Anti-Assad Slogans Reappear on Walls of Dara’a Schools

 'Dara’a is once again regaining its leading role in opposing the Assad regime as it did during the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011. Anti-regime slogans have recently reappeared on walls of the Basic Education School in the village of Karak in eastern rural Dara’a.
 Local activists said that the slogans reaffirmed that the Syrian revolution will continue until the overthrow of the regime.

 Activists pointed out that the graffiti are being scrawled at night by a group calling themselves "The Popular Resistance.” The Assad regime’s security services are erasing the graffiti in the morning for fear of becoming a new norm.

 Similar graffiti begun to appear on the walls in the town of Al-Muzayrib in rural Dara’a. The slogans are reminiscent of the early days of the revolution when anti-regime slogans become ubiquitous on the walls of schools in the province, such as “it’s your turn now Doctor,” and "the people want to overthrow the regime" and "we prefer death to humiliation.”

 In 2011, the Assad regime’s security forces detained schoolchildren who were accused of scrawling anti-regime graffiti on the walls of a school in Dara’a city. The kids were tortured and their nails were removed, sparking peaceful mass demonstrations calling for the overthrow of the Assad regime. The incident was the spark that led to the revolution for freedom and dignity.

Raed Fares: Kfar Nabl rebel writing his last signs with blood

 'Seven years have elapsed since the beginning of the Syrian revolution. During this period of time, the peaceful activist Raed Fares did not stop protesting and demonstrating against the Syrian regime. He wrote the signs that he held during these demonstrations and organized the peaceful movement for which his city in rural Idlib, Kafr Nabl, has become well-known. Despite the threats he was exposed to, in these recent years, he insisted on staying in Syria, calling to overthrow the regime, and to reject the authority of the militant groups.

 Fares was assassinated along with his fellow activist Hammod Junaid by hooded men in the center of Kafr Nabl, and the news of his “martyrdom” became a grim day in Idlib. The way he was linked to the Syrian revolution and his impact throughout the years he spent fighting for peaceful activity give the impression that the revolution ended with the news of his assassination, especially with the attention that was drawn to Idlib recently and the attempts to portray it as a black spot away from any peaceful civilian movement.

 Born in 1972, he was known as the “famous sign designer” in Kafr Nabl. He was one of the prominent activists who committed themselves to taking part in demonstrations against the Syrian regime since the first day of the revolution until today.


 Fares was the director of the local radio station “Fresh,” which criticizes militant groups, including the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. He was chosen as information officer for Kafr Nabl signs, and also the director of the Union of Revolutionary Bureaus (URB).

 On the other hand, Junaid works as a photographer and has documented the events of the revolution and bombing over the past years.

 Fares studied at the Faculty of Medicine in Aleppo. He started in 1990 and left after three years for personal reasons. He later moved between Lebanon and Syria, and occupied himself with several things, including trade and handling transactions.

 Raed’s name stood out in March 2011, when he was active with his fellow, lawyer Yasser al-Saleem. Speaking of the spark that ignited the signs of Kafr Nabl, Raed said during an interview with Enab Baladi in July 2012 that the spark of revolutionary movement and the propaganda lies of Addounia TV channel (pro-regime) were both the main reasons behind the emergence of the idea of signs.

 Originally from Kafr Nabl, Raed refused several international offers to leave Syria. Despite being threatened with assassination, he insisted on staying in Idlib. An assassination attempt by unknown people who shot him in 2014 put his life at risk. Back then, he was taken to the hospital and underwent a sensitive chest surgery.

 The assassination attempt coincided with threats from al-Nusra Front, which repeatedly raided the headquarters of Fresh radio station where he worked in the early years of the Syrian revolution.Al-Nusra Front, which has been merged into Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, has arrested Fares twice, first in 2014 with the photographer Hammod Junaid at a checkpoint in Maarat al-Nu’man, and the second time when he was with activist Hadi al-Abdullah in 2016 while they were at the radio station in Kafr Nabl.

 During a previous interview with Enab Baladi, Fares said that “the pressure exercised by al-Nusra front was overwhelming. Therefore we had to stop.” He also clarified that the girls working in Fresh radio station and the music played during programs were excuses for al-Nusra to shut the radio station down.

 Together with dozens of activists in Kafr Nabl, Fares was able to make it one of the most important cities interested in the affairs of the revolution and distinguished by its civil activity that was characterized by paintings and signs. These have caught the attention and were displayed in the most famous exhibitions, for they reflected a peaceful state aiming to express the Syrians’ point of view.

 He was “modest” and always caught on camera during demonstrations in Idlib, along with his comrades. Some of them were martyred, such as photographer Khalid al-Issa, while others were arrested. The most notable figure was lawyer Yasser al-Saleem, who was arrested by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham when he was at home in Kafr Nabl in September 2018.

