 other men. There was no running water, no toilet. In the mornings, the guards would take a prisoner or two out of the room. When they returned, the men would be bloody, their hands broken, their skin burned with cigarettes, nails ripped off their fingers. I treated them as best I could, cleaning their wounds. The guards were experts at torturing people without killing them. They electrocuted us and hit us with cables. They hung me by my wrists, my toes just touching the ground, and left me in the heat of the sun for 24 hours. The thirst was indescribable. But the worst part was the helplessness. You never knew if this was the moment they were going to kill you.

 After two weeks, I was transferred to solitary confinement in another prison. As strange as it sounds, I felt triumphant. If the regime was afraid of us, then we were doing something right. In March 2012, after I had been in jail for six months, the door opened. By then the protests had become a civil war. I suspect they only released me because they needed the space. Suddenly, I was back on the streets of Damascus again, wearing my summer clothes in the winter cold. The first thing I did was call my parents. When I got my mother on the phone, we both burst into tears. I couldn’t hear a word she said, she was crying so hard.

 When I got back to Aleppo, I spent a month helping displaced families, trying to find them housing and medical care. But even helping protesters was a crime. One night a colleague was arrested. That’s when I knew it was time to get out.



 In April 2012, I crossed the Turkish border and made my way to a city called Gaziantep, where I had relatives. I rented a small apartment and soon sent for my parents. Gaziantep is just 65 kilometres from the border, and Syrians were slowly making their way to the city. Every day we would see injured refugees coming across the border—confused families and children, soldiers who had defected, people who didn’t know the language. They were often alone, injured and terrified.

 I wasn’t an aid worker, but I had an education and connections. When Syrians crossed the border, they started calling me. Soon I was working in Turkish hospitals, connecting refugees with their families. After six months, an old friend called me from Jordan. He was working with a charity for Syrian refugees, and he asked me to run the office in Turkey.

 For the next few months, I sent ambulances to the border so they could bring people to hospitals. Although I was helping refugees, what I really wanted to do was provide relief for Syrians who were still trapped in my country. About a year into my aid work, the Syrian National Coalition asked me to establish a humanitarian medical office in Turkey. It would be my job to try to organize care for people in the parts of Syria controlled by rebels. It was an opportunity to put my training to good use and leave the politics to other people. I could never make sense of politics. With humanitarian work, at least there’s logic. There is always a clear objective: you simply do your best to help people.

 Along with a colleague, I developed an early warning system to catch possible disease outbreaks. In 2013, we saw our first cases of polio in eastern Syria. At that point, the disease existed only in parts of Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan. We reported the case to the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control. They wanted to start a mass vaccination, but in that part of Syria there was no single group that could organize such a massive operation. So we did it ourselves.

 We put together 8,500 volunteers in just under three weeks. We planned all the logistics, determined to show the WHO that we could handle the job. The vaccine needed to be refrigerated at all times, so we had to figure out how to get refrigerated trucks out to rural towns. We needed to go village to village, house to house, in areas that were being barrel bombed.

 Once we showed the WHO our plan, they agreed to give us the polio vaccine. In Turkey, the government helped us distribute the inoculations, but we had to smuggle the vaccine across the front lines to reach certain parts of Syria. That first week, I was in Gaziantep, getting daily updates from the people in the field. In Aleppo, a volunteer had just finished vaccinating the children in an apartment block when the entire building was destroyed by a barrel bomb, killing him. One of my friends, a doctor managing the regional vaccinations at a health centre, was killed by an air strike. The losses were heartbreaking, but our mission was a success: in eight days we managed to vaccinate 1.2 million kids under five.

 At the beginning, no one would fund us. I had to convince my boss to use $1 million earmarked for food on the project. A month later we did another round, and donors started to take notice. By the fourth round, we had full funding from the Gates Foundation.

 Our work was all-consuming. Everyone would go home to sleep for a few hours before coming back to the office. We took on more ambitious projects—testing water in northern Syria, training doctors and nurses. When Assad began deploying chemical weapons, I went across the border myself to collect samples so we could prove that he was using Sarin. In 2014, I met two humanitarian doctors, Jay Dahman and Mark Cameron, who had come to Turkey to train Syrian nurses and doctors. I convinced them that we could be much more effective if, instead of bringing a handful of Syrians to Turkey, we crossed the border and trained people there. Eventually, the three of us formed our own NGO, the Canadian International Medical Relief Organization.