 Since the arrest of al-Saleem, Fares has been calling for his release from the prisons of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. In early 2018, he posted on Facebook: “keep going with this hatred and continue igniting the strife, but I warn you that Kafr Nabl (…) is patient but when furious it will defend its children like a lioness and a roaring fire.”

 Fares also stated that his friend al-Saleem was arrested while he was home because he spoke up and expressed his opinion. He is neither a criminal nor a murderer, but was arrested only because he expressed himself.

 During an interview with “al-Ghad al-Arabi” in 2014, in the US, Fares sported the shirt he came wearing from Kafr Nabl, saying that he represents the people. He talked about the media work in the north of Syria, and that “media professionals, activists and journalists have become a target assuming the responsibility of protecting the Syrian revolution.”

 Fares also declared that fulfilling achievements during revolution needs “sacrifices.” He pointed out that “the revolution destroyed al-Assad’s farm, but the homeland will be left for the Syrians to live in.”

Syria's Druze reject Assad's call to serve

 

 'Nearly eight years into the Syrian war, Selim still refuses to perform his military service, just like many fellow Druze from Sweida province rejecting the régime's conscription call.

 "I don't want to get involved in the Syrian bloodbath," said the 27-year-old, who gave a pseudonym for fear of reprisals.


 The Sweida region south of Damascus is the Syrian heartland of the country's Druze minority which follows a secretive offshoot of Islam.After the anti-government protests that sparked Syria's war in 2011, the Druze obtained a de facto exemption from military service in exchange for their tacit support of the régime.

 Last week however, Bashar al-Assad urged the minority, which accounted for around three percent of Syria's pre-war population, to send its young men to the army.

 After rotating out some very long-serving conscripts, the régime is looking for fresh blood to beef up its ranks and exercise real control over the swathes of land it reconquered from the opposition.


 Assad's appeal came after the government helped release, earlier this month, a large group of Druze civilians who had been taken hostage by ISIS in Sweida.

 His call appeared to terminate a deal whereby the Druze were allowed to organise their own militia rather than serve in the army, but its implementation could prove tricky.


 "I don't want to have to kill the people of Hama, the people of Homs or any other province, for the sake of keeping one man in power," Selim said by phone from Sweida.

 "The army is your grave," said the young man, explaining that the lack of a time limit on conscription during war means recruits will not be able to know when they can return home.

 To be on the safe side, Selim never leaves Sweida, a province in southern Syria that borders Jordan and where the Syrian security services have a limited presence.

 Young Druze men have in recent years enlisted in local militia to protect their region from jihadists and the régime's interests.

In July, Selim was among hundreds of other residents who took up arms to pin back ISIS after a series of attacks that left at least 260 people dead.

 During the assault, the deadliest to have hit the Druze community since the start of the war, the jihadists kidnapped about 30 people, mainly women and children.

 The last of the surviving hostages were released on November 8, leading to Assad's demand that the Druze contribute to the national war effort.

 "The régime is trying to tell us: it's Daesh or the military service," said Selim, using a acronym for the Islamic State group.


 Khattar Abu Diab, a Paris-based professor of political science and a specialist in Druze affairs, said Assad was attempting to intimidate the minority.

 "He wants to use the residents of Sweida as cannon fodder for future battles," he said.


 Sweida was mostly spared by the deadly Syrian conflict.

 Residents on several occasions in 2014 besieged detention centres to obtain the release of men who had been rounded up to join the army.

 At the time the central government was at its weakest, stretched very thin on many fronts and had humoured the Druze not to risk opening up another.

 That level of autonomy now comes at a cost for Sweida, where security is all but guaranteed by the presence of the Syrian police.

 Some residents see a deliberate government effort to maintain a level of chaos in the province.

 "The régime uses other means to punish Sweida: the Islamic State instead of barrel bombs, crime and disorder instead of arrests," activist Hamam al-Khatib said.

 Around 30,000 Druze men are liable for military service.


 ISIS fighters who had been holding out in the volcanic area of Tulul al-Safa, between Damascus and Sweida, finally retreated last week after heavy régime bombardment and a government-negotiated deal.

 Regardless of the agreements being cut in Damascus and by their leaders, Druze youngsters willing to serve in the national army are hard to come by.

 "The war just keeps going on ... we are not killing machines," said Uday al-Khatib, a 25-year-old Sweida resident. "Yes, the Sweida youth don't do military service, I'm one of them, but we are the ones who pushed back ISIS and the army didn't help us." '

‘We Do Not Ask. We Act’: A Syrian Women Activist Tells It Like It Is

 'When the Syrian Revolution started, I couldn’t look anywhere else. And I saw that there were very few women at the forefront or being seen. So a few of my friends and I started talking about how to get more women included in the talks that were happening. This was back in 2011, even before the armed groups had changed the nature of the conflict.