 For years, all I did was work. I barely had time to eat or sleep; I definitely didn’t have time to date. But in 2014, an old high school friend and colleague introduced me to his wife’s cousin, a 24-year-old medical student named Jehan Mouhsen. She was born in Montenegro and escaped to Aleppo as a child during the Balkan War. When the fighting started in Aleppo, she fled back to Montenegro. At first, the three of us chatted on Facebook. Soon, Jehan and I were privately messaging and chatting on Skype. Slowly, we got to know one another. Jehan was beautiful. She was serious when she needed to be serious, but she could also be incredibly funny. I hadn’t realized it, but for three years, an essential part of me had been frozen. Jehan made me feel human again. She made me feel like myself. Meeting her was a beautiful gift.

 In late 2014, I went to Geneva for work. On my way home, I visited Jehan in Montenegro for a week—a tiny, precious window of time to get to know one another before we were thrown back into our chaotic lives. That week, we walked along the shore, bundling up against the winter cold. We ate in restaurants overlooking the Adriatic Sea. I met her family, and we shared stories from Aleppo. Mostly we just talked—for hours and hours, about the mundane details of life, about our plans for the future, as if we were just two regular people getting to know one another, not two people stuck in a civil war. By the time I left, I knew she was the woman I wanted to spend my life with. When I returned to Turkey, we kept talking, and I visited her when I could. On one of those trips, in February 2015, I asked her to marry me, and she said yes. We decided to have the wedding a year later, when she had finished medical school.

 In Turkey, my NGO was taking on more demanding projects. All this time I had been doing public health work, but I had no real training for any of it, no credentials. Even when projects succeeded, a small part of me believed that it was all just a matter of luck and sheer will. In 2016, I applied for a master’s in public health at Brown University in Rhode Island. It was a fantastic opportunity to better myself and improve my work in Syria. During my interview over Skype, I explained the fieldwork I had been doing to the dean. When they offered me a full scholarship, I was overjoyed.



 The next few months were busy. My mother needed heart surgery, so my parents made their way to Germany, taking a boat to Greece and then travelling by land along with thousands of other Syrian refugees. Jehan and I followed them there that summer. Our wedding was set for July 9 in Stuttgart. We didn’t have time for elaborate planning. I spent the entire day before the wedding doing the decorations myself, draping white cloth around the hall and filling the place with flowers and balloons.

 The ceremony was beautiful. Both of our families were there. Most moving of all was the fact that some of my old friends were able to attend, people who had ended up in Germany as refugees. They were doctors who had been with me at the beginning, treating protesters in makeshift hospitals and suffering alongside me in prison. After we’d all experienced so many difficult days together, it seemed like a miracle to see them on my happiest day.

 A month after the wedding, Jehan and I got our visas. We arrived in New York City on August 15. For five days, we did all the touristy stuff—seeing the Statue of Liberty and Times Square, visiting the Met and Central Park. Then we moved to Providence, where I began my master’s. The university gave us housing in College Hill, a quiet and welcoming neighbourhood. It seemed like the perfect place to settle down, concentrate on our studies and begin our lives together.



 The fall semester was exhausting. Every morning, I would wake up at 6 a.m. for a conference with my NGO staff in Turkey (they were seven hours ahead). Then I’d work 14 hours straight on my studies. Jehan was shadowing doctors at the university, studying for the tests that would let her practise medicine in the States. It was a crazy time, but we were happy. We made friends in our classes. The courses were fascinating, and I finished my first semester with strong grades. In December, we got the best news imaginable: Jehan was pregnant.

 When the fall semester ended, I decided to go back to Turkey for a short trip. I had a week of meetings with my team and the UN, and I wanted to renew my residency permit. Jehan and I were both nervous about me leaving the country. Trump hadn’t yet been inaugurated, but we knew what he’d promised. Some of my friends—Syrian doctors who had been in the U.S. for years—said they weren’t going to risk leaving the country until they got their green cards. For me, that wasn’t an option. My work helping Syrians is the most important thing in my life. I couldn’t live with myself if I abandoned my team and my people just because I was afraid I might not get back into America.