 When the Syrian National Coalition was established, they actually came to me and said that they wanted more women in. And I agreed to join them, with the understanding that I would work on the inclusion of women in the peace process and in all talks about Syria. I thought it would be an easy job, but it’s proven to be very difficult. It’s not just a Syrian issue; it’s a global issue that women are not present at the tables and aren’t part of the political scene. Because of that, I became part of a group of women that wanted to do something different. We started the Syrian Women’s Political Movement last year. It’s a movement that addresses all the issues the general opposition is not addressing: inclusion of women, women’s rights and a feminist foreign policy perspective.


 Being included in bodies that already exist has proven to be very difficult. You’ve got a woman here and a woman there, but we’re not systematically included. For the last six years, we have tried different ways of how to be included. One way was to form our own advisory group within the opposition, following the model the UN created with the Women’s Advisory Board to Staffan de Mistura, the UN special envoy on Syria at the time. But in practice we found that this further marginalized women because they may be consulted, but they’re not sitting at the table. They’re actually not even in the room. They’re only involved in ways men define.

 And as much as I respect the Syrian Negotiation Commission, within it, the military forces were positioned to have the loudest voice. It became very apparent that we, as Syrian women, needed to come together in one front — because the whole of us together is so much stronger and influential than the sum of our parts working separately.

 We are going to get pushback, of course. Let’s say I’m sitting comfortably in a chair. It’s not human nature that I stand up and let someone else sit down. You go in the New York City subway and you see it. There could be a pregnant woman looking for a seat, and most of the time nobody stands up for her. No one’s going to give you their seat. You have to talk to them, and say: “Hey, maybe we can share the seat. Maybe I can take the leading seat here, and you can watch a little bit from the side.”

There are different tactics that we can use. But it is a fact about the world that it’s difficult for somebody with privileges to give up those privileges. So, we do not ask. We act.


I need to be honest that at the beginning I thought maybe it was a good thing for women to have a formal advisory role. But it was done, as the UN has done so often in the past — as much as I respect that institution — with the view that women are one single entity who can sit at the same table with different political opinions, and should come up with wonderful solutions by finding the common denominator. But mostly, this was a mistake because it made women just advisers.

We created a different kind of advisory committee for the opposition, which I was a part of. In hindsight, however, that committee also became a systematic way to marginalize women. So, we dissolved that committee, and now with the Syrian Women’s Political Movement, we work to include more women in the negotiation committees that already exist.


It’s not about land. The media talks about what the régime has, and what the opposition has, who are the allies to the régime, and who are the allies to the opposition; they focus on this dichotomy. But they leave out the civilians, who started the revolution and continue to be engaged on the ground.

When Syrians came out to the streets, we had zero land. The conflict originally started with people resisting a régime that imprisoned, tortured and detained with impunity, and had an emergency law in effect. We had zero land, and zero support from the international community. People still came out. Syrian people felt that they actually deserved to be free.

Civil society groups are still working very actively on the ground. We’re still in the same place, that we want to create democracy, freedom, dignity for all Syrian people, not have a dictator that is just killing and detaining and executing with impunity.


 Syria is destroyed. It’s been destroyed at the hands of the régime and its allies. Because nobody else has the kinds of air power that the régime and Russia have, or the kind of ground power that the régime and the Iranians have. The destruction has affected the Syrian population en masse. There are over three million children that are in school age that are not going to school.

 And Syrian refugees have left a situation on the ground that was not conducive to their livelihood. They could not survive. That has not changed. How are they going to come back to a place where there are no guarantees they won’t be arrested, detained, tortured, or killed?

 One of the very striking statistics that I keep talking about, is that a 17-year-old teenage girl in Syria is more likely to be raped, tortured or detained than to graduate high school.

 A lot of talk is happening about reconstruction — this is what Russians and Iranians are actually trying to push for. But the international community is saying that no reconstruction money should be sent unless there is some kind of transition. How could you give money to a régime, to a government, that has actually destroyed Syria? You’re going to give them money, to rebuild and then destroy again? The reconstruction money has to come in through different means, in order to actually benefit the people.


 When the Syrian revolution started, there were about 700 civil society groups registered in the country. And they were under the auspices of the government. But since the revolution started, over 2,500 organizations have sprung up in Syria and in the surrounding region. When I talk to people on the inside, and organizations on the ground, I get inspired by their resilience, by the ideas they have, by the work that they are doing. Because most people want the same things: respect of human life and human dignity, respect for children, respect for the elderly, respect for education, respect for health care and respect for what makes a better country.

 This has given momentum for Syrian people to make decisions for themselves. Yes, we are coming together as women, but we are coming together because we want a solution for our country. We want to find a way to protect our citizens, our people and create a space that respects everybody equally under the law, where everybody has equal citizenship.'

Interview with Captain Abu Salim, Jaysh al-Izza's spokesperson

 Abu Salim, Jaish al-Izza's spokesperson:

 "It seems there is a problem between some of the guarantor countries such as Iran and Russia concerning the Sochi agreement. Of course the treachery of the régime, Iranian militias and Hezbollah is nothing new. They attacked a position belonging to Jaish al-Izza under the cover of Russian drones. The aerial cover lasted almost 24 hours. They used modern nightvision and thermal weapons to attack a point belonging to Jaish al-Izza. After a few martyrdoms in our ranks, we were able to retake our position. 

 Regarding Jaish al-Izza, neither Sochi or any other agreement stopped the bombs falling on us. Starting from the Russian invasion and until now, we get bombed by artillery, rockets and airstrikes on a daily basis. The response was an assault on a régime checkpoint known as al-Tarabee. There are more responses coming, the bullets are still in our hands. We will teach them a lesson they will never forget.

 The reality is noone has details about HTS' own response except themselves.

I think there is some disagreement between some guarantor countries of Sochi like Russia and Iran. It looks like Iran is trying to make this plan fail and wants the resumption of war after it was paused for a bit. It seems like it is trying to remind everyone it is still there after sanctions were imposed on it by the USA. It appears it is trying to achieve something, working secretly or openly to make this agreement fail. In my opinion, if it continues like this, the agreement will be dead in the water. 

Death is better than losing sanity in prison - woman jailed in Assad's prisons

 "My name is Sarah al-Abdullah. I am a 29 year old computer and control engineer. My husband was killed three years ago. I only have one daughter, she is three.

 On August 19th, 2017, my home in Mazzeh was raided and I was detained by the General Intelligence. I was first held in Branch 40, and then I was transferred to al-Khatib or Branch 251. After that, I was transferred to the Central State Security Branch, and then to Adra prison pending trial at the counterterrorism court which eventually ordered my release.

 However, the Air Force Intelligence Directorate refused to release me. Theoretically, and on paper, I was released. But in reality, as was the case with many other detainees, my situation was presumed to have been resolved by the Civil Court, but instead I was handcuffed, blindfolded and transferred to the Air Force Intelligence Branch. In total I was detained for one year and four months, or 1 year, 3 months and 20 days to be more specific. 

 Interrogation techniques varied from one branch to another. In al-Khatib branch, they prey on detainees' morale or psychological makeup. Interrogation techniques vary from one detainee to another. They also inflict neurological pain. Prior to being tortured, the guard would place me in a position where my nerves are tight, and deliberately beat me on the parts that have clusters of nerve endings, to ensure a rapid nervous breakdown. 

 Torture has left me with a chronic knee injury. Other women developed mental problems. It varies from one to another. Cells in the Air Force Intelligence Branch are 1m². They are also dark.

 Water drop sound torture is one of the most brutal torture techniques. It had the biggest impact on me personally. For a prolonged period of time, one is made to listen to dripping water in a consistent pattern. But then it suddenly shifts to an inconsistent pattern which puts you on alert. Until today, I scream whenever I hear an unexpected noise as if I am still in prison.


 At first, I thought my husband was the reason for my detention. But later, during the interrogation, I found out the reason for my detention was my work in delivering relief assistance to besieged people, along with my media activity in documenting the violations of the 'non-Syrian' army or the Assadist army, including the shelling, torture and destruction.

 Many detained women lost their sanity. One inmate was beaten to death. She was a mother. They took her son away from her. Her cries went unheard. She didn't fear their beating. So, despite the fact that they knew of her heart condition, they kept torturing her until one day she died in our arms. I think that those who died have found some relief. Losing your sanity is harder.


 There was another detainee from Daraya. The interrogator used to apply pressure on her through her son, despite the fact that her son was living in the liberated areas. In order to make her confess, the interrogator repeatedly led her to believe that they detained her son and he confessed. They used the same technique in four or five interrogation sessions. Until one night, we were confused when she started screaming and banging on the door. Meanwhile, we could hear a young man clearly being tortured. At that point, we didn't really know the reason she was screaming, but later we realised that she believed the man who was being tortured was her son. The interrogator's threats misled her to imagine hearing and seeing her son.

 For three days, whenever the guard opened the door, to take her or someone else for interrogation, she would rush to the guard and ask him for the 'document'. 'What document, calm down,' we said. She said, 'I want them to give me a certificate to be able to bury my son. My son was killed four days ago. I need to bury him.' She started suffering from numerous nervous breakdowns, until one day, the major at the prison was tired of hearing her cries. So they took her out, and brought her back five minutes later. Her face was numb, and she was unable to speak clearly. Apparently she was given something. For the following 72 hours, she didn't eat or say anything. She was unable to speak. Instead she used signs to communicate with us.