 On New Year’s Day, Jehan drove me to JFK airport to say goodbye. She was anxious, but I told her not to worry. I would be home by January 8; Trump’s inauguration wasn’t until the 20th. After my week in Turkey, I went to the airport in Gaziantep to fly home. At the desk, they told me there had been a snowstorm in Istanbul and my connecting flight had been cancelled. They also said that something was wrong with my visa, telling me to check with the American embassy. I had no idea what they meant. I called a few Americans I knew in Turkey. They were confused, too. A few days later, after the snowstorm was over, I went back to the airport. This time, their message was clear. “My friend, you have a problem,” they told me. “And the problem is with the Americans. Your visa has been revoked.”

 I was shocked. I didn’t realize it then, but that month, before Trump’s inauguration, at least 40 visiting students had had their visas revoked when they left the United States. Many of them were from the Middle East. Maybe immigration officials were just being extra cautious. Maybe someone at the airport was flagging Syrians for travelling to Turkey. We still don’t know. On January 18, I got a call from the American Consulate in Istanbul telling me that Jehan’s visa had also been revoked. They didn’t give me a reason but asked me to reapply immediately. Two days later, I had a meeting with the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul.

 The officers interviewed me for less than five minutes. It was clear that they were just going through the motions. They had no suspicions, no concerns, no new questions. They knew I had already completed a thorough process to get my visa. And anyone who checked could see I was doing humanitarian work. I left the consulate hopeful that they would just correct the mistake and I would be able to go home in a couple of weeks. Then, on January 27, Trump announced his travel ban. My application was frozen.

 When I read the news, I wasn’t angry. Jehan and I have been through a lot. If we lost it whenever we got a piece of bad news, we would be dead by now. I phoned her that day, and we talked through our situation calmly and logically. I didn’t think the travel ban would make it through the courts. High-level administrators at Brown were bringing in powerful advocates to help get me back. Even a Rhode Island senator was pleading my case. “Everything will be okay,” I told Jehan. “I’m sure I’ll be home in a couple of weeks.”

 When the new semester started, I tried to continue my studies, watching lectures online and borrowing my classmates’ notes. In the end, I couldn’t keep up. Living in a hotel, I followed the protests that were taking over American airports. I was filled with hope as I watched Americans defending the rights of people like me. After two weeks, I rented a small apartment in Gaziantep and prepared to wait. Separated from my wife and my studies, I threw myself into my NGO, spending the days working on whatever I could. We were in the middle of building the Avicenna women’s and children’s hospital, a massive underground complex in northwest Syria that would be safe from the government’s air strikes. I spent my days fundraising and talking with engineers, figuring out logistics.



 In early February, when the courts blocked Trump’s travel ban, I spoke with my lawyers again. They told me there was a chance my visa would be accepted, but even if I was allowed back into the United States, there was no way I could keep visiting the Middle East. Because Jehan’s visa had also been revoked, she would need to leave the country and reapply as well. Who knew if she’d be accepted? The situation seemed hopeless. Jehan and I talked about having her join me in Turkey, but that would have meant starting again from scratch. All of our things were in America. We wanted to advance. The idea of leaving those opportunities behind was heartbreaking.

 When U of T offered me a scholarship, I accepted, and we applied for student visas in Canada. In June, my Canadian partners and I received the Meritorious Service Medal from the Governor General for our humanitarian work. A few days later, Jehan and I got our Canadian visas approved.

 In Toronto, the notion that everyone should be accepted and respected, regardless of their nationality or background, is something that’s practised on a daily basis. I saw it on my first day. In the airport, I looked around and saw people with different faces, different skin tones, different ethnicities, but the same spirit. To see a stable, established country like Canada using diversity to make itself richer and stronger has inspired me. This was what we were fighting for in Syria in 2011. That’s what I want for the future of my country. That’s the spirit I hope to bring to Syria when I return one day.