 Less than 15 days later, she lost her sanity. You wouldn't believe she was the same person she was 90 days before. She was well educated and knowledgeable. She would charm you with her words, her way of thinking and her maturity, how she and her son were seeking and fighting to eliminate injustice. But if you met her after those 20 days, you would think that she was born this way.

 I can't get her memory out of my head. I keep thinking that I too could have lost my sanity. She is just one example of numerous women who collapsed. I can't imagine what is waiting for them, or where they will end up. That said, sometimes I think death is less painful. But unfortunately, death has become a blessing we don't have. Every night, detainees pray that they don't wake up in the morning. Particularly, when they know they will be taken to interrogation, they hope they cease to exist. They would pray to God to acknowledge the good they have done in their lives and not to wake them up in the morning. And yet, we can't even die.

 Here I am, after eighteen months in the liberated areas. Many others, however, are still inside. Many young women and men, old women and men, mothers and children. What hurt me the most while in detention was to hear a child crying, or yelling because they needed to use the bathroom, or because they were hungry. The Air Force Intelligence Branch is packed with children, five year olds and even babies under twelve months. There was one kid who was four. Imagine, a four year old detainee. He has been there for two years with his mother.

 It's difficult. There are no words to describe it. You can only feel it."

Thousands rally against Assad in northern Syria

 'Despite a fragile buffer zone deal and mounting skirmishes, thousands of people came out to the streets of rebel-held areas in Idlib and Aleppo provinces to rally against the Syria régime and its key ally Russia.

 Demonstrators held up the three-star flag of the Syrian revolution and placards recalling the first days of the Syrian revolution in 2011, saying their goal is the toppling of the Assad régime and stopping the Russian aggression.


 The de-militarized zone in Idlib province and parts of Hama was announced by rebel backer Ankara and Moscow in September to separate regime troops from rebel fighters in Idlib and adjacent areas.

 Under the deal, the rebels were supposed to have removed all heavy weapons from the buffer zone by Oct. 10 but skirmishes have continued to pit regime forces against militants and other insurgents on the ground.

 Rebel factions have said they withdrew their heavy weapons from the zone but Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an alliance led by Syria's former al-Qaeda branch and other hardline groups have refused to pull out their fighters.

 Russia has said rebels are trying to wreck the Russian-Turkish initiative and Damascus has said Turkey seems unwilling to implement it. But Turkey says the deal is going to plan.


 About 20 régime troops were killed and wounded Friday in a surprise attack targeted three checkpoints for regime army forces near the village of Forrow in the western countryside of Hama.

 Last week, Tahrir al-Sham killed at least eight régime troops in the north of Hama province.

 The deadly militant assault came hours after régime troops killed 23 fighters of a formerly U.S.-backed Jaish al-Izza group. The regime forces pushed into the stronghold of Jaish al-Izaa near the town of al-Latameh.

 In retaliation, rebels wounded 9 régime army troops in rocket attack on Joureen military camp, local activists said.

 Also in the northern countryside of Hama, several troops were killed and wounded by a landmine near the town of Bredeeg, local reports said Monday.


 Meanwhile, Tahrir al-Sham is on alert amid concerns of imminent offensive on northern Idlib province following violations for the Russian -brokered buffer zone agreement, sources said.

 All the formations and units of Tahrir al-Sham have been mobilizing units.

A statement issued by Tahrir al-Sham accused the régime forces of breaching the deal through unprecedented attacks on the northern countryside of Hama and Idlib province that left casualties, including 10 civilians.

 Idlib and some adjacent areas are the last major rebel bastion in Syria, where the Russian-backed régime has in recent months retaken much of the territory it had lost since the civil war erupted.

 It had threatened an assault on rebel territory around Idlib, which is home to some three million people, but the truce deal struck by Russia and Turkey averted it.'

Blinded in war, former Syrian fighter guides others with app

 'Years after losing his eyesight in battle, former Syrian rebel fighter Ahmad Talha hunches over his mobile phone in a bare classroom, listening to the robotic voice he helped translate.

 At a rare association for the blind in the northern province of Aleppo, Talha is helping a dozen others like him to better navigate their smartphones using a screen reader app.

 “My wish for all blind people is for them to have the best device, the best tools,” says 24-year-old Talha, whose eyes are permanently closed, a purple scar under his right eye.

 Heads lowered in concentration at the centre in the rebel-controlled town of Anjara, men of all ages and a teenager clutch their phones and listen for instructions.


 “Alright guys, everybody open up WhatsApp,” says instructor Mohammad Ramadan, dressed in a brown leather jacket, aviator sunglasses concealing his eyes.

 As the students scroll around to find the messaging service, the classroom erupts into a low cacophony of artificial voices guiding them across the invisible icons.

 The voices are male and female, some sped up to three times the normal pace.


 Talha says he found the screen reader application online in English, and translated it to Arabic with help from friends.

 The application tells the user what page they are looking at, what they can do with it, and reads out text it encounters.

 A student in computer sciences, Talha joined the fight against Bashar al-Assad’s régime in 2012.

 But two years later, a gunshot wound to the head saw him lose his eyesight.

 “I didn’t give up. I continued living,” says the young man with a short black beard.


 Talha married his first wife, then a second, and returned to his studies. And he recently became engaged to a third woman, who is also blind.

 “I still see a little light in my right eye,” he says, gazing out the window into the sunlight outside.

 “It’s all mostly dark, but with a little romance – like a lit candle in a large room,” says that father-of-three.

 At home, Talha helps his one-year-old daughter Aisha walk by holding her little arms, and crouches by his three-year-old son Hassan to talk him through opening up YouTube on his phone.

 Three months ago, his first wife gave birth to another daughter.

 “We’re not missing anything in life,” says his first wife Samia, her eyes made up beneath her black face veil.

 “Nothing stops him,” she says of her husband. “He may have lost his eyesight, but he has vision.”

 This year, Talha helped set up the area’s first association for the visually impaired, whose name in Arabic translates to “Seeing Hearts”.

 “It’s a home for the blind. We gather, get active, ask for our rights,” he says.


 Largely self-funded with a few donations, the centre stands in a one-floor stone building, its façade freshly painted.

 Around a dozen people arrive for the day’s lesson on foot, aided by friends, or on a dilapidated grey minibus.

 Director Ahmed Khalil says the new centre seeks to help those who have lost their eyesight in the seven-year war, including in air strikes.

 “The association aims to draw the blind out of their isolation,” he says, seated inside his office, wearing a brown jacket.

 Since October, eight volunteers have offered psychological support, as well as training to use mobile phones and the centre’s single computer, he says.

 But they also have more fun activities, says Talha, including chess and football – using a special ball with an inbuilt bell.'

Extracts from Nicolas Hénin's Jihad Academy, translated by Martin Makinson

 'The promotion of the idea of a Syrian régime that defends its Christians is carefully stage-managed. Any visit from an academic, MP, or lobbyist, with the potential to involve Syria's Christian groups, is always seized upon and exploited in news reports. Soon after the Ba'ath party came to power, its relationship with the Sunni majority turned sour. Very quickly, the régime targeted the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the only forces which could claim to constitute any sort of opposition. But it was the assumption of power by Hafez al-Assad in 1970, and the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1976, that lit the touch paper. Confrontation escalated: there were terrorist attacks and murders on one side, and arrests and torture on the other. Then, in 1979, a sectarian offshoot of the Brotherhood launched an attack against the Aleppo artillery academy. Eight-three cadets, all Alawis, were killed. The régime's revenge was ruthless. A full-scale civil war followed, which was little known in the West since no media were able to cover it. It ended with the crushing of the city of Hama in 1982. Tens of thousands of people were killed. Thousands more were deported to the Palmyra prison in the middle of the eastern desert, which effectively became an extermination camp. This massacre - which sparked little international protest - brought the régime three decades of relative internal peace, at a high price. The régime sent a number of Christian officers to the front line to crush the Hama insurgency. This was a Machiavellian way of sealing a blood pact with the Christian community. The message was clear: if one day the Sunni are in a position to take their revenge, they will avenge themselves on you as much as on us. Your fate now depends on our régime's survival.'
[Chapter 1, Marketing Secularism, pp 2-3]

 'In reality, the régime fed sectarian fears. It did, after all, claim that when the revolution began, that the demonstrators were chanting: "Christians to Beirut, Alawis to the grave!" ("Massihiyin bi-Beirut, Alawiyin bi-Tabut!").

 I have not found any confirmation of this claim. Yet many believed the threat was real, and from the start of the uprising, it contributed to inter-communal tension. Also early on, the régime distributed weapons, particularly in the Alawi coastal villages, and the Druze suburbs of Damascus, and these deliveries were accompanied by scaremongering about entirely invented threats, said to originate in neighbouring Sunni villages.

 Yassin al-Haj Saleh is an old communist militant from Raqqa, long opposed to the régime. These Machiavellian tactics do not surprise him in the least. In a chilling article, "The Murder Industry in Syria", he describes Assad's methods of creating two walls of fear: fear of oppression by the régime and the fear of potential informants: "Before the outbreak of the revolution, we knew the régime depended on two Orwellian strategic systems: the fear complex, whose aim is to prevent things being called by their proper names, and the lie complex, whose function is to call things by other names than their own. Both ensure that Syrians are cut off from the real conditions of their lives, and that they can neither describe nor control them." '
[pp 6-7]

 'The number of its victims give the lie to the régime's alleged "protection of minorities". Photographs secretly sent out by someone using the codename "Caesar", who was employed for years by the military police in Damascus, photographing people killed. More than two years after the revolution began, he managed to send 55,000 pictures out of the country, documenting the fate of nearly 11,000 victims. These pictures prove in disturbing detail that the régime has indeed attacked minorities. Many Christians could be identified by the fact that they were uncircumcised and by tattoos in the shape of the cross. Other victims bore religious markings indicating they were Shia, and others even had the name or face of Bashar al-Assad on their bodies.