 For Jehan and me, the long-term plan remains the same: we want to learn everything we can before returning to rebuild the health care system of Syria. But first we’re going to start our family. Jehan is due to deliver at the end of August, and our apartment is full of baby things. Friends in Turkey and Canada held baby showers for us and sent boxes over. There’s a stroller and toys from friends from Providence. There are all of the baby clothes I bought while I was walking around in Turkey, separated from my wife. A few years ago, I never would have imagined having a child in Canada. Now I’m honoured by the fact that my daughter will be a Canadian. Hopefully she can take that with her for the rest of her life.'

Wednesday, 16 August 2017

Saudi Arabia's ultimate betrayal of the Syrian revolution



 Sam Charles Hamad:

 'It’s something of an understatement to say Syria is a ‘multifaceted’ war – often discerning the dynamics of different microeconomic and macroeconomic struggles is half the battle. But as counter-revolution sweeps across the land, the ‘geopolitical’ shifts that will affect the lives of all Syrians continue to change.

 The most prominent of these happenings has not just been the abandonment of the anti-Assad rebels by their self-declared allies, a process which began years ago, but rather a battle over the narrative of who was to blame for the catastrophe that has engulfed the Syrian revolution.

 There’s something much bigger at stake than the fate of mere Syrians in the mind of these actors: an attempt to curtail and ideologically condition the trajectory of the Arab spring.

 One could roughly split the sides in this struggle into two main blocs, though there are nuances and areas of disagreement between the two, namely the Saudi Arabia-UAE-US bloc and the Qatar-Turkish bloc. In many ways, this is an old struggle made new – one must never forget the divide that defined the calamity of the original attempts to set up coherent opposition.



 To cut multiple long stories short, Saudi Arabia refused to arm rebel forces or back opposition outfits connected to the Muslim Brotherhood or any force that wasn’t sufficiently supportive of Saudi interests, while Qatar and Turkey had a more open approach to arming and aiding groups. This is essentially the main dynamic of the divide – Saudi Arabia and the UAE are determined to ensure that democratic Islamist forces, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are not allowed to triumph, not just in Syria but across the region.

 The contours of this clash are hardly difficult to discern. We’ve seen the Saudi and UAE-led ‘siege’ on Qatar. We’ve seen Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s own counter-revolutionary rampage across the region, most notably their support in Egypt for Abdel Fattah El Sisi’s brutal counter-revolution against the democratically elected Mohamed Morsi, of the Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party. In addition to this, the UAE, and to a lesser but not insignificant degree, Saudi Arabia, have ploughed their resources into backing the hugely destructive anti-Muslim Brotherhood crusade of Khalifa Haftar in Libya.

 This was the spirit that lurked behind a recent op-ed in the UAE newspaper The National, which sought to pin the blame firmly on Turkey for the current plight of the Syrian rebels. The article somewhat briefly and irresolutely mentions that Saudi Arabia has allegedly called for the Syrian opposition, or its chief negotiating body the High Negotiations Committee (HNC), to accept the rule of Bashar al-Assad as a precondition for any negotiations with Assad and his allies.

 The author also attempts to casually exonerate Riyadh for what has been a clear shift in its policy towards the Syrian rebels since the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House, claiming that it ‘considered lifting pressure from the regime in Damascus as a way to reduce its need for Iran’, before going on to say that Turkey’s alleged policy shift has been ‘most damaging’.



 Saudi Arabia and the UAE love nothing more than to justify everything they do by conjuring up the spectre of Iran, but there is absolutely no doubt that the rationale behind Saudi’s veritable abandonment of the Syrian rebels has everything to do with it falling behind Trump’s policy towards the Syrian revolution, as well as it being congruent with their specific stance against liberty in the region. Riyadh went out of its way to accommodate Trump, and while one calculation might be Trump’s rhetorically hawkish stance against Iranian expansionism, the reality is that the policy casually dismissed by the author above has been far more destructive than anything Turkey has done.

 The policy that the author claims is a way to force Assad to reduce his reliance on Iran has meant, in concrete terms, the announcement of the end of the, to quote Trump himself, ‘dangerous and wasteful’ not-so-secret CIA arms and funding programme for anti-Assad rebels. One must understand that though this programme was never even remotely adequate or even geared towards allowing rebel forces to overthrow Assad (though it did wield successes), the main function of the CIA in it was to ‘vet’ rebel brigades and ensure that weapons got over the border with Jordan – the weapons themselves were provided by Saudi Arabia.