 Alawi and Christian revolutionaries I met in Lattakia at the start of the uprising told me: "God help us if the Mukhabarat [the dreaded intelligence services] catch us because they take it out on people like us in particular, because they consider us traitors to our community." '
[pp 9-10]

 'Ayman Abdel-Nour: "The Syrian Christian clergy has literally been bought wholesale by the régime. In the photos of every official event, there is always a representative of each religious denomination around the government representative. The régime has turned it into a competition between the representatives of each Christian church, who fight each other for the privilege of being in the photo. And there is also direct corruption, with cash handouts." '
[pp 10-11]

                                            ********************************

 'From the summer of 2011, detainees held for their alleged jihadi activities began to be released. In January 2014, Nawaf al-Fares, a former chief in Military Intelligence (Amn al-Askari), revealed that, "the régime did not just open the door to the prisons and let these extremists out, it facilitated them in their work, by helping them set up armed units."

 This four-month release programme was supervised by the Directorate of General security and lasted until October 2011. The prisoners were carefully selected. Those with a known commitment to human rights and democracy remained in jail, while the radicals went free. One of the most famous was Zahran Alloush, who founded the most powerful anti-Assad group in the Damascus area as soon as he was freed and became well known for his violently anti-Shia rhetoric.'
[Chapter 2, Birth of the Jihadists, pp 16-17]

 'Wherever ISIS fighters advanced, they drove back moderate groups, forcing them from their hard-won territories. ISIS is like a cuckoo, plundering the nest the revolutionaries fought so hard for. Almost all of the territory  ruled by ISIS was previously occupied by other groups. ISIS has on the whole been content with seizing teritory only after others have taken it.

 As a result, ISIS has rarely launched frontal attacks on the régime, seizing the Menagh airbase, capturing Division 17 in Raqqa, and small-scale battles elsewhere being the complete list. Baghdadi's men have not tried to confront the régime. Quite the reverse: they have concentrated their offensives on revolutionaries and the Kurds, with whom ISIS competes for territory.'
[p19]

 'ISIS has an adversarial relationship with other jihadi movements such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar ash-Sham. The accusations of betrayal, even of collaboration with the régime, are some of the main charges made against ISIS, even more than its extremist stance and violent methods.'
[p20]

 'At the end of 2013, the moderate groups, lost patience when ISIS took the border town of Azaz in the country's north-west. In early January 2014, a coalition was formed (mainly between the Islamic Front and the Northern Storm Brigade), in order to dislodge ISIS from its north-western strongholds. The coalition also had the support of several countries, notably the United States, Turkey, and several powerful Gulf states.'
[p20]

 'Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda franchise, nevertheless enjoys real support in Sunni areas. This is the result of its genuine and effective fight against the régime. In the parts of Syria it controls, the population appreciates the fact that it plunders resources less than other armed groups, including the régime's militias. Sunnis also tend to consider Jabhat al-Nusra to be effective in protecting them against the régime's abuses.

 Abu Mohammad al-Joulani sought recognition in the summer of 2014, and asked the United Nations to remove his group from the list of terrorist organisations. The group offered to withdraw from al-Qaeda in exchange for this, but this did not seem to catch the attention of the great powers.'
[p22]

 'Thomas Pierret: "The military advantages of alliance with Assad are insignificant compared to the political drawbacks. Backing Assad and abandoning the rebels is equivalent to making ISIS the régime's sole credible opponent, and therefore means throwing a large proportion of Sunnis, even the moderate ones, into its arms." '
[p24]

                                           ***********************************

 'The "House of Assad" quickly became "Assad, Inc." it met in the winter of 2005, shortly after the Ba'ath party's tenth congress, amid the colonnades of a luxury hotel in the ancient Roman city of Palmyra in the eastern desert. In this luxurious setting, the régime's favoured businessmen agreed to divide up the country's entire wealth. The result of this "Yalta of privatisations was the creation of two holding companies, the Cham group, run by Rami Makhlouf, the president's cousin, and the Souria group. From then on, these groups split the country between them, tapping its wealth through participation in the government and taking public contracts.'
[Chapter 3, Money Talks, pp 27-28]

 'Ziad Majed: "There is a class dimension to the Syrian revolution. Apart from the students, intellectuals and activists, who played an important part in the early months, this revolution is mostly about the poor country folk, simple peasants for whom some of the new Syrian middle class have little sympathy. The new rich prefer to identify with the régime's "westernised" appearance, and the régime in addition protects its "deals", interests and businesses. There is also a strong element of social racism. People only want to see others who look "like us". People shut themselves off in a kind of bubble, and despise workers, vegetable sellers, cleaning ladies and all those who support them." '
[p30]

 'Syrian journalist Hala Kodmani describes how "a spontaneous but very well organised movement sprang up as soon as there were free zones: the city's prominent citizens came together and created local councils. The people organised food supplies, schooling, hospitals and courts. This experiment failed for two reasons: first of all the bombings by the régime, which particularly targeted civilians - especially schools and hospitals - and secondly because of the Islamic fundamentalists." '
[p31]

 'The state soon had difficulty paying for the various militias and informal militiamen called shabihha it used to carry out repression (often ex-criminals in charge of the intelligence services' dirty work). The régime's henchmen were therefore authorised to "live off the land". When subduing a neighbourhood or retaking a village from the revolutionaries, they would not only attack the locals, but also loot and plunder.'
[p31]

 'Hamit Bozarslan: "In Syria, we are witnessing an insane disintegration of the state, to the point where it is turning into a militia. We are watching a mafia state destroying its own society to live off its very destruction." '
[p32]

 'The régime does not have a monopoly on theft and looting. Yassin al-Haj Saleh describes how, "Armed groups have stripped the civilian population. You need them for everything - even just to eat. They want to control people. Among them are groups that are more open-minded, but their resources are more limited and they are weaker than the radical groups." '
[p32]

 'ISIS and the Syrian régime are happy to do business together when it suits them. In January 2014, Ruth Sherlock, the Daily Telegraph's Middle East correspondent, revealed the murky secrets of oil trafficking between these two "enemies". Crude oil extracted in government-controlled areas was being transported via pipelines to areas held by ISIS and vice versa.'
[p36]

 'The terrible irony pf these airstrikes is that people suffer more in the areas no longer under government control, whether they are held by the Free Syrian Army, ISIS or another rebel group. The régime is able to maintain the population's standard of living through substantial financial support from Iran and Russia. Quite the opposite occurs in areas freed from its yoke, with the partial exception of Kurdish regions.'
[pp 37-38]

                                          *******************************************

 'When it was founded in spring 2012, when the Homs neighbourhood of Baba Amr was under siege from the Syrian army, Jabhat al-Nusra initially enjoyed the esteem of its countrymen. Fairly well-organised, honest, effective in battle, with a limited use of "martyrdom operations", its members were, in the eyes of Syrians, an effective bulwark against the régime, even though most did not share their extremely conservative political, religious and social views. It did not baulk at taking on the army and intervening when the latter attacked. It was always careful to distinguish between civilian and military targets.

 The régime continued to push the radicalisation of the conflict, contributing both to Jabhat al-Nusra's increasing sectarianism, and the creation of ISIS. This is why Jabhat al-Nusra, which had previously been selective in its choice of targets, changed tack in summer 2013, after the chemical attack on the Ghouta. The movement decided to be more sectarian by attacking "Alawi targets".

 One of Jabat al-Nusra's priorities is to avoid fitna, an internecine struggle between Muslims.'
[Chapter 4, A Self-fulfilling Prophecy, pp 42-45]

 'It seems obvious to everyone I've met in Syria since the revolution began that the country needs international assistance to finish off Assad's dictatorship. But it has taken a long time for Syrians to realise that this assistance will never come, and that realisation has been painful.

 There have been innumerable calls for help from revolutionary groups. In October 2011, a request for a no-fly zone. In December 2011, a request for a humanitarian buffer zone, in which displaced people could seek protection. In January 2012, there was a request for clear support for the Free Syrian Army. In March 2012, a request for an international military intervention to put an end to massacres. In August 2012, a request for anti-aircraft weaponry, and so on.

 The most shameful inaction followed the chemical bombing of the Ghouta in August 2013, which resulted in 1400 deaths. Initially the régime panicked. Observers in Damascus thought the upper echelons of the régime were preparing to flee, convinced that Western intervention was imminent.

 But on the contrary, the absence of reaction was finally taken as giving the régime carte blanche; it realised the West would never do anything. Assad immediately intensified the brutality of his attacks, and insidiously reintroduced chlorine, his chemical weapon of choice.

 Historian and publisher Farouk Mardam Bey, agrees that "since the lack of ant Western reaction to the chemical bombing of the Ghouta, régime bombing has doubled in ferocity and now targets the civilian population much more viciously to cause the maximum number of civilian casualties. We have seen the advance of the Syrian army on the ground, with militia support, while watching a media offensive intent on conveying the message: 'it's either Daesh [ISIS]. or the régime.' " '
[pp 46-47]