 In other words, one of the last lifelines to the rebels, no matter how paltry, was cut off to some rebels and, far from it being a US decision alone, it was very much a joint decision by Saudi and the US. However, it was just a public confirmation of what has been a reality in Syria for two years – Saudi aid to rebels dried up.



 As per the anti-Brotherhood agenda of Saudi when it came to arming rebels, this briefly changed in 2015, following the death of King Abdullah and the assumption of the throne by Salman. Salman decided that Abdullah’s policy towards groups like the Muslim Brotherhood had been too harsh, which saw the Army of Conquest, which was led by the anti-Saudi moderate Islamist force Ahrar al-Sham, as well as groups like the MB-affiliated democratic Islamist force Sham Legion, receive Saudi-sourced TOW anti-tank missiles.

 This was in June 2015, but, after Russia intervened decisively on behalf of Assad and the US turned towards focussing solely on fight against the Islamic State group (IS), the aid to the anti-Assad rebels dried up and the momentum gained by this influx of weaponry was stalled and reversed. It was at this moment that Iranian-led pro-regime forces, buoyed by the Russian air force, began to solidify their semi-occupation of Syria.

 The author of course mentions none of this. Instead, he ironically blames Turkey for shifting its focus away from anti-Assad rebels to ‘focussing on disrupting Kurdish expansion’, adding that Turkey ‘has since worked closely with Iran and Russia … politically … and ‘militarily on the ground’.

 There’s little doubt that Turkey’s general anti-Kurdish separatist agenda fuels its current policy in Northern Syria (and liberty in Syria’s revolution ought to have no ethnic or sectarian limits), but Turkey isn’t trying to take Rojava proper – it is aiding rebels to take back villages and towns near the Turkish border that have been occupied by IS, or which the YPG grabbed under the cover of deadly Russian airstrikes.

 The YPG have imposed their rule on these areas and, in places that are not needed to cement their one-party state, have occupied the cities or handed-back control to the Assad regime. Moreover, as was the case in Aleppo and Manbij, we’ve seen the YPG directly aid the Iranian-led militias that the author accuses Turkey of working with.



 Unlike the YPG, the rebel forces that fight with Turkey remain committed to fighting Assad and refugees are able to be resettled – this and ensuring genuine ceasefires is the main calculation behind Turkey’s role in the Astana process, which contrary to the author’s sentiments, Turkey has never said was an alternative to Geneva.

 But while the author wants to paint a picture of Turkey ‘collaborating’ with Assad, Russia and Iran, and while it’s certainly true that Turkey has good relations with both, its role in Syria, while flawed, is nowhere near as destructive as the current US or Saudi policy. Look, for example, at the Saudi/US-backed Southern Front of the Free Syrian Army, which has been transformed from one of the most efficient anti-Assad coalitions to a mere shell that would, under pain of losing its funding and backing, look the other way as Iranian-led pro-Assad forces murdering Syrians to fight only IS.

 The author also tries to put the blame of the current triumph of the fascist counter-revolutionaries of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS – al-Qaeda’s franchise in Syria) in Idlib, claiming that ‘Turkey also stood idly by as HTS weakened and fragmented Ahrar Al Sham … and forced it to give up control of a border crossing.’. It’s perfectly true that Turkey hasn’t done enough to support rebel forces in Idlib an that its policy has been conditioned by US pressure to focus solely on IS, but these are the same rebels that Saudi Arabia and the US have now officially abandoned.

 The author also misses the fact that Turkey sent rebel forces it funds into Idlib to bolster moderate forces against HTS, as well as providing medical services to injured rebels.



 Turkey, as with all other states, will ultimately put its own interests first. But this does not mean that the interests of all states are as equally cynical when it comes to Syria. Turkey did its very best to get the US to implement a no-fly zone over areas of Syria being hit by Assad, while the US wouldn’t even entertain it.

 Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE use their powerful airforces only to commit hugely destructive war crimes in Yemen, a situation they created due to their fear of the MB-affiliated Al-Islah gaining power in a post-Saleh democracy.

 Syrians have always been let down by their allies, but with the US, Saudi and UAE allegedly on their side, they don’t need enemies.'